

Debt-Management Policy and the Own Price Elasticity of Demand for U.S. Government Notes and Bonds

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DEBT-management policies of the U.S. Government are actions which affect the composition of the publicly held Federal debt. Such actions include operations of both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve. As a macroeconomic policy tool, discretionary debt-management policy attempts to affect economic activity in a specific way by altering the maturity structure of the Government's debt. The effectiveness of such a policy depends upon the extent to which changes in the composition of the debt affect the structure of interest rates, and the extent to which changes in the structure of interest rates affect economic activity.

The effectiveness of discretionary debt-management policy has been debated for a long time, both on a theoretical and an empirical level. A major attempt at discretionary debt-management policy, called "Operation Twist," occurred in the early 1960s. The Treasury, in coordination with the Federal Reserve, attempted to twist the structure of interest rates in order to lower long-term interest rates to promote investment and economic growth, while raising short-term rates to improve the balance-of-payments deficit. Empirical studies of "Operation Twist" have not conclusively determined whether such debt-management policies are effective.¹

¹See, for example, Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," *The American Economic Review* (May 1966), pp. 178-97.

On the theoretical level, there are two major approaches to the term structure of interest rates which have conflicting implications for the effectiveness of debt-management policy. The pure expectations theory implies that debt-management operations have no lasting impact on the structure of interest rates.² The preferred-habitat theory, on the other hand, implies that changes in the quantity of short-term relative to long-term debt can have significant effects on the term structure of interest rates.³ A large amount of empirical work on both theories has accumulated, but with inconclusive results. At the present time, the preferred-habitat theory cannot be rejected, so that it is not clear whether changes in the relative quantities of debt affect the structure of interest rates. However, if such effects exist, their magnitude may be quite small.

This paper investigates the effect of debt-management operations on the structure of interest rates. It is shown that even if the maturity structure of the debt

²David Meiselman, *The Term Structure of Interest Rates* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962); Burton Gordon Malkiel, *The Term Structure of Interest Rates: Expectations and Behavior Patterns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

³Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," and "Debt Management and the Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Empirical Analysis," *The Journal of Political Economy* (August 1967), pp. 569-89; Charles R. Nelson, *The Term Structure of Interest Rates* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972).

is admitted as a variable which affects the structure of interest rates, there are reasons to expect that such an effect is small. This conclusion helps to explain the inability of researchers to identify empirically such debt-management effects on the term structure of interest rates. It also implies that only massive changes in the composition of the debt could significantly alter the differential between long- and short-term interest rates.

To derive these results, demand curves for short- and long-term debt are used to formulate a term-structure equation similar to that of other researchers. This equation relates the long-term rate to the short-term rate, expected future short-term rates, and the stocks of short- and long-term debt.⁴ In this framework, the effects of the debt variables on the long-term rate depend upon the elasticity of demand for long-term debt. The own price elasticities of demand for forty-seven Treasury issues marketed between 1952 and 1976 are measured, and the demands for both short- and long-term securities are found to be very elastic. These large elasticities of demand imply that debt-management operations have little effect on the term structure of interest rates.

THE PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR TREASURY NOTES AND BONDS

It is relatively easy to measure the own price elasticity of demand for a commodity in introductory economics courses. Two points on the demand curve are chosen, and then a simple formula is used to obtain the price elasticity. However, in actual empirical work this technique is generally not operational, and a more involved approach must be employed. Both demand and supply functions for the commodity must be appropriately specified, time series data on the relevant variables must be collected, and simultaneous equation estimation techniques must be employed that control for the variables that shift the demand and supply curves. Using this approach, the measurement of the own price elasticity of demand for a financial asset is especially difficult because of the problems of specifying the asset's supply curve, and because of high correlations among prices of alternative assets.

The simpler method of using two points on an asset's demand curve can be employed, however, in

⁴See Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," and "Debt Management and the Term Structure of Interest Rates."

the measurement of the own price elasticity of demand for U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. This approach is made possible by the Treasury's past use of the "subscription sale" technique for marketing such securities.

Subscription Sales and Demand Curves for Treasury Notes and Bonds

Prior to November 1970, and on three occasions during 1976, the U.S. Treasury sold Treasury notes and bonds on a subscription basis, in contrast to the auction method that is used for Treasury bills.⁵ When the Treasury offers debt issues on a subscription basis, it announces the maturity date, coupon rate, and price at which it will issue debt, and invites tenders for the issue.⁶ The Treasury also announces the approximate amount of debt which it plans to issue as a result of the subscription sale. In the event that the volume of tenders is greater than the amount of debt which the Treasury wishes to sell, subscriptions are filled on a partial basis known as allotments. The allotment procedures, which have varied frequently from issue to issue, are published in the announcement of the offering. However, the fraction of the order which will be

⁵This auction method has also been used in marketing Treasury notes and bonds since November 1970, with the exception of the three issues in 1976.

⁶For example, in April 1976, the Treasury announced: "The Department of the Treasury will offer to sell \$3.5 billion of 10-year notes as one of three securities to be issued for the purpose of refunding debt maturing May 15 and raising new cash. The amount of the offering may be increased by a reasonable amount to the extent that the total amount of subscriptions for \$500,000 or less accompanied by 20% deposit so warrants. . ."

"The notes now being offered will be 7% Treasury Notes of Series A-1986 dated May 17, 1976, due May 15, 1986 (Cusip No. 912827 FP 2). They will be sold at par. Interest will be payable on a semiannual basis on November 15, 1976, and thereafter on May 15 and November 15. . ."

"Subscriptions will be received through Wednesday, May 5, 1976, at any Federal Reserve Bank or Branch and at the Bureau of the Public Debt, Washington, D. C. 20226; provided, however, that subscriptions up to \$500,000 accompanied by a 20% deposit will be considered timely received if they are mailed to any such agency under a postmark no later than Tuesday, May 4, 1976. . ."

"The Secretary of the Treasury expressly reserves the right to accept or reject any or all subscriptions, in whole or in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final. Subject to these reservations, subscriptions for \$500,000, or less, will be allotted in full provided that 20% of the face value of the securities for each subscriber is submitted as a deposit. . ."

"Subscriptions not accompanied by the 20% deposit will be received subject to a percentage allotment irrespective of the size of the subscription. No allotment will be made of these subscriptions until and unless the subscriptions accompanied by 20% deposit pursuant to the preceding paragraph have been allotted in full. . ."


filled, the allotment ratio, is not known until after all offers to buy have been submitted.

Subscription sales of Government securities offer a unique opportunity to observe two points on the market demand curve for the particular security being offered. First, the Treasury announces a price, usually par, and invites the private sector to make offers for the amount that they wish to purchase at that price (P_s in Figure I). Once the volume of subscriptions has been counted, a point on the demand curve, such as A in Figure I, can be located. After the subscription books are closed, but before the date of issue of the security, the Treasury announces allotment fractions and the total amount of the security which will be issued, represented by Q_i in Figure I. When the quantity which the Treasury issues is less than the amount of subscriptions submitted, the issue is said to have been oversubscribed. Once the amount to be issued has been determined by the Treasury, a second point on the demand curve for this issue can be observed. This point is determined by the amount issued and the price at which the issue sells in the Government securities market, P_m in Figure I.⁷

These two points can be safely regarded as approximations to two points on the same demand curve. First, the time which elapses from the close of the

⁷It might be argued that the quantity Q_s , associated with point A in Figure I, is an overestimate of the true quantity demanded at the announced price, on the grounds that the economic units which submit bids which are subject to partial allocation inflate those bids based on their expectations of the allocation ratio (the percent of their bid which will be filled). The allocation ratio has been quite variable from issue to issue, ranging from a low of 5 percent to a high of 70 percent. The mean of the allocation ratios is 27.4 percent, and the standard deviation is 17.2 percent. Thus, it would seem to be quite difficult to guess the allocation ratio on any particular issue with great confidence.

It might also be argued that Q_s is an overestimate of the true quantity demanded at price P_s on the grounds that market participants submit bids with the expectation that P_m exceeds P_s . Thus, Q_s includes some speculative demand by traders who, knowing the prices of outstanding securities which are close substitutes and knowing (or knowing approximately) the amount to be issued, inflate their bids with the intention of purchasing for resale. According to this argument, the larger the expected price differential, $P_m - P_s$, the larger would be the quantity differential, $Q_s - Q_i$. However, such behavior, although possible, does not apparently characterize a large portion of the demand by market participants for these issues. Using the data in Tables I and II, with P_m the price on the first day of trading, the simple correlation between $P_m - P_s$ and $Q_s - Q_i$ is very low (0.19), as is the simple correlation between the percentage price change and the percentage quantity change (0.08). (This assumes, of course, that market traders expect the market price to be P_m . Considering that information on close substitutes is readily available, this assumption does not seem overly tenuous.) Consequently, even though there may be some speculative demand for these issues at price P_s which leads to Q_s being an overestimate of the true quantity demanded, the above correlations indicate that the problem is not very severe. In this regard, see footnote 15 below.



subscription books to the date of issue of the security is quite short.⁸ Second, the securities are usually traded by Government securities dealers in the intervening period on a 'when issued' basis once the allocation has become known. Therefore, very little information that would shift the demand curve for the particular issue would become available between the time the volume of subscriptions, Q_s , is submitted and the time the market price, P_m , for the issued volume, Q_i , is observed. Third, small shifts in the demand curve would result in only small changes in the position or shape of the demand curve, so that various measures of points A and B in Figure I are still close approximations of two points on the same

⁸In the case of the 10 year note issued in May 1976, which is cited in footnote 6, the subscription books closed on May 5, 1976 and the security was issued on May 17, 1976. Only eight trading days elapsed between these two dates. This is a typical lag for subscriptions issued since the 1950s.

The possibility of the demand curve being shifted because of monetary policy actions which affect short-term rates is minimized because of the 'even-keel' commitment. "... even-keel has meant that, for a period encompassing the announcement and settlement dates of a large new security offering or refunding by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve has not made new monetary policy decisions (as contained in announcements from the Board of Governors or as specified in the second paragraph of the policy directives of the Federal Open Market Committee) that would impede the orderly marketing of Treasury securities and significantly increase risks of market disruption from sharp changes in market attitudes in the course of a financing." Stephen H. Axilrod, "The FOMC Directive as Structured in the Late 1960's: Theory and Appraisal," in *Open Market Policies and Operating Procedures — Staff Studies*, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (July 1971), p. 28.

demand curve.⁹ Thus, we can assume, without danger of large measurement error, that points A and B in Figure I approximate two points on the same demand curve.

Data have been obtained from various issues of the *Treasury Bulletin* on fifty-one subscription issues which were offered during the period from June 1952 through August 1976. Issues exchanged exclusively in advance refunding operations — not exchanged for cash — were excluded from the sample.¹⁰ Two issues which were auctioned in 1963 were also excluded. Data for the fifty-one issues are given in Table I, including the offering date, maturity date, coupon, term-to-maturity, offering price by the Treasury (P_s), volume of subscriptions tendered (Q_s — excluding subscriptions tendered by Government trust accounts and the Federal Reserve System), and the volume of subscriptions filled (Q_i). All of these issues were oversubscribed.

The additional data which is required to calculate the price elasticity of demand for each security is the market price, P_m . Data which were used to construct measures of this variable were obtained from closing quotations published daily in *The New York Times*. Table II contains daily market quotations from the first quotation subsequent to the opening of the subscription books, through the date of issue of the security.¹¹ From these, four measures of the market price quotation were constructed: 1) the market price on the first day of trading subsequent to the opening of the subscription books (P_1); 2) the average of the prices on the first five days of trading (P_2); 3) the average of the prices of all trading days from the first day of trading through the day of issue (P_3); and 4) the market price on the day of issue (P_4).

These prices can be compared with the issue prices set by the Treasury. There are only four cases in which the market price fails to rise above the Treasury issue price using at least one of the four measures of the market price.¹² For these four issues, no

meaningful negatively sloped demand curve can be constructed. Thus, our sample is reduced to forty-seven issues for which a negatively sloped demand curve was observed using at least one of the four measures of market price.

Given two points on a demand curve, the appropriate measure of the price elasticity, $\varepsilon(Q,P)$, depends on the functional form assumed for the demand curve. In elementary texts, where the emphasis is on linear demand curves, the distinction is frequently made between arc and point elasticities, and several formulas are typically suggested for computing arc elasticities.¹³ If the demand curve is log-linear, then it is appropriate to construct the arc elasticity estimate as the ratio of the difference of the logarithms of the two quantities to the difference of the logarithms of the two prices, since the elasticity is constant along the entire range of the demand curve.

An alternative case, which is of interest in the later discussion of the term structure of interest rates, is a semi-logarithmic demand curve, in which the logarithm of the quantity demanded is a function of the level of the price or interest rate. In this case, it is appropriate to compute the arc elasticity as the ratio of the difference in the logarithms of the two quantities to the percentage change in the price or interest rate, where the latter can be measured in the various ways typically suggested for a linear demand function. In our sample, however, the differences in the two price or interest rate observations are so small that insignificant measurement errors are introduced in the semi-logarithmic case if the elasticity is measured by the ratio of the difference of the logarithms of the quantities to the difference of the logarithms of the prices.¹⁴

Table III contains the measured price and interest rate elasticities (in absolute values) for each of the securities in the sample, based on the four measures of the market price and the corresponding yields to maturity. The securities have been arranged in order of increasing maturity rather than by date of issue, so that the elasticities of issues with similar maturities can be compared.

⁹In fact, various measures of the price, P_m , associated with point B are used in the analysis below without substantively affecting our conclusions.

¹⁰Advance refunding consists of offering holders of an existing security the option of exchanging it, prior to its maturity, for a newly issued security.

¹¹The market quotations as published in *The New York Times* give fractional prices in 32nds of a point. In Table II the price quotations have been converted to a decimal basis and rounded to the second decimal place.

¹²In Table II, these issues are those for which the subscription books opened on: 1/12/59j, 4/04/60, 10/30/67b, and 5/08/68.

¹³For four alternative formulas for computing arc elasticities with linear demand curves see, Kenneth E. Boulding, *Economic Analysis: Microeconomics*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 194.

¹⁴Using the notation of Figure I:

$$\begin{aligned}\varepsilon(Q,P) &= \frac{dQ}{Q} \frac{P}{dP} = \frac{d \ln Q}{d \ln P} \\ &= \frac{\ln Q_s - \ln Q_i}{\ln P_s - \ln P_m}\end{aligned}$$

Table 1

SUBSCRIPTION ISSUES: 1952-1976

| Date Subscription Books Open | Issue Date | Coupon | Maturity Date | Term-to-Maturity | | Subscriptions Tendered* | Subscriptions Filled* (Public) | Treasury's Price at Issue |
|------------------------------------|---------------|--------|------------------|------------------|--------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | | | | Years | Months | | | |
| 8/04/76 | 8/16/76 | 8.00 | 8/15/86 | 10 | 0 | 24,426 | 8,039 | 100.00 |
| 5/05/76 | 5/17/76 | 7.875 | 5/15/86 | 10 | 0 | 9,000 | 4,747 | 100.00 |
| 2/03/76 | 2/17/76 | 8.00 | 2/15/83 | 7 | 0 | 29,211 | 6,019 | 100.00 |
| 8/05/70 | 8/17/70 | 7.50 | 2/15/72 | 1 | 6 | 18,629 | 3,172 | 99.95 |
| 8/05/68 | 8/15/68 | 5.625 | 8/15/74 | 6 | 0 | 23,557 | 5,473 | 99.62 |
| 5/08/68 | 5/15/68 | 6.00 | 8/15/69 | 1 | 3 | 10,160 | 3,242 | 100.00 |
| 2/13/68 | 2/21/68 | 5.625 | 5/15/69 | 1 | 3 | 9,734 | 4,138 | 100.00 |
| 10/30/67 | 11/15/67 | 5.625 | 2/15/69 | 1 | 3 | 8,159 | 3,251 | 100.00 |
| 10/30/67 | 11/15/67 | 5.75 | 11/15/74 | 7 | 0 | 14,055 | 1,575 | 100.00 |
| 8/22/67 | 8/30/67 | 5.375 | 2/15/71 | 3 | 5.5 | 5,952 | 2,457 | 99.92 |
| 8/01/67 | 8/15/67 | 5.25 | 11/15/68 | 1 | 3 | 9,594 | 3,847 | 99.94 |
| 1/30/67 | 2/15/67 | 4.75 | 5/15/68 | 1 | 3 | 16,427 | 2,099 | 99.875 |
| 1/30/67 | 2/15/67 | 4.75 | 2/15/72 | 5 | 0 | 21,996 | 1,866 | 99.625 |
| 11/01/66 | 11/15/66 | 5.625 | 2/15/68 | 1 | 3 | 5,017 | 1,791 | 100.00 |
| 11/01/66 | 11/15/66 | 5.375 | 11/15/71 | 5 | 0 | 14,029 | 1,734 | 100.00 |
| 11/01/65 | 11/15/65 | 4.25 | 5/15/67 | 1 | 6 | 6,030 | 3,171 | 99.83 |
| 2/01/65 | 2/15/65 | 4.00 | 11/15/66 | 1 | 9 | 10,149 | 1,766 | 99.85 |
| 11/02/64 | 11/15/64 | 4.00 | 5/15/66 | 1 | 6 | 15,458 | 3,077 | 100.00 |
| 8/03/64 | 8/15/64 | 3.875 | 2/15/66 | 1 | 6 | 12,985 | 2,173 | 100.00 |
| 3/31/64 | 4/08/64 (R) | 3.875 | 8/13/65 | 1 | 4 | 10,227 | 1,066 | 99.70 |
| 10/28/63 | 11/15/63 | 3.875 | 5/15/65 | 1 | 6 | 16,064 | 3,972 | 100.00 |
| 6/11/63 | 6/20/63 | 4.00 | 8/15/70 | 7 | 2 | 16,262 | 1,906 | 100.00 |
| 7/30/62 | 8/15/62 | 4.00 | 2/15/69 | 6 | 6 | 6,643 | 1,744 | 100.00 |
| 4/09/62 | 4/18/62 | 3.75 | 8/15/68 | 6 | 4 | 6,727 | 1,158 | 100.00 |
| 1/15/62 | 1/24/62 (R) | 4.00 | 10/01/69 | 7 | 8.5 | 1,519 | 1,014 | 99.75 |
| 10/02/61 | 10/11/61 (R) | 3.25 | 5/15/63 | 1 | 7 | 5,587 | 2,195 | 99.875 |
| 5/01/61 | 5/15/61 | 3.25 | 5/15/63 | 2 | 0 | 12,110 | 1,916 | 100.00 |
| 2/06/61 | 2/15/61 | 3.25 | 8/15/62 | 1 | 6 | 15,375 | 3,720 | 100.00 |
| 8/01/60 | 8/15/60 (R) | 3.875 | 5/15/68 | 7 | 9 | 5,158 | 1,045 | 100.00 |
| 4/04/60 | 4/14/60 | 4.00 | 5/15/62 | 2 | 1 | 6,688 | 2,184 | 100.00 |
| 10/06/59 | 10/15/59 | 5.00 | 8/15/64 | 4 | 10 | 11,025 | 2,216 | 100.00 |
| 3/23/59 | 4/01/59 | 4.00 | 10/01/69 | 10 | 6 | 1,452 | 569 | 100.00 |
| 3/23/59 | 4/01/59 (R) | 4.00 | 5/15/63 | 4 | 1.5 | 2,952 | 1,643 | 100.00 |
| 1/12/59 | 1/23/59 | 4.00 | 2/15/80 | 21 | 1 | 1,750 | 834 | 99.00 |
| 1/12/59 | 1/21/59 | 3.25 | 5/15/60 | 1 | 4 | 5,508 | 2,738 | 99.75 |
| 9/29/58 | 10/10/58 | 3.50 | 11/15/59 | 1 | 1 | 2,581 | 1,079 | 100.00 |
| 6/03/58 | 6/03/58 | 3.25 | 5/15/85 | 26 | 11 | 2,470 | 1,035 | 100.50 |
| 4/07/58 | 4/15/58 | 2.625 | 2/15/63 | 4 | 10 | 15,639 | 3,869 | 100.00 |
| 2/28/58 | 3/10/58 | 3.00 | 8/15/66 | 8 | 5.5 | 6,615 | 1,384 | 100.00 |
| 11/20/57 | 11/29/57 | 3.75 | 11/15/62 | 4 | 11.5 | 7,686 | 1,043 | 100.00 |
| 11/20/57 | 12/02/57 | 3.875 | 11/15/74 | 16 | 11.5 | 3,717 | 554 | 100.00 |
| 9/16/57 | 9/26/57 | 4.00 | 8/15/62 | 4 | 11 | 6,021 | 1,900 | 100.00 |
| 9/16/57 | 10/01/57 | 4.00 | 10/01/69 | 12 | 0 | 4,548 | 557 | 100.00 |
| 3/18/57 | 3/28/57 (R) | 3.50 | 5/15/60 | 3 | 1.5 | 5,768 | 842 | 100.00 |
| 7/11/55 | 7/20/55 (R) | 3.00 | 2/15/95 | 39 | 7 | 1,695 | 796 | 100.00 |
| 5/03/55 | 5/17/55 | 2.00 | 8/15/56 | 1 | 3 | 5,477 | 4,020 | 100.00 |
| 9/23/54 | 10/04/54 | 1.625 | 5/15/57 | 2 | 7.5 | 8,178 | 4,143 | 100.00 |
| 5/04/54 | 5/17/54 | 1.875 | 2/15/59 | 4 | 9 | 12,621 | 5,076 | 100.00 |
| 10/28/53 | 11/09/53 | 2.75 | 9/15/61 | 7 | 10 | 12,493 | 2,189 | 100.00 |
| 4/13/53 | 5/01/53 | 3.25 | 6/15/78-83 | 30 | 1.5 | 5,549 | 1,487 | 100.00 |
| 6/16/52 | 7/01/52 | 2.375 | 6/15/58 | 5 | 11.5 | 11,593 | 4,145 | 100.00 |

(R) = Reopened issue

*Millions of dollars

Source: Table PDO-4, "Offerings of Public Marketable Securities Other than Weekly Treasury Bills," and Table PDO-6, "Allotments by Investor Classes on Subscriptions for Public Marketable Securities," selected issues of the *Treasury Bulletin*.

Table II

MARKET PRICES — CLOSING ASKED
Trading Days Since Closing Of Subscription Books

| Date Subscription Books Opened | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | +6 | +7 | +8 | +9 | +10 | +11 | +12 | +13 | +14 |
|---|---------|--------|-------------------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|
| 8/04/76 | 101.09 | 101.03 | 100.99 | 101.06 | 101.25 | 101.25 | 101.53 | 101.78* | | | | | | |
| 5/05/76 | 100.50 | 100.03 | 99.72 | 99.69 | 99.53 | 99.56 | 99.56 | 99.50* | | | | | | |
| 2/03/76 | 100.53 | 100.94 | 100.94 | 101.03 | 101.00 | 101.19 | 101.44 | 101.69* | | | | | | |
| 8/05/70 | 100.25 | 100.19 | 100.19 | 100.19 | 100.19 | 100.25 | 100.22 | 100.13* | | | | | | |
| 8/05/68 | n.t. | 100.13 | 99.97 | 99.94 | 99.78 | 99.88 | 99.84 | 99.84* | | | | | | |
| 5/08/68 | n.t. | 99.94 | 99.97 | 99.94 | 99.94* | | | | | | | | | |
| 2/13/68 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03* | | | | | | | | | |
| 10/30/67 ^a | n.t. | n.t. | 99.97 | 99.94 | 99.84 | 99.88 | 99.88 | 99.84 | 99.84 | 99.94 | 100.03* | | | |
| 10/30/67 ^b | n.t. | n.t. | 99.97 | 99.97 | 99.88 | 99.97 | 99.94 | 99.81 | 99.75 | 99.84 | 100.00* | | | |
| 8/22/67 | n.t. | 99.88 | 99.88 | 99.91 | 99.94 | 99.94* | | | | | | | | |
| 8/01/67 | 99.97 | 99.97 | 99.97 | 99.91 | 99.91 | 99.91 | 99.94 | 99.97 | 99.97 | 99.97 | 99.97* | | | |
| 1/30/67 ^c | n.t. | n.t. | 100.19 | 100.19 | 100.16 | 100.09 | 100.09 | 100.13 | 100.06 | 100.09 | 100.00* | | | |
| 1/30/67 ^d | n.t. | n.t. | 100.25 | 100.28 | 100.22 | 100.16 | 100.19 | 100.19 | 100.03 | 100.09 | 100.00 | 99.88* | | |
| 11/01/66 ^e | n.t. | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.03 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.03* | | | | | | |
| 11/01/65 ^f | n.t. | 100.16 | 100.06 | 100.03 | 100.06 | 99.97 | 99.94 | 100.00* | | | | | | |
| 11/01/65 | n.t. | n.t. | 99.84 | 99.84 | 99.81 | n.a. | 99.84 | 99.88* | | | | | | |
| 2/01/65 | 99.91 | 99.88 | 99.84 | 99.88 | 99.88 | 99.88 | 99.88 | 99.88* | | | | | | |
| 11/02/64 | n.t. | 100.06 | 100.09 | 100.09 | 100.09 | 100.09 | 100.09 | 100.09 | 100.09* | | | | | |
| 8/03/64 | 100.09 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.06 | 100.06* | | | | |
| 3/31/64 | 99.72 | 99.72 | 99.72 | 99.72 | 99.75 | 99.78 | 99.78 | 99.78 | 99.78 | 99.78* | | | | |
| 10/28/63 | 100.09 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.01 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | n.a. | n.a. | 100.03* | | | |
| 6/11/63 | 100.31 | 100.31 | 100.31 | 100.28 | 100.34 | 100.34 | 100.34* | | | | | | | |
| 7/30/62 | n.t. | 100.09 | 100.28 | 100.25 | 100.28 | 100.25 | 100.34 | 100.34 | 100.53 | 100.63 | 100.66* | | | |
| 4/09/62 | 100.25 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.13 | 100.16 | 100.13 | 100.16 | 100.16* | | | | | | |
| 1/15/62 | n.t. | 99.81 | 99.78 | 99.78 | 99.78 | 99.78 | 99.78* | | | | | | | |
| 10/02/61 | 99.94 | 99.91 | 99.94 | 99.97 | 99.91 | 99.94* | | | | | | | | |
| 5/01/61 | n.t. | 100.44 | 100.41 | 100.44 | 100.38 | 100.38 | 100.44 | 100.44 | 100.50 | 100.47* | | | | |
| 2/06/61 | 100.28 | 100.28 | 100.28 | 100.25 | 100.28 | 100.28 | 100.31* | | | | | | | |
| 8/01/60 | 101.25 | 100.69 | 101.00 | 101.81 | 100.69 | 100.88 | 100.75 | 100.75 | 101.06 | 101.06* | | | | |
| 4/04/60 | n.t. | 99.97 | 99.88 | 99.84 | 99.69 | 99.63 | 99.63 | 99.50* | | | | | | |
| 10/06/59 | 100.88 | 101.13 | 100.88 | 100.88 | 101.00* | 101.00* | 101.00* | | | | | | | |
| 3/23/59 ^g | 100.13 | 100.19 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.00 | 100.03* | 100.03* | | | | | | | |
| 3/23/59 ^h | n.t. | 99.94 | 99.88 | 99.91 | 99.94 | 100.03* | 100.03* | | | | | | | |
| 1/12/59 ⁱ | n.t. | 99.09 | 99.31 | 99.06 | 98.50 | 98.56 | 98.75 | 98.68 | 98.56* | | | | | |
| 1/12/59 ^j | 99.59 | 99.66 | 99.66 | 99.66 | 99.56 | 99.53 | 99.53* | | | | | | | |
| 9/29/58 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.03 | 100.06 | 100.19 | 100.25 | 100.28 | 100.34* | | | | | |
| 6/03/58 | 101.25* | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4/07/58 | 100.53 | 100.56 | 100.63 | 100.63 | 100.75 | 100.88* | 100.88* | | | | | | | |
| 2/28/58 | 100.63 | 100.56 | 100.59 | 100.66 | 100.66 | 100.59* | 100.59* | | | | | | | |
| 11/20/57 ^k | 100.94 | 101.06 | 100.94 | 100.75 | 101.13 | 101.31* | 101.31* | | | | | | | |
| 11/20/57 ^l | 102.00 | 102.00 | 102.63 | 102.63 | 102.13 | 102.25 | 102.81* | | | | | | | |
| 9/16/57 ^m | 100.19 | 100.19 | 100.06 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.00 | 100.00* | | | | | | |
| 9/16/57 ⁿ | 100.38 | 100.38 | 100.09 | 100.06 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 99.97 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.03* | | | |
| 3/18/57 | 100.06 | 100.16 | 100.16 | 100.16 | 100.16 | 100.13 | 100.16 | 100.13* | | | | | | |
| 7/11/55 | 100.16 | 100.25 | 100.28 | 100.22 | 100.16 | 100.16 | 100.06* | | | | | | | |
| 5/03/55 | 100.00 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03 | 100.03* | | | | |
| 9/23/54 | 100.09 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.06 | 100.06* | | | | | | | |
| 5/04/54 | 100.53 | 100.53 | 100.47 | 100.38 | 100.44 | 100.31 | 100.31 | 100.38 | 100.31* | | | | | |
| 10/28/53 | 100.94 | 100.94 | 100.09 | 100.97 | 100.84 | 100.94 | 100.81* | 100.38 | 100.28 | 99.88 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.05 | 100.00* |
| 4/13/53 | n.t. | 100.38 | 100.19 | 100.25 | 100.44 | 100.34 | 100.34 | 100.38 | 100.53 | 100.50 | 100.53 | 100.53* | | |
| 6/16/52 | n.t. | 100.47 | 100.44 | 100.50 | 100.44 | 100.41 | 100.38 | 100.44 | 100.44 | 100.53 | 100.66* | | | |
| ^a matures 2/15/69 | | | ^d matures 2/15/72 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ^b matures 11/15/74 | | | ^e matures 2/15/68 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ^c matures 5/15/68 | | | ^f matures 11/15/71 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| n.t. = not traded | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| n.a. = not available; microfilms of price quotations for these days were not available. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| * = day of issue | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Selected issues of *The New York Times*.

The choice of the measure of the market price does not seem to be a significant factor in affecting the major conclusions to be drawn from Table III. In all cases, the price and interest elasticities are large.¹⁵ The mean price and interest elasticities (shown at the bottom of Table III) using the price on the first trading day are not generally as large as the elasticities using other price measures, with one exception, but the larger elasticity values using the alternative price measures are also more variable across issues. The price elasticities for longer maturities (five years and over) seem to be considerably smaller on average than those for the shorter maturities (one to five years). Since a given price elasticity, $\epsilon(Q,P)$, produces a larger yield elasticity, $\epsilon(Q,R)$, the longer the term-to-maturity, this difference between the average price elasticities of the different maturities is offset, with the result that the average yield elasticities for the two maturity groupings are not significantly different from each other.¹⁶

For all of the measured series, whether price elasticities or yield elasticities, the values computed for

the individual securities tend to exhibit considerable variance across issues, as indicated by the series' standard deviations (bottom of Table III). The large variance among issues produces a standard deviation which is large relative to the mean elasticity. However, the computed means on all elasticity measures, for both maturity groupings, are significantly different from zero at the 2½ percent level. In thirteen of the sixteen cases, the mean price and yield elasticities are significantly different from zero at the 0.5 percent level.¹⁷

Given the large elasticities in Table III, the question arises as to whether these results can be generalized to conclude that the price and interest elasticities of demand for other Treasury securities are also large. Treating the elasticities in Table III as sample observations drawn from a population of elasticities for all Treasury securities, the probability that the own price or interest elasticity is larger than a specified value for any security can be computed.¹⁸ If the probability is high that the elasticity of demand is large for any given security, then we have greater confidence that the large elasticities in Table III are representative of the elasticities of demand for other Treasury issues. Under the assumption that the individual elasticity estimates are drawn from a normal distribution, the probabilities that the elasticities are larger than 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 are computed in Table IV. From these results it is seen that the probability is very high that the Government debt, both long- and short-term, is very elastic with respect to its own price or yield, all other factors held constant.

¹⁵We have adjusted several of the elasticity computations under the assumption that the total bid, Q_s , is inflated (see footnote 7). In one case, it is assumed that the true value of Q_s , called Q_s^* , exceeds Q_i by half of the amount by which Q_s exceeds Q_i ; that is, $Q_s^* = Q_i + 0.5(Q_s - Q_i)$. In the second case, Q_s^* is assumed to exceed Q_i by only one-fourth of the amount by which Q_s exceeds Q_i ; that is, $Q_s^* = Q_i + 0.25(Q_s - Q_i)$. Under the former assumption, the elasticities reported in Table III would be multiplied by a correction factor averaging 0.65, while under the latter assumption the correction factor averages 0.4. Biases of this magnitude in our computations do not substantively alter our conclusions.

¹⁶To be precise, a given price elasticity produces a larger yield elasticity the longer the *duration* of the bonds. Duration and term-to-maturity are identical measures of the time structure of bonds for non-coupon bonds, such as Treasury bills. But for coupon bonds, such as the Treasury notes and bonds discussed in this paper, duration and term-to-maturity are not equivalent. However, for coupon bonds selling at par or premiums, duration increases with term-to-maturity, so that the stated relationship holds for almost all the issues listed in Tables I and II. For coupon bonds selling at discounts, duration increases with term-to-maturity up to a maximum, and then decreases as term-to-maturity increases. This case, although possible, does not appear to be of significant importance in the results reported here.

For a discussion of duration, see Michael H. Hopewell and George G. Kaufman, "Bond Price Volatility and Term to Maturity: A Generalized Respecification," *The American Economic Review* (September 1973), pp. 749-53; and Roman L. Weil, "Macaulay's Duration: An Appreciation," *The Journal of Business* (October 1973), pp. 589-92.

The formula relating price and yield elasticities is of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon(Q,P) &= \frac{dQ}{Q} \frac{P}{dP} = \frac{dQ}{Q} \left(-\frac{1}{D} \frac{1+R}{R} \right) \frac{R}{dR} \\ &= -\frac{1}{D} \frac{1+R}{R} \epsilon(Q,R) \end{aligned}$$

where D = duration

THE ROLE OF DEMAND ELASTICITIES IN THE ASSESSMENT OF DEBT-MANAGEMENT POLICY

Discretionary debt-management policy, as usually defined, deals with the manipulation of the relative

$$= \frac{1+R}{R} - \frac{F}{P} \frac{[1+R - n(R-c)]}{R(1+R)^n}$$

- and F = face value of bonds
- P = price of bonds
- R = yield on bonds
- c = coupon rate on bonds
- Q = quantity of bonds

Tests for the equality of the average yield elasticities for the two maturity groupings were performed using t-tests at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test).

¹⁷A one-tailed test was applied in both cases.

¹⁸In this case, the "population of elasticities" is more specifically the elasticities of demand for Treasury securities over the range of the market demand curve in which the Treasury operates.

Table III

ESTIMATED PRICE AND INTEREST ELASTICITIES FOR VARIOUS SUBSCRIPTION ISSUES: 1952-1976*

| Date | Term-to-Maturity | | $\hat{E}(Q,P_1)$ | $\hat{E}(Q,P_2)$ | $\hat{E}(Q,P_3)$ | $\hat{E}(Q,P_4)$ | $\hat{E}(Q,R_1)$ | $\hat{E}(Q,R_2)$ | $\hat{E}(Q,R_3)$ | $\hat{E}(Q,R_4)$ |
|------------|------------------|--------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Years | Months | | | | | | | | |
| 9/29/58 | 1 | 1 | — | 4361.15 | 671.31 | 256.95 | — | 160.13 | 24.36 | 9.15 |
| 5/08/68 | 1 | 3 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 2/13/68 | 1 | 3 | 2851.80 | 2851.80 | 2851.80 | 2851.80 | 191.73 | 191.73 | 191.73 | 191.73 |
| 10/30/67 | 1 | 3 | — | — | — | 3067.66 | — | — | — | 206.24 |
| 8/01/67 | 1 | 3 | 3044.78 | 9133.42 | 9133.42 | 3044.78 | 193.02 | 536.98 | 536.98 | 193.02 |
| 1/30/67 | 1 | 3 | 653.38 | 776.46 | 875.45 | 1644.94 | 37.03 | 44.10 | 49.85 | 94.87 |
| 11/01/66 | 1 | 3 | — | 10301.10 | 10301.10 | 3434.04 | — | 722.59 | 722.59 | 230.88 |
| 5/03/55 | 1 | 3 | — | 1546.53 | 1031.07 | 1031.07 | — | 36.21 | 24.57 | 24.57 |
| 1/12/59 | 1 | 4 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 3/31/64 | 1 | 4 | 11272.80 | 7515.58 | 4509.80 | 2819.05 | 661.38 | 420.46 | 242.95 | 150.92 |
| 8/05/70 | 1 | 6 | 590.71 | 681.45 | 681.45 | 983.92 | 60.88 | 70.46 | 70.46 | 101.74 |
| 11/01/65 | 1 | 6 | 6416.39 | 6416.39 | 3208.36 | 1283.54 | 400.72 | 400.72 | 200.20 | 79.89 |
| 11/02/64 | 1 | 6 | 2691.09 | 2018.52 | 1794.33 | 1794.33 | 152.92 | 114.49 | 101.68 | 101.68 |
| 8/03/64 | 1 | 6 | 1987.21 | 2554.73 | 3576.27 | 2980.37 | 110.83 | 140.48 | 197.03 | 164.04 |
| 10/28/63 | 1 | 6 | 1553.27 | 3493.98 | 4658.40 | 4658.40 | 86.63 | 192.68 | 257.14 | 257.14 |
| 2/06/61 | 1 | 6 | 507.50 | 526.27 | 507.50 | 458.46 | 23.18 | 24.08 | 23.18 | 20.93 |
| 10/02/61 | 1 | 7 | 1435.99 | 1581.98 | 1555.62 | 1435.99 | 71.88 | 85.95 | 71.88 | 71.88 |
| 2/01/65 | 1 | 9 | 2910.93 | 5820.99 | 5820.99 | 5820.99 | 197.65 | 396.17 | 396.17 | 396.17 |
| 5/01/61 | 2 | 0 | 419.96 | 450.63 | 419.96 | 393.22 | 25.35 | 27.20 | 25.35 | 23.62 |
| 4/04/60 | 2 | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 9/23/54 | 2 | 7.5 | 755.93 | 971.81 | 1133.72 | 1133.72 | 31.23 | 40.58 | 45.70 | 45.70 |
| 3/18/57 | 3 | 1.5 | 3208.13 | 1375.46 | 1375.46 | 1481.19 | 335.69 | 142.29 | 142.29 | 152.06 |
| 8/22/67 | 3 | 5.5 | — | — | — | 4420.83 | — | — | — | 795.86 |
| 3/23/59 | 4 | 1.5 | — | — | — | 1953.49 | — | — | — | 292.61 |
| 5/04/54 | 4 | 9 | 172.31 | 194.25 | 228.16 | 294.27 | 14.14 | 15.96 | 18.95 | 24.66 |
| 10/06/59 | 4 | 10 | 183.13 | 173.32 | 171.49 | 161.25 | 38.13 | 35.98 | 35.65 | 33.47 |
| 4/07/58 | 4 | 10 | 264.24 | 225.98 | 212.33 | 159.42 | 30.63 | 26.06 | 24.41 | 18.19 |
| 9/16/57 | 4 | 11 | 607.63 | 1153.98 | 1648.29 | — | 106.69 | 209.08 | 306.92 | — |
| 11/20/57 | 4 | 11.5 | 213.48 | 209.05 | 196.81 | 153.46 | 35.00 | 34.16 | 32.13 | 24.82 |
| 1/30/67 | 5 | 0 | 394.48 | 414.31 | 487.93 | 965.08 | 82.78 | 86.49 | 102.51 | 204.47 |
| 11/01/66 | 5 | 0 | 1307.73 | 3485.54 | 6970.03 | — | 302.67 | 801.63 | 1604.31 | — |
| 6/16/52 | 5 | 11.5 | 219.34 | 229.07 | 219.34 | 194.57 | 28.22 | 29.64 | 28.22 | 25.19 |
| 8/05/68 | 6 | 0 | 285.84 | 455.12 | 502.13 | 661.66 | 80.85 | 129.29 | 142.74 | 188.39 |
| 4/09/62 | 6 | 4 | 704.65 | 1354.29 | 1257.62 | 1100.53 | 145.74 | 274.03 | 263.03 | 226.63 |
| 7/30/62 | 6 | 6 | 1486.65 | 582.14 | 352.61 | 203.30 | 333.68 | 133.07 | 80.38 | 45.44 |
| 2/03/76 | 7 | 0 | 298.83 | 178.27 | 144.39 | 94.26 | 125.58 | 74.88 | 60.26 | 39.07 |
| 10/30/67 | 7 | 0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| 6/11/63 | 7 | 2 | 692.63 | 715.68 | 692.65 | 631.61 | 170.43 | 173.93 | 170.43 | 154.84 |
| 1/15/62 | 7 | 8.5 | 672.10 | 1008.05 | 1008.05 | 1343.99 | 181.13 | 271.79 | 271.79 | 326.19 |
| 8/01/60 | 7 | 9 | 128.52 | 147.27 | 162.06 | 151.41 | 32.28 | 37.15 | 40.72 | 38.11 |
| 10/28/53 | 7 | 10 | 186.16 | 182.30 | 188.15 | 215.90 | 35.14 | 34.34 | 35.41 | 40.77 |
| 2/28/58 | 8 | 5.5 | 249.09 | 253.10 | 253.10 | 265.93 | 54.43 | 55.76 | 55.76 | 58.62 |
| 5/05/76 | 10 | 0 | 130.39 | — | — | — | 68.69 | — | — | — |
| 8/04/76 | 10 | 0 | 108.45 | 101.58 | 88.75 | 62.99 | 58.71 | 54.66 | 47.76 | 33.77 |
| 3/23/59 | 10 | 6 | 721.10 | 1171.49 | 1338.78 | 3123.19 | 249.35 | 415.89 | 467.94 | 1248.62 |
| 9/16/57 | 12 | 0 | 553.65 | 1106.25 | 2334.25 | 7000.64 | 208.94 | 418.92 | 932.23 | 2798.79 |
| 11/20/57 | 16 | 11.5 | 96.12 | 84.44 | 81.95 | 68.69 | 45.14 | 39.57 | 38.48 | 32.12 |
| 1/12/59 | 21 | 1 | 815.62 | — | — | — | 502.49 | — | — | — |
| 6/03/58 | 26 | 11 | 116.99 | 116.99 | 116.99 | 116.99 | 67.92 | 67.92 | 67.92 | 67.92 |
| 4/13/53 | 30 | 1.5 | 347.20 | 425.45 | 693.74 | — | 193.88 | 237.11 | 388.41 | — |
| 7/11/55 | 39 | 7 | 472.78 | 360.30 | 420.29 | 1260.11 | 323.55 | 251.57 | 323.55 | 1133.38 |
| Maturities | \bar{x} | | 2087.03 | 2797.17 | 2459.26 | 1908.69 | 140.24 | 176.89 | 162.70 | 148.23 |
| 1 to 5 | s | | 2668.49 | 3029.01 | 2799.71 | 1568.46 | 162.41 | 191.10 | 183.96 | 168.71 |
| years | N | | 20 | 23 | 23 | 25 | 20 | 23 | 23 | 25 |
| | t: $H_0\mu=0$ | | 3.50 | 4.43 | 4.21 | 6.08 | 3.86 | 4.44 | 4.24 | 4.39 |
| Maturities | \bar{x} | | 475.63 | 651.14 | 911.20 | 1027.11 | 156.74 | 188.82 | 269.57 | 391.90 |
| Over 5 | s | | 385.55 | 792.84 | 1574.45 | 1722.16 | 126.63 | 193.73 | 391.93 | 722.08 |
| years | N | | 21 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 21 | 19 | 19 | 17 |
| | t: $H_0\mu=0$ | | 5.65 | 3.58 | 2.52 | 2.46 | 5.67 | 4.25 | 3.00 | 2.24 |

*Elasticities in absolute value

\bar{x} = sample mean.

s = sample standard deviation

N = number of observations in sample

t: $H_0\mu=0$ is the t-value for testing the hypothesis (H_0) that the population mean (μ) is equal to zero ($\mu=0$).

$\hat{E}(Q,P_1)$ = the estimated price elasticity of demand for a security, using price P_1 as the measure of the market price.

$\hat{E}(Q,R_1)$ = the estimated interest rate elasticity of demand for a security, using yield R_1 as the measure of the market interest rate (R_1 is the yield corresponding to price P_1).

P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4 : Measures of market prices as defined in the text.

R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4 : Measures of market yields corresponding to the price measures.

Table IV

PROBABILITIES THAT OWN PRICE AND INTEREST ELASTICITIES ARE GREATER THAN SPECIFIED VALUES

| Value (X) | Pr [$E(Q, P_i) > X$] | | | | Pr [$\varepsilon(Q, R_i) > X$] | | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | $\hat{E}(Q, P_1)$ | $\hat{E}(Q, P_2)$ | $\hat{E}(Q, P_3)$ | $\hat{E}(Q, P_4)$ | $\hat{\varepsilon}(Q, R_1)$ | $\hat{\varepsilon}(Q, R_2)$ | $\hat{\varepsilon}(Q, R_3)$ | $\hat{\varepsilon}(Q, R_4)$ |
| Maturity 1 - 5 Years | | | | | | | | |
| 1.0 | .78 | .82 | .81 | .89 | .80 | .82 | .81 | .81 |
| 5.0 | .78 | .82 | .81 | .89 | .80 | .82 | .80 | .80 |
| 10.0 | .78 | .82 | .81 | .89 | .79 | .81 | .80 | .79 |
| 25.0 | .78 | .82 | .81 | .89 | .76 | .79 | .77 | .77 |
| 50.0 | .77 | .82 | .81 | .88 | .71 | .75 | .73 | .72 |
| Maturity Over 5 Years | | | | | | | | |
| 1.0 | .89 | .79 | .72 | .72 | .89 | .83 | .75 | .71 |
| 5.0 | .89 | .79 | .72 | .72 | .88 | .83 | .75 | .70 |
| 10.0 | .89 | .79 | .72 | .72 | .88 | .82 | .75 | .70 |
| 25.0 | .88 | .79 | .71 | .72 | .85 | .80 | .73 | .69 |
| 50.0 | .87 | .78 | .71 | .71 | .80 | .76 | .71 | .68 |

maturity composition of a given stock of interest-bearing Government debt to accomplish a desired change in the term structure of interest rates. Two major hypotheses exist in the term-structure literature which have conflicting implications for the effectiveness of such debt-management policies. The first hypothesis in its purest form is known as the "expectations hypothesis" of the term structure. This hypothesis maintains that interest rates on long-term securities are determined as a geometric average of current short-term interest rates, and the expectations of future short-term interest rates that will prevail over the life of the long-term security.¹⁹ Given short-term rates and expectations regarding future short-term rates, the long-term rate is determined independently of the maturity structure of the outstanding debt.

The second hypothesis was originally formulated as a "segmented markets" theory, but in recent years has been revised and has come to be known as a "preferred habitat" theory.²⁰ In this latter form, the theory holds that different classes of lenders (and in the case of private debt, borrowers) have a preference for different maturity segments of the debt market. These preferred maturities, or preferred habitats, are assumed to be well-defined for different groups of market participants, but they are not mu-

tually exclusive across groups as the proponents of the "segmented markets" hypothesis maintained.²¹ Thus, for the market as a whole, arbitrage will occur across the maturity spectrum, and the short-term rate and expectations of future short-term rates should be relevant in determining the long-term rate. However, since individual groups of market participants are hypothesized to have well-defined maturity preferences, demand and supply imbalances in a particular maturity segment cannot be completely arbitrated away. Consequently, the theory maintains that substantial changes in the maturity composition of the outstanding debt should also have an influence on the long-term rate, given the short-term rate and expectations of future short-term rates.

In two articles published in 1966 and 1967, Modigliani and Sutch investigated the effects of various measures of the maturity composition of the Federal debt on the average yields on long-term Treasury securities.²² They found very little empirical evidence that debt variables significantly affect the long-term rate. Current and lagged values of the short-term rate, which can be considered as proxy measures for expected future short-term rates, accounted for almost all the variation in long-term rates. Modigliani and Sutch concluded that debt-management effects, if they exist, have only a small impact on the long-term rate.

¹⁹Meiselman, *The Term Structure of Interest Rates*; Malkiel, *The Term Structure of Interest Rates*.

²⁰John M. Culbertson, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (November 1957), pp. 485-517; Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," and "Debt Management and the Term Structure of Interest Rates;" and Nelson, *The Term Structure of Interest Rates*.

²¹Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy;" Nelson, *The Term Structure of Interest Rates*.

²²Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," and "Debt Management and the Term Structure of Interest Rates."

Other researchers who have done similar empirical work have also found that such debt-management effects are small.²³ Some have maintained that problems of measuring the various debt variables, and especially the inability to accurately measure a debt variable which includes all debt and not only Treasury debt, may bias these empirical tests.²⁴ Thus, it is argued that debt-management policies may have a significantly larger effect on long-term rates than has been reported, but that measurement problems prevent its empirical identification. Discretionary debt-management policies, according to this line of argument, may yet be found to be very effective in changing the structure of interest rates.

Utilizing the information reported in the first section of this paper on the elasticities of demand for Treasury securities, it can be shown that there are other reasons to conclude that even if debt-management variables affect long-term rates, the effect is small. This can be demonstrated by deriving an equation similar to that investigated by Modigliani and Sutch, but starting from demand functions for Government securities rather than the preferred-habitat theory.

Consider the following market demand functions for long- and short-term Government debt:

$$\ln(Q_s^d/W) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 R_s + \alpha_2 R_s^e - \alpha_3 R_l + Z_s \lambda_s \quad (1)$$

$$\ln(Q_l^d/W) = \beta_0 - \beta_1 R_s - \beta_2 R_s^e + \beta_3 R_l + Z_l \lambda_l \quad (2)$$

where:

- Q_s^d is the quantity demanded of short-term debt
- Q_l^d is the quantity demanded of long-term debt
- R_s is the current interest rate on short-term debt
- R_l is the current interest rate on long-term debt
- R_s^e is the expected future interest rate on short-term debt
- W is total wealth
- Z_s, Z_l are vectors of other variables affecting Q_s and Q_l , respectively, including rates of return on other assets

and $\alpha_i > 0$, $\beta_i > 0$, λ_s and λ_l are coefficients. Since the demand functions are expressed in terms of interest rates rather than prices, the own elasticities of demand are positive and the cross elasticities are negative. The functional form indicated in equations

(1) and (2) has been chosen primarily for expositional convenience. However, this form has been used in recent studies of asset demand functions, and recent theoretical work suggests that it is preferred to the more traditional linear and log-linear specifications.²⁵ The restriction of wealth elasticities to unity is maintained to eliminate detail which is not relevant to this discussion. None of the conclusions of the subsequent analysis is affected by this constraint.²⁶ By subtracting equation (2) from equation (1) the following expression can be obtained:²⁷

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(Q_s/W) - \ln(Q_l/W) = \ln(Q_s/Q_l) = & (\alpha_0 - \beta_0) + \\ & (\alpha_1 + \beta_1) R_s + \\ & (\alpha_2 + \beta_2) R_s^e - (\alpha_3 + \beta_3) R_l + Z_s \lambda_s - Z_l \lambda_l \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

This equation, in turn, can be solved for the long-term rate to obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} R_l = & \left(\frac{\alpha_0 - \beta_0}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) + \left(\frac{\alpha_1 + \beta_1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) R_s + \left(\frac{\alpha_2 + \beta_2}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) R_s^e \\ - & \left(\frac{1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) \ln(Q_s/Q_l) + \frac{Z_s \lambda_s}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} - \frac{Z_l \lambda_l}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

By appropriate manipulation, this equation can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned} R_l = & \left(\frac{\alpha_0 - \beta_0}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) + \left(\frac{\alpha_1 + \beta_1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) R_s + \left(\frac{\alpha_2 + \beta_2}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) R_s^e \\ + & \left(\frac{1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) \left(\frac{Q_l}{\text{DEBT}} \right) - \left(\frac{1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \right) \left(\frac{Q_s}{\text{DEBT}} \right) + \epsilon \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where DEBT is the quantity of debt outstanding at all maturities, say short (Q_s), intermediate (Q_n) and long (Q_l), and where the influence of the (unspecified) variables in the vectors Z_s and Z_l have been impounded in the error term ϵ .²⁸

²⁵Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz, "Has the Growth of Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy?" *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* (May 1975), pp. 137-59; J. B. Ramsey and R. H. Rasche, "The Velocity of M2 and of Its Components," *Workshop Paper No. 7504* (Michigan State University, June 1976); Ramsey, "Limiting Functional Forms for Market Demand Curves," *Econometrica* (March 1972), pp. 327-41.

²⁶Equations (1) and (2), with the constrained wealth elasticities, are consistent with the general asset demand specifications suggested by James Tobin, "An Essay on Principles of Debt Management," in *Fiscal and Debt Management Policies*, by William Fellner et al. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 216, and "A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* (February 1969), p. 24.

²⁷It is implicitly assumed here that the supplies of Q_s and Q_l are exogenously determined by the Treasury, so that the superscripts on these two variables are dropped.

²⁸ $\ln(Q_s/Q_l) = \ln[(Q_s/\text{DEBT}) \left(\frac{\text{DEBT}}{Q_l} \right)] = \ln(Q_s/\text{DEBT}) - \ln(Q_l/\text{DEBT})$ where DEBT is the quantity of debt outstanding at all maturities, say short (Q_s), intermediate (Q_n)

²³For example, Frank de Leeuw, "A Model of Financial Behavior," in *The Brookings Quarterly Econometric Model of the United States*, ed. James S. Duesenberry et al. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965); Neil Wallace, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates and The Maturity Composition of the Federal Debt" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, December 1964).

²⁴See the "Discussions" and "Comments" to Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," and "Debt Management and the Term Structure of Interest Rates."

Equation (5) is one form of the equation which Modigliani and Sutch (1966) proposed and tested as the "preferred habitat" model.²⁹ It can be seen from equation (5) that the magnitude of the parameters α_3 and β_3 will be crucial in determining whether one can find sizable impacts of the maturity composition of the debt on the long-term rate. If either of these parameters is very large, then the true coefficients of the maturity-composition variables are very small. In addition, since the variation of the maturity structure of the debt is quite limited in any sample period, the precision of the estimates of these coefficients will not be very high. Consequently, it is quite likely that if either α_3 or β_3 is large, it will be possible to reject the hypothesis that changes in the maturity structure of the debt have a significant impact on the long-term rate, for a given short-term rate.

The parameters in equation (5), such as β_3 and α_3 , are associated with the elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand for short- and long-term Government securities, which can be derived from equations (1) and (2). The interest rate elasticity of demand for long-term debt (Q_l) is equal to $\beta_3 R_l$, while the interest elasticity of demand for short-term debt (Q_s) is equal to $\alpha_1 R_s$.³⁰ The cross-elasticity of demand for short-term debt with respect to the long-term interest rate is given by $-\alpha_3 R_l$.³¹ Although there is insufficient information to estimate α_3 , estimates of β_3 and α_1 for individual Treasury securities

can be obtained from the elasticities of demand in Table III and measures of the interest rates which correspond to the prices in Table II. Estimates of α_1 and β_3 are given in Table V using the four measures of the market yields corresponding to the price measures discussed earlier. Very few of the values of α_1 and β_3 in Table V are below ten, and many are larger than twenty-five. The probability that β_3 is larger than a specified value can be computed in the same manner as the computations for the elasticities presented in Table IV. The probabilities that β_3 is greater than 10 and 25 are presented in Table VI. These probabilities are based on the data in Table V with maturities greater than 5 years.

From Table VI it can be seen that the data from the subscription sales suggest that it is highly probable that β_3 is larger than 10. If this is the case for long-term debt as a whole, then the coefficients of the debt-composition variables in the "term structure" equation (5) are even more likely to be less than 0.1, since the denominator of this coefficient is the sum of α_3 and β_3 (and both are positive).

To illustrate the implication of such a parameter value, assume that 10 percent of the outstanding Government debt is switched from long-term to short-term debt by an advance refunding operation. This would be a very large debt-management operation relative to the advance refunding operations which were attempted in the early 1960s as part of "Operation Twist." With $\frac{1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} = 0.1$, an operation of such a magnitude would imply a change in the long-term rate of two basis points, according to equation (5).³² With this information, it is not surprising that attempts to estimate maturity-structure effects in specifications such as equation (5) have been notably unsuccessful. The evidence presented here suggests that even large changes in the maturity composition of the Government debt will have very minor impacts on the long-term rates on Government securities, and supports the position that debt management can be dismissed as a useful tool of stabilization policy.

The effects discussed above are not merely a function of the linear approximation of the debt vari-

and long (Q_l). Then $\ln(Q_s/DEBT) = \ln\left(1 - \frac{Q_l + Q_n}{DEBT}\right)$

But $\ln\left(1 - \frac{Q_l + Q_n}{DEBT}\right) \approx -\left(\frac{Q_n + Q_l}{DEBT}\right)$. Similarly

$\ln\left(\frac{Q_l}{DEBT}\right) \approx -\frac{Q_s + Q_n}{DEBT}$. Therefore, $\ln(Q_s/Q_l) \approx -\frac{(Q_n + Q_l)}{DEBT} + \frac{(Q_s + Q_n)}{DEBT} = \frac{Q_s}{DEBT} - \frac{Q_l}{DEBT}$.

This approximation [$\ln(1 - X) \approx -X$] is accurate only for values of X between -0.3 and $+0.3$; that is, when the ratio of the type of debt to total debt is less than 1/3. However, its use here does not alter the conclusions drawn below, as will be shown later using the original term: $\ln(Q_s/Q_l)$. The approximation is employed here in order to compare equation (5) with the work of Modigliani and Sutch.

²⁹Modigliani and Sutch assumed three maturity classes of debt — short, intermediate and long maturities — and approximated the expected future short-term rate by a distributed lag on past short-term rates. See Modigliani and Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy."

³⁰ $\varepsilon(Q_l, R_l) = \frac{d \ln Q_l}{d R_l} R_l = \beta_3 R_l$ from equation (2);

and $\varepsilon(Q_s, R_s) = \frac{d \ln Q_s}{d R_s} R_s = \alpha_1 R_s$ from equation (1)

³¹ $\varepsilon(Q_s, R_l) = \frac{d \ln Q_s}{d R_l} R_l = -\alpha_3 R_l$ from equation (1)

³²
$$\frac{1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \frac{Q_l - 0.1 DEBT}{DEBT} - \frac{1}{\alpha_3 + \beta_3} \frac{Q_s + 0.1 DEBT}{DEBT}$$

$$= (0.1) \left[\frac{Q_l}{DEBT} - 0.1 \right] - (0.1) \left[\frac{Q_s}{DEBT} + 0.1 \right]$$

$$= (0.1) \frac{Q_l}{DEBT} - (0.1) \frac{Q_s}{DEBT} - 0.02$$

Table V

ESTIMATES OF α_1 AND β_3 USING VARIOUS MEASURES OF THE MARKET YIELD*

| Date | Term-to-Maturity | | $\hat{\alpha}_1^1$ or $\hat{\beta}_3^1$ | $\hat{\alpha}_1^2$ or $\hat{\beta}_3^2$ | $\hat{\alpha}_1^3$ or $\hat{\beta}_3^3$ | $\hat{\alpha}_1^4$ or $\hat{\beta}_3^4$ |
|------------|------------------|--------|---|---|---|---|
| | Years | Months | | | | |
| 9/29/58 | 1 | 1 | — | 46.03 | 7.22 | 2.88 |
| 5/08/68 | 1 | 3 | — | — | — | — |
| 2/13/68 | 1 | 3 | 34.29 | 34.29 | 34.29 | 34.29 |
| 10/30/67 | 1 | 3 | — | — | — | 36.89 |
| 8/01/67 | 1 | 3 | 36.64 | 101.62 | 101.62 | 36.64 |
| 1/30/67 | 1 | 3 | 8.08 | 9.53 | 10.72 | 19.99 |
| 11/01/66 | 1 | 3 | — | 128.85 | 128.85 | 41.29 |
| 5/03/55 | 1 | 3 | — | 18.27 | 12.45 | 12.45 |
| 1/12/59 | 1 | 4 | — | — | — | — |
| 3/31/64 | 1 | 4 | 161.78 | 103.05 | 59.78 | 37.35 |
| 8/05/70 | 1 | 6 | 8.32 | 9.59 | 9.59 | 13.74 |
| 11/01/65 | 1 | 6 | 91.89 | 91.89 | 45.98 | 18.44 |
| 11/02/64 | 1 | 6 | 38.64 | 29.03 | 25.83 | 25.83 |
| 8/03/64 | 1 | 6 | 29.07 | 36.72 | 51.31 | 42.80 |
| 10/28/63 | 1 | 6 | 22.72 | 50.09 | 66.72 | 66.72 |
| 2/06/61 | 1 | 6 | 7.58 | 7.86 | 7.58 | 6.89 |
| 10/02/61 | 1 | 7 | 21.87 | 26.09 | 21.87 | 21.87 |
| 2/01/65 | 1 | 9 | 48.79 | 97.36 | 97.36 | 97.36 |
| 5/01/61 | 2 | 0 | 8.39 | 8.96 | 8.39 | 7.86 |
| 4/04/60 | 2 | 1 | — | — | — | — |
| 9/23/54 | 2 | 7.5 | 19.64 | 25.40 | 28.55 | 28.55 |
| 3/18/57 | 3 | 1.5 | 96.49 | 41.22 | 41.22 | 44.01 |
| 8/22/67 | 3 | 5.5 | — | — | — | 147.55 |
| 3/23/59 | 4 | 1.5 | — | — | — | 73.32 |
| 5/04/54 | 4 | 9 | 8.04 | 9.01 | 10.60 | 13.65 |
| 10/06/59 | 4 | 10 | 7.95 | 7.53 | 7.46 | 7.02 |
| 4/07/58 | 4 | 10 | 12.21 | 10.47 | 9.85 | 7.48 |
| 9/16/57 | 4 | 11 | 26.97 | 52.57 | 77.04 | — |
| 11/20/57 | 4 | 11.5 | 9.88 | 9.66 | 9.12 | 7.17 |
| | | | $\hat{\beta}_3^1$ | $\hat{\beta}_3^2$ | $\hat{\beta}_3^3$ | $\hat{\beta}_3^4$ |
| 1/30/67 | 5 | 0 | 17.64 | 18.40 | 21.71 | 42.79 |
| 11/01/66 | 5 | 0 | 56.70 | 149.53 | 298.87 | — |
| 6/16/52 | 5 | 11.5 | 12.32 | 12.92 | 12.32 | 11.05 |
| 8/05/68 | 6 | 0 | 14.44 | 22.94 | 25.29 | 33.30 |
| 4/09/62 | 6 | 4 | 39.34 | 73.55 | 70.61 | 60.91 |
| 7/30/62 | 6 | 6 | 83.75 | 33.60 | 20.43 | 11.70 |
| 2/03/76 | 7 | 0 | 15.90 | 9.56 | 7.73 | 5.09 |
| 10/30/67 | 7 | 0 | — | — | — | — |
| 6/11/63 | 7 | 2 | 43.15 | 44.02 | 43.15 | 39.25 |
| 1/15/62 | 7 | 8.5 | 44.96 | 67.41 | 67.41 | 80.88 |
| 8/01/60 | 7 | 9 | 8.75 | 10.01 | 10.93 | 10.25 |
| 10/28/53 | 7 | 10 | 13.43 | 13.14 | 13.52 | 15.47 |
| 2/28/58 | 8 | 5.5 | 18.67 | 19.11 | 19.11 | 20.07 |
| 5/05/76 | 10 | 0 | 8.80 | — | — | — |
| 8/04/76 | 10 | 0 | 7.48 | 6.97 | 6.11 | 4.36 |
| 3/23/59 | 10 | 6 | 62.57 | 104.21 | 117.22 | 312.39 |
| 9/16/57 | 12 | 0 | 52.76 | 105.26 | 233.58 | 700.22 |
| 11/20/57 | 16 | 11.5 | 12.15 | 10.71 | 10.44 | 8.79 |
| 1/12/59 | 21 | 1 | 123.61 | — | — | — |
| 6/03/58 | 26 | 11 | 21.35 | 21.35 | 21.35 | 21.35 |
| 4/13/53 | 30 | 1.5 | 60.06 | 73.36 | 119.92 | — |
| 7/11/55 | 39 | 7 | 108.10 | 84.11 | 108.10 | 378.05 |
| Maturities | \bar{x} | | 34.96 | 41.53 | 37.97 | 34.08 |
| 1 to 5 | s | | 39.38 | 37.29 | 35.47 | 33.10 |
| years | N | | 20 | 23 | 23 | 25 |
| | t: $H_0\mu=0$ | | 3.97 | 5.34 | 5.13 | 5.15 |
| Maturities | \bar{x} | | 39.33 | 46.32 | 64.62 | 103.29 |
| Over 5 | s | | 33.70 | 41.76 | 81.22 | 188.04 |
| years | N | | 21 | 19 | 19 | 17 |
| | t: $H_0\mu=0$ | | 5.35 | 4.83 | 3.47 | 2.26 |

$$^* \beta_3 = \frac{\varepsilon(Q_L, R_L)}{R_L} \text{ and } \alpha_1 = \frac{\varepsilon(Q_S, R_S)}{R_S}$$

$\hat{\beta}_3^1 = \beta_3$ using R_t as the market yield, as defined in Table III.
 x , s, N, and t: $H_0\mu=0$ are defined at the bottom of Table III.

Table VI
PROBABILITIES THAT DEBT COEFFICIENT β_3 EXCEEDS SPECIFIED VALUES $[\text{Pr}(\beta_3 > X)]^*$

| Value (X) | $\hat{\beta}_3^1$ | $\hat{\beta}_3^2$ | $\hat{\beta}_3^3$ | $\hat{\beta}_3^4$ |
|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 10 | .81 | .81 | .75 | .69 |
| 25 | .66 | .70 | .69 | .66 |

*Based on data in Table V with maturities greater than 5 years.

ables.³³ To show this, the original term for the debt variables in equation (4), $\ln(Q_s/Q_1)$, has been calculated for the fiscal years 1967-1976 (Table VII). In Table VII, short- and long-term debt are defined in the conventional manner: short-term debt includes securities with one year or less to maturity; long-term debt includes securities with 10 or more years to maturity. If the coefficient on $\ln(Q_s/Q_1)$ in equation (4) is 0.1 (that is, if $1/(\alpha_3 + \beta_3) = 0.1$, as given in the example above), then the impact of the debt variable on the long-term interest rate, given the short-term rate, has been less than 25 basis points over the period 1967-1976.³⁴ Furthermore, debt-man-

³³See footnote 28 and equations (4) and (5).

³⁴Note that the assumption that the coefficient is 0.1 is a liberal one for assessing the effect of the debt variables. As noted earlier, it is very likely that the coefficient is smaller than 0.1, which implies even smaller debt-management effects.

agement operations can again be shown to have relatively small effects on the long-term rate for given short-term rates.

Table VIII presents the effects of two debt-management operations based on the data in Table VII: switching 10 percent of the outstanding Government debt from short-term to long-term debt, and switching 5 percent of the outstanding debt from long-term to short-term debt.³⁵ In the former case, the long-term rate is raised by less than 15 basis points (0.15 percent) in each of the years. Thus, a shifting of 10 percent of the debt from the short- to long-term end of the maturity spectrum, which again is a large debt-management operation, results in a relatively small change in the long-term rate, given the short-term rate.

In the latter case, the shifting of 5 percent of the debt from the long- to short-term end of the maturity spectrum results in the long-term rate declining by less than 17 basis points (0.17 percent) in all but one

³⁵The debt variable, $\ln(Q_s/Q_1)$, would now be:

$$\ln[(Q_s - 0.1 \text{ DEBT}) / (Q_1 + 0.1 \text{ DEBT})],$$

$$\text{or } \ln[(Q_s + 0.05 \text{ DEBT}) / (Q_1 - 0.05 \text{ DEBT})].$$

Note that if 10 percent of the debt were switched from long- to short-term, the long-term debt would be wiped out in most years. Since such an operation is not very likely, a switch of 5 percent of the debt was used in Table VIII instead.

Table VII
EFFECT OF DEBT VARIABLE $\ln(Q_s/Q_1)$ ON LONG-TERM RATE IN EQUATION (4)
ASSUMING $1/(\alpha_3 + \beta_3) = .1$

| End of Fiscal Year | Total Amount of Outstanding Debt Privately Held (Debt)* | Debt Maturing Within 1 Year (Q_s)* | Debt Maturing in 10 Years or More (Q_1)* | Q_s/Q_1 | $\ln(Q_s/Q_1)$ | Effect of Debt Variable on Long-Term Rate** $(.1) \ln(Q_s/Q_1)$ |
|--------------------|---|--|--|-----------|----------------|---|
| 1967 | 150,321 | 56,561 | 19,121 | 2.958 | 1.085 | .109 |
| 1968 | 159,671 | 66,746 | 18,780 | 3.554 | 1.268 | .127 |
| 1969 | 156,008 | 69,311 | 18,434 | 3.760 | 1.324 | .132 |
| 1970 | 157,910 | 76,443 | 16,148 | 4.734 | 1.555 | .156 |
| 1971 | 161,863 | 74,803 | 14,002 | 5.342 | 1.676 | .168 |
| 1972 | 165,978 | 79,509 | 13,280 | 5.987 | 1.790 | .179 |
| 1973 | 167,869 | 84,041 | 13,305 | 6.317 | 1.843 | .184 |
| 1974 | 164,862 | 87,150 | 13,411 | 6.498 | 1.871 | .187 |
| 1975 | 210,382 | 115,677 | 13,468 | 8.589 | 2.150 | .215 |
| 1976 | 279,782 | 150,296 | 14,739 | 10.197 | 2.322 | .232 |

*In millions of dollars

**In percentage points; 1.00 = 1%; .20 = 20 Basis Points

Source: Table FD-4, "Maturity Distribution and Average Length of Marketable Interest-Bearing Public Debt Held by Private Investors," selected issues of the *Treasury Bulletin*.

EFFECT OF DEBT OPERATIONS ON THE LONG-TERM RATE USING EQUATION (4) WITH $1/(\alpha_3 + \beta_3) = 1$

| End of Fiscal Year | Shifting 10% of Total Debt from Short-Term to Long-Term | | | | Shifting 5% of Total Debt from Long-Term to Short-Term | | | |
|--------------------|---|--|----------------|---------------------|--|---|----------------|---------------------|
| | $Q_s - (.1) \text{ Debt}$ (Q_s^*) | $Q_l + (.1) \text{ Debt}$ (Q_l^*) | $\ln(Q_s/Q_l)$ | $(.1) \ln(Q_s/Q_l)$ | $Q_s + (.05) \text{ Debt}$ (Q_s^*) | $Q_l - (.05) \text{ Debt}$ (Q_l^*) | $\ln(Q_s/Q_l)$ | $(.1) \ln(Q_s/Q_l)$ |
| 1967 | 41,528.9 | 34,153.1 | .196 | .020 | 64,077.1 | 11,605.0 | 1.709 | .171 |
| 1968 | 50,778.9 | 34,747.1 | .379 | .038 | 74,729.6 | 10,796.5 | 1.935 | .194 |
| 1969 | 53,710.2 | 34,034.8 | .456 | .046 | 77,111.4 | 10,633.6 | 1.981 | .198 |
| 1970 | 60,652.0 | 31,939.0 | .641 | .064 | 84,338.5 | 8,252.5 | 2.374 | .232 |
| 1971 | 58,616.7 | 30,188.3 | .664 | .066 | 82,896.2 | 5,908.9 | 2.641 | .264 |
| 1972 | 62,911.2 | 29,877.8 | .745 | .075 | 87,807.9 | 4,981.1 | 2.869 | .287 |
| 1973 | 67,234.1 | 30,091.9 | .804 | .080 | 92,434.5 | 4,911.6 | 2.935 | .294 |
| 1974 | 70,663.8 | 29,897.2 | .860 | .086 | 95,393.1 | 5,167.9 | 2.916 | .292 |
| 1975 | 94,638.8 | 34,506.2 | 1.009 | .101 | 126,196.1 | 2,948.9 | 3.756 | .376 |
| 1976 | 122,317.8 | 42,717.2 | 1.052 | .105 | 164,285.1 | 749.9 | 5.389 | .539 |

* In millions of dollars. Q_s , Q_l and Debt are given in Table VII.

** In percentage points, 1.00 = 1 percent; .20 = 20 Basis Points.

$$\Delta R_l = (.1) \ln(Q_s/Q_l) - (.1) \ln(Q_s/Q_l)$$

$$\text{or} = (.1) \ln(Q_s/Q_l) - (.1) \ln(Q_s/Q_l)$$

case. The exception is for fiscal year 1976, when the long-term rate would decrease by about 31 basis points under this debt-management operation. This change is still not very large, and is accounted for by the fact that shifting 5 percent of the debt from long-term to short-term in fiscal 1976 reduces the amount of long-term debt outstanding to only \$750 million. It is to be expected from equation (4) that if the amount of long-term debt outstanding were virtually eliminated by a debt-management operation, the long-term rate would fall considerably more than would otherwise be the case.

From the examples given in Table VIII, we again find that, even using actual ratios of short- to long-term debt, the large elasticities of demand for Treasury securities imply that the debt variable has a relatively small impact on the long-term rate. Only massive changes in the maturity composition of the debt will have very large effects.³⁶

CONCLUSIONS

Measures of the own price (and interest rate) elasticity of demand for Treasury securities, derived from data on Treasury subscription sales, indicate that the demands for both long- and short-term Government debt are very elastic. Market demand functions for long- and short-term debt were used to obtain a Modigliani-Sutch equation of the term structure of interest rates. The large interest rate elasticities of demand imply that the coefficients of the maturity composition of the debt in this equation are expected to be quite small. Based on these estimates, even large changes in the maturity composition of the debt will have little effect on long-term interest rates on Treasury securities. These results are consistent with, and help to explain, the empirical results found by Modigliani and Sutch and other researchers, and support the position that discretionary debt-management operations have little usefulness as a policy tool.

³⁶The above discussion implicitly assumes that the stocks of debt of differing maturities can be taken as exogenous variables (see footnote 27). This may not be an appropriate representation of the behavior of the Treasury. However, the introduction of the simultaneous determination of the supply and demand for Government debt, by introducing a debt-service minimization policy, prevents estimation of any maturity-composition effects using this term-structure framework (see Appendix).

Appendix follows on next page.

APPENDIX

This appendix considers the case of endogenous supplies of Government debt. There has been a great deal of discussion of Treasury policies which suggests that the goal of the Treasury, at least throughout the 1950s, was to manage the maturity structure of the debt so as to minimize the cost of the debt service.¹ If this is the case, we can characterize the behavior of the Treasury by the following supply equations:

$$\ln(Q_s/DEBT) = \gamma_0 - \gamma_1 R_s + \gamma_2 R_1 \quad (\gamma_1 > 0) \quad (A.1)$$

$$\ln(Q_l/DEBT) = \delta_0 + \delta_1 R_s - \delta_2 R_1 \quad (\delta_1 > 0) \quad (A.2)$$

Equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply that as the long-term rate goes up or the short-term rate goes down, the Treas-

ury shortens the average maturity of the debt, and vice-versa for lengthening the maturity of the debt. By subtracting (A.2) from (A.1) we obtain:

$$\ln(Q_s/DEBT) - \ln(Q_l/DEBT) = \ln(Q_s/Q_l) = (\gamma_0 - \delta_0) - (\gamma_1 + \delta_1)R_s + (\gamma_2 + \delta_2)R_1 \quad (A.3)$$

When this is substituted into equation (3), the resulting solution for R_1 is:²

$$R_1 = \frac{\kappa_0 + (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 + \gamma_1 + \delta_1)R_s + (\alpha_2 + \beta_2)R_s^2}{(\gamma_2 + \delta_2 + \alpha_3 + \beta_3)}$$

where $\kappa_0 = (\alpha_0 - \beta_0 - \gamma_0 + \delta_0)$ (A.4)

Equation (A.4) has a form similar to that of the estimated Modigliani-Sutch equation, but implies that the maturity-composition terms do not appear in the equation. Consequently, the introduction of the simultaneous determination of the supply and demand for Government debt, as a result of a debt-service minimization policy, prevents estimation of any maturity-composition effects using this term-structure framework.

²Ignoring the terms in Z_s and Z_l .

¹See U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Employment, Growth, and Price Levels*, Study Paper No. 19, Warren L. Smith, "Debt Management in the United States," 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960. In the late 1960s the ability of the Treasury to pursue any policies with respect to the maturity structure of the Government debt was severely limited by legal restrictions on the maximum coupon which could be placed on new bonds. Since this coupon was substantially below prevailing market rates for long-term issues, the Treasury was effectively prohibited from issuing new bonds.

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