The key role of government policies in the process of development has long been recognized. The recent availability of quality data has led to quantitative analyses of the effect such policies have on development. Most of the renewed research effort on this front, both theoretical and empirical, has emphasized the relationship between fiscal policy and the paths of development of countries. Although there have been several empirical studies on the relationship between monetary policy and growth, there has been very little theoretical work in this area. We have two goals in this article. One is to summarize the recent empirical work on the growth effects of monetary policy instruments. The other is to compare the empirical findings with the implications of quantitative models in which monetary policy can affect growth rates. We ask, in particular, what is the relationship in the data between monetary policy instruments and the rate of growth of output? Are the predicted quantitative relationships from theoretical models consistent with the data?

Monetary policy plays a key role in determining inflation rates. In the next section, we summarize the empirical evidence on the relationship between inflation and growth in a cross-section of countries. This evidence suggests a systematic, quantitatively significant negative association between inflation and growth. Although the precise estimates vary from one study to another, evidence suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the average inflation rate is associated with a decrease in the average growth rate of somewhere between 0.2 percentage points and 0.7 percentage points.

Some researchers are tempted to view this link as implying that if a country conducts monetary policy so as to lower its inflation rate by 10 percentage points, its growth rate will rise by anywhere from 0.2 percentage points to 0.7 percentage points. Obviously, the data alone cannot give us an answer to the policy question we care about. Therefore we explore the ability of various models with transactions demand for money to account for this association. We use the growth rate of the money supply as our measure of the differences in monetary policies across countries. Although many models predict qualitatively that an increase in the long-run growth rate of the money supply decreases the long-run growth rate of output in the economy, we find that in these models, a change in the growth rate of the money supply has a quantitatively trivial effect on the growth rate of output. The reason is that in endogenous growth models, changes in output growth rates require changes in real rates of return to savings, and it turns out that changes in inflation rates have trivial effects on real rates of return and thus on output growth rates.

We go on, then, to broaden our notion of monetary policy to include financial regulations. We study environments in which a banking sector holds money to meet reserve requirements. We model banks as providing intermediated capital, which is an imperfect substitute for other forms of capital, and we consider three kinds of experiments.

In the first we hold reserve requirements fixed and examine the effects of changes in inflation rates on output growth rates. Even though higher inflation rates distort...
the composition of capital between bank-intermediated capital and other forms of capital and thus reduce growth rates, the quantitative effects turn out to be small.

In the second kind of experiment, we simultaneously change money growth rates and reserve requirements in a way that is consistent with the association between these variables in the data. This avenue is promising because these variables are positively correlated, and changes in each of them have the desired effect on output growth rates. We find that monetary policy changes of this kind have a quantitative effect on growth rates that is consistent with the lower end of the estimates of the relationship between inflation rates and growth rates.

Our third experiment uses data on inflation rates and cash held by banks in each country to compute our model's implications for growth in that country. We regress growth on inflation using the data generated by our model and find that a reduction in inflation rates of 10 percentage points is associated with an increase in growth rates of as much as 0.08 percent.

Thus, although our models cannot reproduce the large association between inflation rates and growth rates found in the data, the policy implication is that reductions in inflation rates can indeed generate substantial increases in growth rates. We conclude by arguing that models which focus on the transactions demand for money alone cannot account for the sizable negative association between inflation and growth, while models that focus on the distortions caused by financial regulations can.

THE EVIDENCE ON INFLATION AND GROWTH

Numerous empirical studies analyze the relationship between the behavior of inflation and the rate of growth of economies around the world. Most of these studies are based on (some subset of) the Summers and Heston (1991) data sets and concentrate on the cross-sectional aspects of the data that look at the relationship between the average rate of growth of an economy over a long horizon (typically from 1960 to the date of the study) to the corresponding average rate of inflation over the same period and other variables. Some of the more recent empirical studies undertake similar investigations using the panel aspects of the data more fully.4

To summarize this literature, we begin with some simple facts about the data. According to Levine and Renelt (1992), those countries that grew faster than average had an average inflation rate of 12.34 percent per year over the period, while those countries that grew more slowly than average had an average inflation rate of 31.13 percent per year.5 Similar results are reported in Easterly et al. (1994). Here fast growers are defined as those countries having a growth rate more than one standard deviation above the average (and averaging about 4 percent per year) and are found to have had an average inflation rate of 8.42 percent per year. In contrast, slow growers, defined as those countries having a growth rate more than one standard deviation below the average (and averaging about 0.2 percent per year), had an average inflation rate of 16.51 percent per year. Using the numbers from either Levine and Renelt (1992) or Easterly et al. (1994) to estimate an unconditional slope (which those studies do not do), we see that a 10 percentage point rise in the inflation rate is associated with a 5.2 percentage point fall in the growth rate. These groups of countries also differ in other systematic ways. For example, fast growers spent less on government consumption, had higher investment shares in gross domestic product (GDP), and had lower black-market premiums. However, this association between inflation and growth suggests that monetary policy differences are important determinants in the differential growth performances present in the data.6

In two recent studies, Fischer (1991 and 1993) analyzes the Summers and Heston (1991) data, using both cross-sectional and panel-regression approaches to control for the other systematic ways in which countries differ from one another. Fischer (1991) controls for the effects of

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4 See, for example, Fischer (1993).

5 The cross-sectional average of the time-series average rates of per capita income growth in the Summers and Heston (1991) data is around 1.92 percent per year.

variables such as initial income level, secondary school enrollment rate, and budget deficit size and finds that on average, an increase in a country's inflation rate of 10 percentage points is associated with a decrease in its growth rate of between 0.3 percentage points and 0.4 percentage points per year. Similar results are reported by Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), who find that a 10 percentage point increase in the inflation rate is associated with a decrease in the growth rate of between 0.5 percentage points and 0.7 percentage points. In his article in this issue of the Review, Barro, using a slightly different framework to control for the effect of initial conditions and other institutional factors, also finds a negative effect of inflation on growth that he estimates to be between 0.2 percentage points and 0.3 percentage points per 10 percentage point increase in inflation. He also finds the relationship to be nonlinear, although—contrary to the other studies—he estimates that the greater effect of inflation on growth comes from the experiences of countries in which inflation exceeds a rate of between 10 percent and 20 percent per year.

In summary, the standard regression model seems to suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the inflation rate is associated with a decrease in the growth rate of between 0.3 percentage points and 0.7 percentage points. Are these growth effects of higher inflation significant? As an illustration of the importance of these effects, note the difference in income levels between two countries that are otherwise similar but which have a 10 percentage point difference in annual inflation rates. Although these countries start in 1950 with the same levels of income, their income levels would differ by a factor of between 16 percentage points and 41 percentage points by the year 2000 (starting with the average growth rate of 1.92 percent per year as the base). One argument is based on what has become known as the Mundell-Tobin effect, in which more inflationary monetary policy enhances growth as investors move out of money and into growth-improving capital investment. The evidence we have summarized seems to contrast this argument sharply, at least as a quantitatively important alternative. The other argument is based on the study of exogenous growth models. In an early paper in this area, Sidrauski (1967) constructs a model in which a higher inflation rate has no effect on either the growth rate or the steady-state rate of output. Other authors construct variants in which higher inflation rates affect steady-state capital output ratios but not growth rates.10

In this section we analyze a class of endogenous growth models in an attempt to better understand the empirical results presented in the previous section. The regression results presented there implicitly ask what the growth response will be to a change in long-run monetary policy that results in a given percentage point change in the long-run rate of inflation. Thus our goal here is to describe models in which monetary policy has the potential for affecting long-run growth. Three elements are obviously necessary in a candidate model: It must generate long-run growth endogenously, it must have a well-defined role for money, and it must be explicit about the fiscal consequences of different monetary policies.

In contrast to the neoclassical family of exogenous growth models, the feature necessary for a model to generate long-run growth endogenously is that the rate of return on capital inputs does not go to zero as the level of inputs is increased, when the quantities of any factors that are necessarily bounded are held fixed. Stated another way, the marginal product of the reproducible factors in the model must be bounded away from zero.11 We report results for four types of endogenous growth models12:

- A simple, one-sector model with a linear production function (Ak)
• A generalization of the linear model that endogenizes the relative price of capital (two-sector)

• A model that emphasizes human capital accumulation (Lucas)

• A model with spillover effects in the accumulation of physical capital (Romer)

To generate a role for money in these models, a variety of alternatives is available. We report results for three models of money demand:

• A cash/credit goods model in which a subset of goods must be purchased with currency [cash in advance (CIA) in consumption]

• A shopping time model in which time and cash are substitute inputs for generating transactions (shopping time)

• A CIA model in which all purchases must be made with currency, but in which cash has a differential productivity between consumption and investment purchases (CIA in everything)

Although these models are only a subset of the available models, we think that the combinations of the various growth and money demand models represent a reasonable cross-section.

Finally, we must specify how the government expands the money supply. We restrict attention to policy regimes in which households are given lump-sum transfers of money. In all the models we examine, the growth effects of inflation that occur when money is distributed lump sum are identical to those which occur when the growth of the money supply is used to finance government consumption, as long as the increased money supply is not used to fund directly growth-enhancing policies. Alternative assumptions about the uses of growth of the money supply may lead to different conclusions about the relationship between inflation and growth. For example, using the growth of the money supply to subsidize the rate of capital formation or to reduce other taxes may stimulate growth. Since the evidence suggests that inflation reduces growth, we restrict attention to lump-sum transfers.

The growth and money demand models just listed give us 12 possible models. Rather than give detailed expositions of each of the 12 models, we will discuss the Lucas model with CIA in consumption. Full details of the balanced growth equations for each of the 12 models are presented in Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (forthcoming).

A REPRESENTATIVE MODEL OF GROWTH AND MONEY DEMAND

We consider a representative agent model with no uncertainty and complete markets. In this model, there are two types of consumption goods, called cash goods and credit goods, in each period. Cash goods must be paid for with currency. Both of these consumption goods, as well as the investment good, are produced using the same technology. The resource constraint in this economy is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
&c_1 + c_2 + x_{kt} + x_{ht} + g \leq F(k_t, n_t, h_t),
\end{align*}
\]

where \(c_1\) is the consumption of cash goods; \(c_2\) is the consumption of credit goods; \(x_{kt}\) and \(x_{ht}\) are investment purchases in physical capital and human capital, respectively; \(k_t\) is the stock of physical capital; \(n_t\) is the number of hours worked; \(h_t\) is the stock of human capital; \(g\) is government consumption; and \(F\) is the production function. Physical capital follows \(k_{t+1} \leq (1 - \delta_k) k_t + x_{kt}\), where \(\delta_k\) is the depreciation rate, while human capital follows \(h_{t+1} \leq (1 - \delta_h) h_t + x_{ht}\), where \(\delta_h\) is the depreciation rate on human capital.

Trading in this economy occurs as follows: At the beginning of each period, a securities market opens. In this market, households receive capital and labor income from the previous period, the pro-
ceeds from government bonds, and any lump-sum transfers from the government. At this time, households pay for credit goods purchased in the previous period. Finally, households must choose how much cash they will hold for the purchase of cash goods in the next period.

The consumer’s problem is to

\[
\max_{c_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, c_{t+1}, 1-n_t),
\]

subject to

\[
\begin{align*}
  m_{t-1} + b_{t-1} & \leq v_t, \\
  p_t c_{t} & \leq m_{t-1} \\
  v_{t+1} & \leq (v_t - b_{t-1} - m_{t-1}) + (m_{t-1} - p_t c_t) \\
  -p_t c_{t+1} - p_t x_{t+1} - p_t x_{t+1} + p_t r_t (1 - \tau) + p_t w_t n_t h_t (1 - \tau) \\
  & + [1 + (1 - \tau)R_t] b_{t-1} + T_t \\
  k_{t+1} & \leq (1 - \delta_t) k_t + x_{t+1} \\
  h_{t+1} & \leq (1 - \delta_t) h_t + x_{t+1},
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \beta \) is the discount factor; \( u \) is the consumer’s utility; \( v_t \) is wealth at the beginning of period \( t \); \( m_{t-1} \) is money holdings at the beginning of period \( t \); \( b_{t-1} \) is bond holdings at the beginning of period \( t \); \( R_t \) is the nominal interest rate paid on bonds during period \( t \); \( r_t \) is the rental price of capital during the period; \( \tau \) is the tax rate on income (assumed constant); \( T_t \) is the size of the transfer to the household delivered at the end of period \( t \); and \( w_t \) is the real wage rate. Note that we have adopted the standard assumption from the human capital literature that firms hire effective labor \( n_t h_t \) from workers and pay a wage of \( w_t \) per unit of time. Since all four goods available in a period \( (c_t, c_{t+1}, x_t, x_{t+1}) \) are perfect substitutes on the production side, they all sell for the same nominal price \( p_t \).

On the production side, we assume that there is a representative firm solving the static maximization problem

\[
\max_{k_t} [F(k_t, n_t, h_t) - r_t k_t - w_t n_t h_t],
\]

Let \( M_t \) be the aggregate stock of money and \( \mu \) be the (assumed constant) rate of growth of the money supply.

Equilibrium for the model requires maximization by both the household and the firms, along with the following conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
  c_t + c_{t+1} + x_{t+1} + x_{t+1} + g_t & \leq F(k_t, n_t, h_t) \\
  m_t & = M_t \\
  T_{t+1} & = M_{t+1} - M_t = (\mu - 1)M_t \\
  g_t & = \tau F(k_t, n_t, h_t).
\end{align*}
\]

The first two of these conditions are market-clearing in the goods market and the money market, respectively. Conditions 11 and 12 describe the characteristics of policy in the model. Condition 11 says that the increase in the money supply enters the system through a direct lump-sum transfer to the household. Finally, condition 12 says that government purchases are financed by a flat-rate tax on income. An implication of conditions 11 and 12 is that the government’s budget is balanced on a period-by-period basis.

To study the long-run behavior of the model, we use the solutions to the maximization problems of the household and the firm together with equilibrium conditions 9 through 12 to calculate what are known as the balanced growth equations. Along a balanced growth path, output grows at a constant rate. In general, for the economy to follow such a path, both the production function and the preferences must take on special forms. On the production side, a sufficient condition is that \( F(k, nh) \) is a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form \( Ak^{\alpha}(n h)^{1-\alpha} \), where \( A \) and \( \alpha \) are parameters. On the preference side, the consumer, when faced with a stationary path of interest rates, must generate a demand for constant growth in consumption. This requirement is

\[
U(c_{t}, c_{t+1}) = \left[ \frac{c_t^{1-\lambda} + \eta c_{t+1}^{1-\lambda}}{1-\lambda} \right]^{1-\alpha} (1-n_t)^{\alpha}\left(1-\frac{\lambda}{1-\alpha}\right),
\]

13 See Rosen (1976).
where $\eta, \lambda, \sigma$, and $\Psi$ are preference parameters. With these assumptions, we can show that the dynamics of the system converge to a balanced growth path.\(^{14}\)

For this model, the balanced growth equations of the system are

\[
\begin{align*}
(14) & \quad c_2/c_1 = \frac{\eta}{1 + \alpha} R \\
(15) & \quad \gamma = \beta [1 - \delta + \alpha \Lambda (h/k)^{-\alpha}] \\
(16) & \quad \gamma = \beta [1 - \delta + (1 - \alpha) \Lambda (h/k)^{-\alpha}] \\
(17) & \quad \gamma = [1 + \eta (c_2/c_1)^{-\lambda} (1 - \gamma)] \\
(18) & \quad [(1 - \eta)/(1 - \gamma)] (h/k)^{-\alpha} (1 - \alpha) A = (c_1/k)^\pi [1 + \eta (c_2/c_1)^{-\lambda} (1 + (1 - \gamma)) R] \\
(19) & \quad \pi = \mu^{(1 - \gamma)} \\
(20) & \quad \lambda = 1 - \delta + (x_e/k) \\
(21) & \quad \lambda = 1 - \delta + (x_e/k)(k/h) \\
(22) & \quad (c_1/k) + (c_2/k) + (x_e/k) + (x_o/k) + (g/k) = A (h/k)^{-\alpha},
\end{align*}
\]

where $\pi = \rho_{21}/\rho_1$ is the steady-state level of inflation; $\gamma = \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_{t+1}} = \frac{x_{t+1}}{x_t} = \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t}$ is the growth rate of output; $c_2/c_1 = \frac{c_2}{c_1}$ is the steady-state ratio of credit consumption to cash consumption; $c_1/k, c_2/k, x_e/k, x_o/k, h/k$ and $n$ are the long-run ratios of the respective parts of output relative to the size of the capital stock; and $\pi$ is the balanced growth level of the labor supply. This system of nine equations in nine variables $\pi, \gamma, R, c_1/k, c_2/k, x_e/k, x_o/k, h/k$ and $n$ can be solved given values of the parameters and the policy variables $\mu$ and $\tau$ to trace the long-run reaction of the system to a change in policy.

Consider the effect of an increase in the growth rate of money $\mu$. Note that the right side of equation 15 (or equation 16) can be interpreted as the after-tax rate of return on savings. Thus equation 15 relates the long-run rate of growth to the equilibrium after-tax rate of return $\eta$ on capital. If either time spent working $n$ or the human capital-to-

\[\text{physical capital ratio } h/k \text{ is affected by changes in } \mu, \text{ then the growth rate of the economy depends on } \mu. \text{ As a special case, consider what happens when } \delta = \delta_0. \text{ Here, equations 15 and 16 can be used to solve for } h/k \text{ and to show that it is given by } (1 - \delta)/\alpha, \text{ which is independent of the rate of inflation. In this case, it follows that the growth rate } \gamma \text{ is affected by changes in } \mu \text{ only if } n \text{ is affected. In this model, inflation acts as a tax that distorts the consumption of cash goods relative to credit goods. This distortion can in turn distort the labor/leisure choice and thus affect time allocated to work. (See equation 18.)}

Given that $h/k$ is constant (since we have assumed that $\delta = \delta_0$), the steady-state, after-tax real rate of return on capital is affected by changes in the steady-state value of $n$. This is true here because $n$ represents the rate of usage of the productive capital good $h$. A higher $n$ corresponds to a more intensive use of the stock and hence a higher marginal product of capital (when $h/k$ is held fixed). In this case, if $n$ decreases in response to an increase in $\mu$, then the equilibrium long-run rate of growth in the economy will decrease as $\mu$ is increased.

Although one would expect an increase in $\mu$ to decrease $n$ and hence decrease $\gamma$, this is not always true. In fact, the exact behavior of this system of equations depends critically on the substitutability between cash goods and credit goods. For example, still assuming $\delta = \delta_0$, we can show that if the two types of consumption goods are complements (that is, $\lambda > 0$), then the growth rate falls monotonically in $\mu$ and approaches the lowest feasible rate in this economy: $1 - \delta$. However, if the two goods are substitutes (that is, $\lambda < 0$), then we can show that the relationship between the steady-state values of $\gamma$ and $\mu$ is not monotone. At low levels of $\mu, \gamma$ is a decreasing function of $\mu$, but eventually $\gamma$ becomes an increasing function of $\mu$ as the system is demonetized. That is, if $\mu$ is high enough, $c_1/c_2$ goes to zero, and the growth rate converges to that of the system when monetary expansion is at its optimal rate.\(^{15}\)

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\[^{14}\text{See Benhabib and Perli (1994) and Ladron-de-Guevara, Ortigueira, and Santos (1994).}\]

\[^{15}\text{See Jones and Manuelli (1990) for details.}\]
Computations

Next, we provide estimates of the quantitative magnitudes of the growth effects of inflation for our 12 models.

To provide these estimates, we must have parameter values for each of these 12 models. We select parameter values for each of the models using a combination of figures from previous studies and facts about the growth experience of the U.S. economy between 1960 and 1987. Throughout the calibrations, we assume that a period is 1.5 months, that is, the length of time it takes one dollar to produce one transaction for the cash good. We assume that the discount factor \( \beta = 0.98 \) at an annual rate. We also assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution \( \sigma = 2.0 \), that the preference parameter \( \lambda = -0.83 \), that the fraction of time spent working \( n = 0.17 \), that the capital share parameter \( \alpha = 0.36 \), that the depreciation rate on human capital \( \delta_h = 0.008 \) at an annual rate, and that the tax rate on income \( \tau = 0.22 \). The rest of the parameters are estimated using the steady-state equations of the models so as to make them hold exactly. We use the following auxiliary relationships based on the U.S. economy’s experience during 1960–87:

- The average annual growth rate in per capita gross national product (GNP) is 2.06 percent.
- The average annual rate of inflation is 5.08 percent.
- If we ignore the fraction of cash held in banks and outside the country, cash in the hands of the public averages 2.04 percent of annual GNP.
- Investment in physical capital as a fraction of GNP averages 16.69 percent.

These facts, along with the parameter values given, are used in conjunction with the balanced growth equations to obtain values for the other (nonspecified) parameters of the models and for the balanced growth endogenous variables of the system.

For example, in the Lucas model with CIA in consumption, the parameter values obtained are \( A = 0.08 \), \( \delta_h = 0.04 \), \( \eta = 1.03 \), and \( \Psi = 8.22 \). The values for the endogenous variables are \( \mu = 1.07 \), \( R = 15 \) percent, \( c_2/k = 0.007 \), \( c_1/k = 0.01 \), \( x_1/k = 0.007 \), \( x_4/k = 0.01 \), and \( h/k = 2.31 \). All variables are in annualized terms. To get some feel for these numbers, note that the fitted growth rate of money \( \mu (1.07) \) is higher than the observed value of the growth rate of the monetary base in the period (1.0684), but only slightly. (That is, equation 19 does not hold exactly at the true \( \mu \), \( \pi \), and \( \gamma \) combination because velocity is not constant in the data.) These numbers also imply a capital/output ratio in this model of 2.8, which is close to that used by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994). The implied value of 0.43 for \( c_1/(c_1 + c_2) \) is roughly the same as the Nilson Report’s (1992) estimate of 0.41 for the ratio of cash purchases to other purchases in the U.S. economy. Finally, the value of 23.54 percent for \( x_4 \) as a fraction of GNP is close to the sum of the values of health care expenditures and education expenditures in the United States.

Thus the model does well mimicking the U.S. economy along some dimensions. Note that the implied pretax nominal rate of return is 15 percent, probably high by most standards. This is a common feature of the endogenous growth models without uncertainty (given our assumptions that \( \sigma = 2.0 \) and \( \beta = 0.98 \)). A detailed description of the calibration method for each model is contained in Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (forthcoming).

We compute solutions to the balanced growth equations assuming that \( \pi = 1.1 \) and \( \pi = 1.2 \). This increase of 10 percentage points in the inflation rate allows us to easily compare the changes in the growth rates predicted by the models with those found in the data, as discussed. We choose a baseline of \( \pi = 1.1 \) because this is close to the average rate of inflation in the samples from across countries analyzed by empirical researchers. Note that from a purely formal point of view, the balanced growth equations describe the relationship be-
28 For the purposes of calibration, our Ak model is a version of the Lucas model in which the labor supply is inelastic. This model has all the important qualitative features of the Ak model, but it allows labor share and investment ratios to be chosen so as to be close to those seen in the U.S. time series. Chari, Jones, and Manuelli (forthcoming) has details.
29 For the CIA in everything versions of the models, we assume that all of $c_1$ and a fraction $c_2$ of the $c_3$ and $x_3$ expenditures used are subject to the CIA constraint. For the results presented in Table 1, we use $c_3 = 0.2$, since most investment transactions do not use cash directly. We experiment with increasing $c_3$ over an appreciable range and, although the growth effects are larger with larger $c_3$, they still (continued on following page) between the growth rate and the rate of monetary expansion, $\mu$. However, since this is not the regression that empirical researchers have run, we did the experiment by changing $\mu$ by however much is necessary to guarantee that the inflation rate is increased by 10 percentage points per year. The findings of this experiment are displayed in Table 1.\textsuperscript{28}

Table 1 gives the percentage change in the growth rates when the inflation rate is increased 10 percentage points.\textsuperscript{29} The results of this experiment produce several notable features. The most important is that the predicted change in the growth rate across all of the models is an order of magnitude smaller than that of around 0.5 found in the empirical literature. Another notable feature is that there is no guarantee, in general, that an increase in the inflation rate will necessarily decrease the growth rate, although this is generally true. [Jones and Manuelli (1990) show that in the Lucas model with CIA in consumption, the relationship between inflation and growth is not monotone.] Note, however, that just because the growth rate increases as $\mu$ increases (in some regions of the parameter space), this increase does not mean that welfare increases. On the contrary, this is not true in general: Increasing levels of inflation induce welfare-decreasing substitutions from $c_1$ to $c_2$. A third notable feature is that in the Ak and two-sector models of growth in combination with the CIA in consumption and shopping time models of money demand, one can show theoretically that the growth effect of inflation is exactly zero. In these models, inflation has no effect on the after-tax real return to savings. (In this sense, these models are Fisherian.) It follows, therefore, from the analogue of equations 15 and 16, that $\gamma$ is unaffected by $\mu$.

In summary, the results of this section show that constructing models in which inflation affects growth is fairly straightforward. However, in general, these models predict a very small effect of inflation on growth.

### MODELS WITH BANKS, GROWTH, AND INFLATION

In this section we study an alternative way of introducing money into the model. The 12 models already analyzed have the feature that all money is held in the hands of the public for carrying out transactions in consumption of one form or another. In fact, banks hold a significant fraction of the monetary base in the United States and other countries. Here we construct a simple model of financial intermediation in which banks are subject to reserve requirements. The equilibrium portfolio of a typical depositor is thus necessarily part capital and part money. Therefore, changes in the real rate of return on money (through inflation) reduce the real after-tax return on savings and thus affect growth. In this model, we repeat the previous computations and again find that the quantitative effect of changes in $\mu$ is much smaller than that seen in the data.

Given these conclusions, we turn to the possibility that our notion of monetary policy is too narrow. A broader and more realistic description of monetary policy allows for changes both in the growth rate of the money supply and in banking regulations. To the extent that increases in inflation rates are driven by needs for seigniorage, one would expect these increases to be accompanied by measures designed to increase the demand for the monetary base. In our model of financial intermediation, these measures are increases in reserve requirements.
We find in the data that inflation and the fraction of the monetary base held by banks are positively correlated. This correlation opens the possibility that a measure of monetary policy such as reserve requirements could be an important variable missing in the existing empirical work. To explore this possibility, we consider monetary policy experiments that consist of simultaneously changing the reserve requirements and the growth rate of the money supply in a way consistent with the empirical evidence. We find that when this change is made, existing models of growth and money demand can approximately reproduce the quantitative effects of inflation on growth found by empirical researchers.

**A Simple Model With Banks**

We study a model in which the banking system plays an essential role in facilitating production and capital accumulation. In our model, two types of capital are used in the production of final output, both of which are essential. One of these two types of capital must be intermediated as loans through the banking system, while the other is financed through conventional equity and debt markets. Finally, we assume that smooth substitution takes place between the two so that the amount of this banking type of capital can be altered across different policy regimes. To make loans, banks are required to hold reserves.

We denote the two types of physical capital by \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \). The first type, \( k_1 \), is intermediated through capital markets. The second type, \( k_2 \), must be intermediated through banks. That is, for \( k_2 \) to be used in production, consumers must place deposits in the banking system and firms must borrow these deposits in the form of bank loans to finance purchases of \( k_2 \). Banks are required to hold reserves against their deposits. We assume that no resources are used to operate the banking system. Here then an intermediary is simply a constraint (the reserve requirement relating the amount of base money that must be held in the banking system to the amount of capital of type 2 that is to be financed). We consider only two kinds of growth models here, the Ak and the Lucas versions. For the Lucas model, the production function is

\[
Y_t = K_{t1}^\alpha k_{t2}^\beta (n_t h_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta}
\]

### Reserve Requirements

For this version of the model, the consumer's problem is to

\[
\max_{\mathbf{c}_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_{t1}, c_{t2}, 1 - n_t),
\]

subject to

\[
p_t c_{t1} \leq m_{t1-1}
\]

\[
d_t + m_{t1} + h_{t1} \leq (m_{t1-1} - p_t c_{t1}) - p_t c_{t2} - p_t x_{t1} - p_t x_{t2} + \rho t + \log (1 - \tau) + \rho w_t n_t h_t \times (1 - \tau) + [1 + (1 - \tau) R_{t1}] d_{t1} + [1 + (1 - \tau) R_{t1}] b_{t1-1} + T_t + 1
\]

\[
k_{t1} \leq (1 - \delta_t) k_{t1} + x_{t1}
\]

\[
h_{t1} \leq (1 - \delta_t) h_{t1} + x_{t1}
\]

where \( m_{t1-1} \) reflects the consumption transactions demand for money (that is, CIA for \( c_{t1} \)) and \( d_t \) is deposits in the banking system. Arbitrage implies that \( R_{t1} = R_t \).

The financial intermediary accepts deposits and chooses its portfolio (that is, loans and cash reserves) with the goal of maximizing profits. The intermediary is constrained by legal requirements on the makeup of this portfolio (that is, the reserve requirements), as well as by feasibility. Then the intermediary solves the problem

\[
\max_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{m}} (1 + R_{t1}) L_t + m_{t1} - (1 - R_{t1}) d_t,
\]

subject to

\[
m_{t1} + L_t \leq d_t
\]

\[
m_{t1} \geq \varepsilon d_t
\]

(footnote 29 continued) fail short of the effect seen in the data. In the next section, we discuss a model in which cash is used indirectly for these transactions through the banking system.

31 See Greenwood and Smith (forthcoming) for a survey of the theoretical work in this area. For recent empirical work, see Roubini and Sal-i-Martin (1992), King and Levine (1993), and Ireland (1994).

32 Our model is similar to the one analyzed by Haslag (1994), but ours is more realistic along two dimensions. First, Haslag assumes that all capital must be intermediated through banks, while we allow the share of bank assets to be endogenous. Second, Haslag uses money only to meet reserve requirements, while we use money to facilitate consumption transactions as well. See also Valenti (1994).
where \( m_2 \) is cash reserves held by the bank, \( d_t \) is deposits at the bank, \( L_t \) is loans, and \( \epsilon \) is the reserve requirement ratio. The reserve requirement ratio is the ratio of required reserves (which must be held in the form of currency) to deposits.

The firm rents capital of type 1 directly from the stock market (that is, the consumer) and purchases capital of type 2 using financing from the bank. Thus the firm faces a dynamic problem:

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\{t \geq 0\}} & \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \rho_t \left( (1-\tau) [p_F(k_{1t}, k_{2t}, n_h) \right. \\
& \quad \left. + p_w n_h - p_k k_{2t} - R_{L_{t-1}} L_{t-1} + L_t - \rho_t x_{2t} - (1+R_{L_{t-1}}) L_{t-1} \right),
\end{align*}
\]

subject to

\[
\begin{align*}
(33) & \quad p_{t+1} k_{2t+1} \leq L_{t+1} \\
(34) & \quad k_{2t+1} \leq (1-\delta) k_{2t} + x_{2t},
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \rho_t \) is the subjective discount factor used by firms. Note that constraint (33) implies that from the firm’s point of view, it may as well be renting \( k_0 \) from the bank itself. Because of this situation, the firm can be seen as facing a static problem; hence, one of the implications of the equilibrium conditions for this version of the model is that the choice of \( \rho_t \) is irrelevant.

To gain some intuition for the role of reserve requirements in this model, consider the intermediary’s problem. The solution to its problem is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
(35) & \quad (1+R_{L_{t-1}}) (1-\epsilon) d_t + \epsilon d_t - (1+R_{a}) d_t = 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Simplifying this, we obtain that in equilibrium

\[
(36) \quad R_{ct} = R_{ct} / (1-\epsilon).
\]

Reserve requirements thus induce a wedge between borrowing rates and lending rates for the intermediary.

Next, from consumer optimization, we have that the consumer must be indifferent between holding a unit of deposits and holding a unit of capital. This indifference implies that the after-tax real returns on the two ways of saving must be equal. That is,

\[
(37) \quad 1 + (1-\tau) R_{ct} = (p_t / p_{t-1}) [1-\delta_t + (1-\tau) r].
\]

Production firms set their after-tax marginal products of the two types of capital equal to their after-tax real rental rates. Therefore,

\[
(38) \quad F_1(t) = r_t,
\]

and

\[
(39) \quad (p_t / p_{t-1}) [(1-\tau) F_2(t) + (1-\delta_t)] = 1 + (1-\tau) R_{ct},
\]

where \( F_1(t) \) and \( F_2(t) \) denote the marginal products of the two types of capital. Substituting, we obtain

\[
(40) \quad 1 + (1-\tau) R_{ct} = (p_t / p_{t-1}) [(1-\tau) F_2(t) + (1-\delta_t) - 1] / (1-\epsilon).
\]

Inspection of this equation reveals that increases in the reserve requirements (higher \( \epsilon \)) or increases in the inflation rate have the effect of raising \( F_2 \) relative to \( F_1 \). That is, higher reserve requirements or higher inflation rates distort the mix of the two types of capital. The reason for this distortion is that financial intermediaries are required to hold non-interest-bearing assets in their portfolios. This requirement introduces a wedge between the rental rates on the two types of assets, and this wedge distorts the capital mix. It can also be seen that the increased distortion in the capital mix induced by a change in the inflation rate is greater with higher reserve requirements. Thus in this model, inflation acts as a tax on capital, the effect of which is magnified by higher reserve requirements.

### Distortions and Financial Intermediation

Many countries impose a variety of impediments to the smooth functioning of
the financial intermediation system. Examples of these impediments include portfolio restrictions, taxes, and requirements that loans to favored industries and individuals be made at below-market interest rates. To some extent these impediments can be thought of as introducing a wedge between the interest rate goods-producing firms pay banks and the rate banks receive on their loans. We can incorporate this wedge into our model as follows. Let $\theta$ denote the wedge. Let $R_{it}$ denote the interest rate paid by goods-producing firms so that $R_{it}(1 - \theta)$ is the interest rate received by banks. Note that the wedge acts as a tax on the interest receipts of banks. The financial intermediary’s problem is now

$$\max_{L_t, d_t, m_t} \left(1 + R_{it}(1 - \theta)\right) L_t + m_t(1 - R_{it}) d_t$$

subject to constraints 30 and 31. The solution to this problem implies that in equilibrium we have

$$R_{it} = R_{it}/\left((1 - \epsilon)(1 - \theta)\right).$$

Thus, not surprisingly, a tax on the receipts of financial intermediaries introduces the same kind of wedge between lending and borrowing rates as does the imposition of reserve requirements. In this sense a wide variety of government interventions reduce growth rates in exactly the same way as do reserve requirements. In particular, these interventions reduce both growth rates, as well as the size of the financial intermediation sector. We can use this observation as a test of the plausibility of our model. Suppose the only difference between countries is in these policy wedges and suppose, as seems reasonable, that direct measures of the policies inducing distortions are not available. Our models imply a positive association between growth rates and the size of the financial intermediary sector. The quantitative magnitude of this association can be compared with the relevant association in the data as a test of our model. We perform such an exercise below.

**Computations**

We begin by computing the effect of changing the growth rate of the money supply so that the annual inflation rate increases 10 percentage points. This computation is done for two calibrated models: the Lucas model and an Ak version of the model.

To do the calibration, we use data on the actual holdings of money in both the banking and non-banking sectors, along with measures of assets intermediated by banks. After taking account of money held outside the United States, we find that the fraction of money held as reserves by banks (denoted by $m_b$) is 0.46. We use assets of commercial banks minus their holdings of U.S. government securities, consumer credit, vault cash, reserves at Federal Reserve Banks, and deposits of nonfinancial businesses to obtain a measure of the capital stock intermediated through banks. We obtain these data from the flow of funds accounts published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The average of the ratio of this measure to GDP from 1986 to 1991 is 0.39. We use these facts (along with the assumption that $k_1 = k_2$) to calibrate the models and obtain estimates of the parameter $\epsilon$ and $k_1$’s share of output (relative to $k_1$).

The parameters from this calibration for the Lucas version of the model are

$$A = 0.095, \delta_1 = \delta_2 = 0.02, \delta_h = 0.016, \alpha_1 = 0.306, \alpha_2 = 0.054, \beta = 0.98, \eta = 1.03, \lambda = -0.83, \sigma = 2.0, \Psi = 6.412, \text{and} \epsilon = 0.042.$$  

Again, all parameters are expressed in annualized terms.

Of course, alternative measures of $\epsilon$ could be taken directly from banking regulations. The difficulty with that approach is that reserve requirements differ greatly among the different types of accounts held in banks. Depending on which types of accounts, average reserve requirements on banks could be anywhere from 2.5 percent to 12 percent.

Findings

Given this calibration, we find that increasing μ in order to increase π from 1.1 to 1.2 on an annual basis decreases the annual growth rate of output by 0.009 percentage points for the Ak model and by 0.021 percentage points for the Lucas model. Thus, although these effects are quantitatively larger (for the Lucas model) than those we have seen in the models with transactions demand for money, they are still too small by a factor of roughly 20 than the regression results reported in the literature. [Haslag (1994) finds growth effects of up to 0.4 percentage points.]

Given that the effects on the growth rate of changing μ are still small, we now explore the effects on the growth rate of changing ε—the other aspect of monetary policy in the model. For this exploration, we use the Lucas model. We run two experiments. In the first, we hold constant the rate of inflation at π = 1.1 and increase ε. The rate of growth of money is determined by the balanced growth equation. In the second, we hold the growth of money fixed and increase ε. The inflation rate is determined by the balanced growth equation. First, consider the effect on the growth rate of holding π constant at 1.1 and adjusting the reserve requirement parameter ε. The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 1.

As the charts in Figure 1 show, even
moderate increases in the reserve requirements can produce the observed changes in the growth rate. For example, an increase from the calibrated level of $\varepsilon = 0.04$ to $\varepsilon = 0.35$ will give the desired effect. We show the implied money holdings (in reserves) by banks for this experiment in the right chart in Figure 1. Note that the result is highly nonlinear and, even at very low levels of $\varepsilon$, the resulting equilibrium changes in $m_b$ are quite severe.

Next, consider the effect on the growth rate of increasing $\varepsilon$ and letting $\pi$ adjust, while holding $\mu$ constant. The impact on $\gamma$ and $m_b$, respectively, is shown in Figure 2. The results of this experiment are qualitatively similar to those when $\pi$ is held fixed. The growth effects of changing $\varepsilon$ are quite large even for quantitatively reasonable changes. Note that it follows from this discussion that we cannot generate the observed correlation between growth and inflation without simultaneously adjusting $\varepsilon$ and $\mu$. That is, from the results of holding $\mu$ fixed and adjusting $\varepsilon$, it follows that the correlation between $\pi$ and $\gamma$ is positive: As $\varepsilon$ is increased, both $\pi$ and $\gamma$ decrease.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Percentage Points</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>New</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<td>.332</td>
<td>1.0206</td>
<td>1.0204</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.004</td>
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<td>.650</td>
<td>1.0203</td>
<td>1.0198</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.066</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.700</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>1.0200</td>
<td>1.0192</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.850</td>
<td>1.0195</td>
<td>1.0175</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In each experiment, the inflation rate is increased from 10 percent to 20 percent.

To do this, we collected data from 88 countries from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS). Since measures of $\varepsilon$ are not readily available, we instead gather data on $m_b$ that in turn—conditional on the model—allow us to estimate $\varepsilon$. To estimate the size of the combined money growth and reserve requirement effects, we estimate the relationship between $\pi$ and $m_b$ from the data and use this estimated effect in comparing computed balanced growth path results. That is, we compute the implied change in the growth rate when the inflation rate is increased 10 percentage points and, at the same time, the reserve requirement is increased so as to change the observed $m_b$ as is seen in the data. To do this computation, we first give the regression result concerning the relationship between $\pi$ and $m_b$:

$$m_b = -0.220 + 0.460\pi,$$

where $m_b$ is the time-series average, by country, of the fraction of the monetary base held in banks, while $\pi$ is the time series average, by country, of the inflation rate. (The $t$-ratio for the coefficient on $\pi$ is 5.98.) For this sample, the mean value of $\pi$ is 1.16 (that corresponds to an infla-
The experiment we perform is to increase $\pi$ from 1.1 to 1.2 and simultaneously to increase $m_b$ by about 0.046. (We will actually change $m_b$ by 0.05.) The size of the equilibrium growth response depends critically on the initial value of $m_b$ because the relationship between $\varepsilon$ and $m_b$ is very nonlinear, as documented in the charts on the right in Figures 1 and 2. Therefore, in Table 2 we report the results for several initial values of $m_b$.

Experiment 1 uses the regression results from the IFS data to estimate the level of $m_b$ at $\pi = 1.1$. Here, the increase of 0.05 in $m_b$ is associated with only a small change in $\varepsilon$ (less than 0.005) and hence a small change in the growth rate results. In this experiment, the predicted change in the growth rate is smaller by a factor of 10 than the regression results in the empirical studies. At higher initial levels of $m_b$, however, the predicted growth effects of the same experiment are substantially higher. At $m_b = 0.7$, even a relatively small increase in $\varepsilon$ (from 0.121 to 0.176) gives a growth effect that is one-fifth as large as that found in the empirical studies. Finally, for substantial initial levels of the reserve requirements ($m_b = 0.8$), a 10 percentage point increase in inflation decreases the annual growth rate approximately 0.2 percentage points. This estimate—although lower than the average value of 0.5 found in different studies—is similar to the lower bound of 0.20 reported in Barro in this issue and elsewhere.

These results suggest that, although higher than those in the United States, reserve requirement values are within a plausible range. The model that allows for simultaneous changes in both money supply and reserve requirements therefore comes close to matching the estimated impact of inflation on growth.

Next, we used the actual values of the relative amount of currency held in the banking system, $m_b$, and the inflation rate, $\pi$, in the data for each country to calculate the implied value of the reserve requirement ratio, $\varepsilon$, as well as all the other model variables. The implied values of the growth rate and the inflation rate for all countries in our sample with the excep-
tion of Israel are reported in Figure 3. We exclude Israel here because in our model there is no combination of inflation and reserve requirements that can rationalize the relative amount of cash held by the banking system in Israel in the data. A regression of growth on inflation in Figure 3 yields the result that a 10 percentage point increase in the inflation rate results in a reduction in the growth rate of 0.02 percentage points.

We re-analyzed by including a proxy for the Israel observation. We computed solutions for the model at several different high values of $m$ and $\pi$. We ran a regression at these values of the reserve requirements on $m_0$ and extrapolated the implied value of reserve requirements for our model. The plot of inflation and growth rates constructed in this manner is shown in Figure 4. A regression of growth on inflation in Figure 4 shows that a 10 percentage point rise in inflation is associated with a 0.05 percent reduction in the growth rate. Alternative parameterizations of our model yield substantially greater evidence of the effects of inflation on growth.

We experimented with other parameter choices. In Figures 5 and 6 we report on the analogues of Figures 3 and 4 for values of $\lambda = -0.5$ and $\sigma = 1.5$. A regression of growth on inflation in Figure 5 shows that an increase in the inflation rate of 10 percentage points results in a fall in growth of 0.04 percent. In Figure 6 the fall in growth rates is 0.08 percent. In this sense our theoretical models account for anywhere between 10 percent and 40 percent of the association in the data. The remainder, it is plausible to suppose, arises from the fact that countries which adopt one kind of growth-reducing policy typically adopt other kinds of growth-reducing policies.

We also examined the relationship between the size of the financial system and growth rates implied by our model. King and Levine (1993) regress growth rates from 1960 to 1989 on the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial sector to GDP, a measure of the size of the financial intermediary sector, and obtain a coefficient of 0.032. The analogous measure of the size of this sector in our model is $k_2/y$. We varied our measure of distortions and calculated the relationship between the size of this sector and growth rates implied by our model. We obtained a coefficient of 0.01. The fact that our model did relatively well in the sense that the order of magnitude is correct at mimicking this relationship in the data increases our confidence in it.
CONCLUSIONS

Empirical researchers have found that the average long-run rate of inflation in a country is negatively associated with the country’s long-run rate of growth. Moreover, the statistical relationship uncovered by these researchers is large. Roughly, increasing the inflation rate by 10 percentage points in a country otherwise similar to the United States decreases the growth rate of per capita output by 0.5 percentage points. We have examined a variety of models with transactions demand for money and have seen that none produce results anywhere near this large.

This finding leads us to reconsider our view of monetary policy to include changes in financial regulations, as well as changes in the money supply. In the data, we document a high correlation between the rate of inflation in a country and the fraction of the currency in the economy that is held in the commercial banking system. We interpret this to mean that monetary authorities who raise inflation rapidly also require banks to hold more currency. (That is, in those countries, reserve requirements are also higher.) After taking account of this extra dimension of monetary policy, we find that existing models of growth and money demand can come much closer to reproducing the results found by empirical researchers. In addition, we find that the relationship between changes in reserve requirements and growth rates is highly nonlinear. Thus the estimated effects depend sensitively on the level of the reserve requirements.

Our analysis suggests that inflation rates per se have negligible effects on growth rates, but financial regulations and the interaction of inflation with such regulations have substantial effects on growth. This analysis suggests that researchers interested in studying the effects of monetary policy should shift their focus away from printing money and toward the study of banking and financial regulation.

REFERENCES


TECHNOLOGY AND PREFERENCES IN THE MODELS

Here we describe the production functions and the preferences used in the growth and money demand models discussed in the article.

MODELS OF GROWTH

Ak Model

The resource constraint is
\[ c_1 t + c_2 t + g_t + x_{st} = A k_t, \]

Two-sector Model

The production function in the investment sector is
\[ x_{st} = A (k_t - k_{1t}), \]
and in the consumption sector it is
\[ c_{1t} + c_{2t} + g_t = B k_t^{n_{1t} - \alpha}, \]
where \( k_{1t} \) is the amount of capital used in the production of consumption goods.

Lucas Model

The production function is
\[ c_{1t} + c_{2t} + g_t + x_{st} = A k_t^\alpha (n_{ht})^{1-\alpha}. \]

Romer Model

The production function is
\[ c_{1t} + c_{2t} + g_t + x_{st} = A k_t^\alpha n_{ht}^{1-\alpha} \bar{K}^{1-\alpha}, \]
where \( \bar{K} \) is the aggregate capital stock.

MODELS OF MONEY DEMAND

CIA in Consumption Model

Cash goods purchases must satisfy the constraint
\[ p_t c_{1t} \leq m_t, \]
where \( m_t \) denotes cash balances.

Shopping Time Model

Time allocated to nonleisure activities \( n_t \) is allocated to shopping time \( n_{ct} \) and market activity \( n_{ft} \) so that
\[ n_t = n_{ct} + n_{ft}. \]
The technology for purchasing cash goods for all models of growth except the Lucas model is
\[ p_t c_{1t} \leq B m_t n_{ct}. \]
For the Lucas model, the shopping time technology is
\[ p_t c_{1t} \leq B m_t (p_t n_{ht})^{1-\epsilon}. \]

CIA in Everything Model

The cash-in-advance constraint is given by
\[ p_t (c_{1t} + \varepsilon c_{2t} + \varepsilon x_{st}) \leq m_t. \]