Some Issues in Monetary Economics*
By DAVID I. FAND

Public policies are continuously sought which will assist in guiding the economy between the perils of inflation and the dangers of unemployment and under-production. During the last five years the perils of inflation have become increasingly apparent, and during the past year stabilization actions have been taken to reduce the rate of advance of the price level. At the present time there is growing concern that these actions may lead the economy into a recession.

What are the vehicles and avenues of stabilization policy which can best restore the economy to a satisfactory course, that is, a high and rising level of output and employment with a reasonably stable price level? Unfortunately, students of this problem are not in substantial agreement on an answer. Economists have tended to fall into two conflicting schools of thought regarding economic stabilization — the income-expenditure approach and the modern quantity theory of money approach.

Until recently, the dominant school has been the modern version of the income-expenditure theory which has evolved from the work of John Maynard Keynes in the 1930's. Policymakers in the 1950's and 1960's generally adopted the theoretical framework of this school for the formulation of economic stabilization actions. Primary emphasis was given to fiscal actions — Federal government spending and taxing programs — in guiding the economy between inflation and unemployment. During the last two decades, proponents of the modern quantity theory of money have increasingly challenged the basic propositions of the income-expenditure school. The modern quantity theory assigns to the money stock the major role in economic stabilization efforts.

The following paper by David I. Fand, Professor of Economics, Wayne State University, outlines the nature of some of the major points of disagreement between the income-expenditure approach to stabilization policy and the modern quantity theory approach. This paper was presented to a seminar of college and university professors of money and banking sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis on November 7, 1969. This paper has appeared in BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO QUARTERLY REVIEW, No. 90, September 1969.

In brief summary, Professor Fand analyzes the following four points of disagreement between proponents of the income-expenditure school and the modern quantity theory school:

1. The modern quantity theory of money espouses the view that the Federal Reserve System can exercise close control over the nominal money stock. On the other hand, proponents of the income-expenditure school have questioned either the feasibility or desirability of such control.

2. Economic analysis based on the income-expenditure approach usually assumes a constant price level, thereby abstracting from the distinction between nominal and real money balances and between market interest rates and real interest rates. Modern quantity theory advocates maintain that this failure to take into consideration the distinction between nominal and real magnitudes has frequently led to erroneous stabilization policies in recent years.

3. The two schools have very different views regarding the causes of inflation. The modern quantity theory stresses the influence of changes in the money stock on aggregate demand in explaining movements in the price level, while the income-expenditure theory has stressed factors which influence aggregate supply, such as wage movements and other influences on costs of production.

4. Finally, Professor Fand compares the special assumptions of the income-expenditure school, which led them to conclude that fiscal actions have a great influence on total spending, with those of the modern quantity school, which lead to the opposite conclusion. He points out that most discussions of the influence of fiscal actions on total spending implicitly assume that interest rates are held constant by accommodative changes in the money stock. On the other hand, in discussing the influence of fiscal actions, proponents of the modern quantity theory of money assume that the money stock is held constant, which results in an offsetting change in interest rates. The first assumption leads to the conclusion that fiscal influence on total spending is great, while the second assumption leads to the conclusion that induced changes in private spending offset a large part of the fiscal influence.

The exposition in the paper is of necessity somewhat technical, and it may be of particular interest to those familiar with the current debate. Extensive footnotes to the paper provide references to some of the most useful presentations of the various points of view.
BASIC ISSUES in monetary theory are being debated at the present time, and increasing attention is now being directed to the following rather technical questions: Can the central bank control the (nominal) money stock within fairly close limits, or should we adopt the analytically more complete (and neutral) approach of the large scale econometric models and treat money as an endogenous variable? Can the central bank implement its policy decisions and calibrate its actions by means of an interest rate criterion — expressed in money market variables — or would it do better to use one of the monetary aggregates as an indicator and target for monetary policy? Can the central bank lower (or raise) market interest rates if the transmission mechanism in aggregative models views a monetary phenomenon resulting from the extraordinary expansion in the monetary aggregates, or has it primarily been due to an excessively lax, and inappropriate, fiscal policy? Does the theory of fiscal policy (and its calculated multipliers) often assume an elastic, permissive, or accommodating monetary policy, and does it therefore fail to distinguish between a pure fiscal deficit excluding any money stock effects, and an increase in the monetary aggregates accompanied by a fiscal deficit? Is the transmission mechanism as conceived in the income-expenditure models a valid one, or may changes in the nominal money stock directly affect private expenditures, aggregate demand, and price levels? Should stabilization policy continue to stress temporary changes in such a change is thought to be desirable? Can the authorities better the stabilization performance of recent years by giving more emphasis to the behavior of monetary aggregates?

These technical questions suggest a number of more fundamental questions concerning recent stabilization policies. Has the post-1965 inflation been a monetary phenomenon resulting from the extraordinary expansion in the monetary aggregates, or has it primarily been due to an excessively lax, and inappropriate, fiscal policy? Does the theory of fiscal policy (and its calculated multipliers) often assume an elastic, permissive, or accommodating monetary policy, and does it therefore fail to distinguish between a pure fiscal deficit excluding any money stock effects, and an increase in the monetary aggregates accompanied by a fiscal deficit? Is the transmission mechanism as conceived in the income-expenditure models a valid one, or may changes in the nominal money stock directly affect private expenditures, aggregate demand, and price levels? Should stabilization policy continue to stress temporary changes in such a change is thought to be desirable? Can the authorities better the stabilization performance of recent years by giving more emphasis to the behavior of monetary aggregates?


(discretionary or automatic) in the full-employment surplus, as if it were the ultimate weapon, in light of our recent experience? 7

In this paper we take up four specific issues. We first consider whether the central bank can actually control the money stock. We then consider whether changes in the (nominal) money stock are identifiable with changes in real cash balances, and whether movements in market interest rates adequately reflect movements in real rates. The third question that we take up concerns the analytical structure and policy implications of the non-monetary theories of the price level. The fourth and final question is: How do we define, and measure, the monetary and fiscal effects that follow a particular policy?

Can the Central Bank Control the Nominal Money Stock?

The money stock at any moment in time is the result of portfolio decisions by the central bank, by the commercial banks, and by the public (including the nonbank intermediaries): 8 the central bank determines the amount of high-powered money or monetary base, that is, currency plus bank reserves, that it will supply; 9 the commercial banks determine the volume of loans and other assets that they will acquire and the quantity of reserves they will hold as excess (and free) reserves; and the public determines how to allocate their holdings of monetary wealth among currency, demand, time and savings deposits, CD’s, intermediary claims, and other financial assets. The money stock that emerges reflects all these decisions.

It is a natural question to consider whether the central bank, by controlling the monetary base, can actually achieve fairly precise control over the money stock. This depends on whether the link between the monetary base and bank reserves, and between bank reserves and the money stock (the monetary base—bank reserves—money stock linkage) is fairly tight and therefore predictable. If there is a tight linkage the monetary authorities can formulate their policies and achieve any particular target for the money stock; on the other hand, if there is significant and unpredictable slippage, and the central bank control over the money stock is not sufficiently precise to achieve a given target, it will necessarily have to formulate its policies in terms of other variables that it can control. The variable used to express (or define) the central bank’s objective, or to implement its policy decisions, must therefore be one that it can control within reasonable limits. 10

The recently recurring idea that the money stock is perhaps best viewed as an endogenous variable, although not a new idea (it would have been acceptable to “real bill” theorists), has received new and powerful support from those who follow the “New View” approach in monetary economics. 11 New View theorists have questioned the validity of much of classical monetary theory concerning the importance of money relative to other liquid assets, the unique—

**Footnotes:**


9The high-powered money concept used by M. Friedman, A. Schwartz and P. Cagan is essentially the monetary base concept used by K. Brunner, A. Meltzer, and others. The monetary base may be defined either in terms of the sources (Federal Reserve credit, gold stock, Treasury items, etc.) or uses (member bank reserves and currency). To compare movements in the monetary base over time, we need to make a correction for changes in reserve requirements. As used here, the monetary base includes a reserve adjustment, that is, it is equal to the source base plus the reserve adjustment.

10It is presumably for this reason that some models treat unborrowed reserves as the policy variable (the practice followed in the FRB-MIT model and other econometric models). These model builders believe that some components of the monetary base, and perhaps the entire base, behave as endogenous variables— as the variables that respond to income changes, and are not directly (or completely) under the control of the central bank. They do believe that the Federal Reserve can control the volume of unborrowed reserves.

ness of commercial banks relative to other intermediaries, and the extent to which the central bank can control the nominal money stock. They argue that the central bank can control its instruments (open market operations, reserve requirements, discount rate) and some money market variables (free reserves, Treasury bill rate); that the commercial banks supply deposits at a fixed rate; and that the stock of money and liquid assets which emerge—at least in the short run—largely reflect the public’s preference for demand and time deposits, intermediary claims, and other financial assets.

Two schools of monetary economics differ on the use of the money stock as an indicator or target variable, and on the extent to which it is an endogenous variable and therefore not available to the monetary authorities as a stabilization instrument. The nonmonetarists believe that the central bank should formulate its policies in terms of money market variables and implement them through operations on the instrument variables. They view the money stock as (in part) an endogenous variable, and do not conceive of it as a proper instrument or target variable. The monetarists believe that the central bank can, and should, define its objectives and implement its policies in terms of the money stock. Indeed, these two conceptions of the money stock and its role in monetary policy decisions summarize some important substantive differences that have emerged in monetary economics:

1. between the monetarist view that changes in the nominal money stock may be a causal, active, and independent factor in influencing aggregate demand and the price level, and the nonmonetarist views ranging from (a) the older “real bills” doctrine that the money stock responds primarily to changes in the real economy; (b) the Income-Expenditure theories (associated with the 45° diagram) which view money as an accommodating factor; and (c) the more recent New View doctrine that the money stock is best viewed as one of several endogenous liquidity aggregates;

2. between the monetarist view that the money stock—using either the conventional or the broader definition—is a reasonably well-behaved quantity, and the Radcliffe-type view that rejects these measures as narrow and inappropriate, and argues for a broader liquidity aggregate; and

3. between the monetarist view that the monetary policy posture should be gauged by the behavior of a monetary aggregate, and the Income-Expenditure theories viewing market interest rates as the proper indicator variable.

Many who question the advisability of operating monetary policy in terms of money stock guidelines also question whether the central bank control is precise enough to comply with the guideline requirements. The extent of this control is therefore a key question. Is the money stock best viewed as an endogenous variable—determined by the interaction of the financial and real sectors—and outside the direct control of the central bank? Or is it more nearly correct to view it as an exogenous variable—as a policy instrument—that the authorities can control, and whose behavior can be made to conform to the stabilization guidelines?

This issue is essentially an empirical one: Does control over the monetary base and other instruments provide the central bank with sufficient powers to fit the behavior of the money stock into a given stabilization program? The monetarists, in assigning an important role for the money stock in stabilization policy, assume that the central bank can engineer the desired behavior of the money stock. The substantive issue can be reformulated in terms of an empirically refutable hypothesis, as follows: Do changes in commercial bank free reserve behavior, and do portfolio shifts by the public involving currency, demand and time deposits, and other financial assets, introduce enough variability and enough “noise” to break the monetary base—bank reserves—money stock linkage, and justify treating the money stock as an endogenous variable—and essentially outside the control of the central bank?

The empirical examination of this issue fits in naturally to a framework of money supply analysis which
I have described in an earlier article. The analysis developed there defines four money supply functions which incorporate alternative assumptions concerning portfolio adjustments.

If we let

\[ M = \text{the nominal money stock} \]
\[ X = \text{a vector of Federal Reserve (monetary policy) instruments variables (the monetary base, reserve requirements, discount rate, Regulation Q)} \]
\[ r_v = \text{a vector of endogenous financial variables (e.g., the Treasury bill rate, the Federal funds rate, the Eurodollar rate, the rate on time deposits and other intermediary claims)} \]
\[ T.C = \text{time deposits, currency, shares and other financial assets that are close substitutes for demand deposits} \]
\[ Y = \text{a vector of real sector variables (GNP, business investment, durables, etc.)} \]

a money supply (M.S.) function may be written as:

\[ M = f(X, r_v; T,C; Y) \]

The four M.S. functions that follow reflect alternative \textit{ceteris paribus} conditions changing the portfolio adjustments that we permit for both the banks and the public:

1. M.S.(I) is a short-run supply concept. It gives the money supply response to a change in reserves on the assumption that while banks may choose to adjust their free reserves, the public can only carry out a limited adjustment with respect to currency, time deposits and other financial assets. There are several ways to impose \textit{ceteris paribus} conditions on the public's holdings of currency, time deposits, and other financial assets. Some investigators hold \textit{levels} of these assets constant, others hold \textit{ratios} constant, and different investigators impose this \textit{ceteris paribus} condition in a manner most compatible with their model. M.S.(I) is of the form \[ M = f(X, r_v; T,C; Y) \] where \( T \) and \( C \) specify our assumptions for currency, time deposits, and other close substitutes. To use it as a short-run concept we assume that all variables in the real sector of the economy, including stocks of real assets and flows such as consumption and investment, are held constant, so that it is primarily a function of the monetary policy instrument variables. Accordingly, if M.S.(I) is fairly stable it provides some support for the view that the monetary authorities can achieve fairly precise control over the money stock.

2. To construct M.S.(II) we remove some of these portfolio restrictions by permitting the public to adjust their holdings of currency and time deposits, and the terms on which banks supply time deposits to reflect the underlying preferences. This function is of the form \[ f(X, r_v; Y) \], and does not contain any arbitrary assumptions about currency, time deposits, or the rate paid on time deposits. It is derived by assuming: (a) that the banks may adjust their free reserves and the rate paid on time deposits; and (b) that the public's holdings of currency and time deposits will be determined by their demand function for these assets. Although M.S.(II) does permit a greater degree of portfolio adjustment, it still is a short-run and restricted function because it assumes that the real sector variables and all other financial assets are held constant.

3. To construct M.S.(III) we permit portfolio adjustments throughout the entire financial sector and solve all the equations in the financial sector simultaneously. The Treasury bill rate and other rates which are endogenous variables in the financial sector will therefore be determined, and no longer enter as independent arguments in the money supply function. M.S.(III) is a reduced form equation of the form \[ M = g(X,Y) \] where all endogenous financial variables will have values determined by the simultaneous solution of the behavior equations in the financial sector. This function measures the supply response due to a change in the monetary base or some other policy instrument, assuming that all the variables in the financial sector adjust simultaneously.

4. Finally, we define M.S.(IV) in the form of \[ M = g(X) \], a reduced-form equation which measures the movements in the money stock in response to adjustments in both the real and the financial sector. To derive this money supply we must solve all the structural equations in the financial and real sectors simultaneously to obtain the reduced form. The real sector variables are no longer treated as exogenous variables, but are now determined simultaneously with all the endogenous financial sector variables. This reduced-form M.S. gives the equilibrium stocks of money as a function of the monetary base and other monetary policy instrument variables. This is the natural M.S. function to construct for those who view the money stock as passive and responding to real sector developments, and to those who view the money stock as an accommodating variable, whose changes may be necessary in order to validate changes in the real economy.\footnote{The M.S.(IV) function as written implies that an increase in the monetary base will affect the money supply if it induces some real sector changes. A "real bills" proponent might therefore prefer to write it as follows:
\[ M = f(Y) \text{ and } X = g(Y); \] where \( M \) and \( X \) are both determined by the real sector variables in \( Y \).}

This brief review of the four money supply functions suggests that it is possible to test some of the substantive points that have come up in the recent "control over the money stock" discussions. For example, M.S.(I) postulates that we can predict the effect of changes in the monetary base (and other instruments) on the money stock, assuming that the public's portfolio ad-
adjustments are restricted; M.S.(II) postulates that we can predict the effect of a change in the monetary base (and other instruments) on the money stock, even allowing the public to adjust their currency and holdings of demand and time deposits; while M.S.(III) postulates that we can predict the money stock response, even allowing the public to adjust their entire portfolios. These three M.S. functions assume that commercial bank free reserve behavior and the public's behavior with respect to currency, demand and time deposits are stable; and that the substitution of intermediary claims and liquid assets for money conforms to behavior that can be incorporated into a stable M.S. function. Econometric estimates of these three functions provide some evidence for testing the reliability of the monetary base—bank reserve—money stock linkage.16

Those who follow the "real bills" view—that the money stock is determined by the real sector variables—or the view in many income-expenditure models—that the money stock is an accommodating or permissive variable—presumably deny the possibility of constructing such functions. In their view these three M.S. functions do not allow any changes in fiscal policy or in the real sector variables; they permit only restricted changes in the financial sector variables, and they emphasize the monetary base and the central bank's instrument variables. Accordingly, they should predict that the first three M.S. functions highlighting the instrument variables are unstable and lack content; indeed, their approach to monetary theory implies that only M.S.(IV), which incorporates changes in the real sector, contains the relevant independent variables.

An analysis of these four money supply functions has implications for the use of the money stock as an independent and major instrument in stabilization. Those who argue that money is, at least in part, an endogenous variable, and who question the precision with which it can be controlled, assume (implicitly perhaps) that no statistically significant supply function can be estimated relating the money stock to the monetary base and other instrument variables. Moreover, if such a function is estimated it would have to be a reduced-form function, and a variant of the M.S. (IV) concept, incorporating feedbacks from the real sector.17

In an earlier study, we compared estimates of the M.S. functions calculated from different econometric models. We found that the elasticities and multipliers for the first three M.S. functions based primarily on financial variables appear to be stable enough to justify further effort towards their refinement and improvement. We also found that: "There are at present too few studies available to calculate reliable M.S. (IV) elasticities. But the available evidence, meager though it may be, does not point to any superiority of M.S. (IV) over M.S. (I) and does not appear to favor a real view over a monetary view. Those who take the view that money is passive, responding primarily to the real economy, have to recognize that this is an assumption rather than a proposition derived from empirical evidence."17

Our findings also suggest that the money stock behavior could be made to conform to a specified stabilization program. For example, by controlling movements in the monetary base, monetary authorities can control quite adequately movements in the money stock. The chart below illustrates a rather close relationship between the monetary base and the money stock.

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16A comparison of the three M.S. functions enables us to evaluate the quantitative effects of these portfolio shifts on the money stock. Consider a given change in the monetary base, or any other instrument variable, and compare the money stock response in these three functions. The calculated differences reflect the portfolio adjustments that we introduce as we move from M.S.(I) to M.S.(III) — i.e., shifts among currency, demand and time deposits, and the substitution of intermediary claims for money — and thus provide a measure of these effects on the money stock.

17See D. Fand, "Some Implications of Money Supply Analysis," op. cit., p. 392. The calculated elasticities and multipliers suggest that the short run M.S. functions — such as the M.S. (I) and M.S.(II) — are reasonably stable. These are preliminary findings, derived by using the steady-state solutions to simplify the analysis; they are subject to revision and require the construction of significance tests.
While this research is far from conclusive it is consistent with a number of other findings. It is difficult to maintain the view that the money stock is sufficiently endogenous so that it is outside the direct control of the authorities, without getting dangerously close to a “real bills” position. Accordingly, the focus of the “control over the money stock” discussion will shift, in my opinion, to the more interesting question — and the more relevant and less ideological question — concerning the length of the period needed to give the Federal Reserve System sufficient control to achieve a given money stock guideline. Assuming that a “reasonable” degree of precision has been defined, can the particular guideline requirements be achieved in a week? a month? a quarter? Or must we extend the period in order to overcome false signals, “noise,” forecasting errors and other disturbances? It would appear that the degree of precision desired is not independent of the time period required for the execution of policy, and it is reassuring to note that recent discussions have been directed increasingly at these points.

The Income-Expenditure Theory and the Quantity Theory:
Nominal and Real Quantities

There is considerable agreement on the proposition in monetary theory that the real value of the money stock is an endogenous variable, determined by the interaction of the financial and real sectors, and therefore outside the control of the monetary authorities. This is in sharp contrast to the theoretical (and practical) disagreements concerning the extent to which the central bank can control the behavior of the (nominal) money stock. In equilibrium, the stock of real cash balances has a value — analogous to, say, the real wage — which the stabilization authorities cannot readily influence, except in those special cases where nominal and real variables move together. The above chart demonstrates that such is not always the case. For instance, the nominal money stock was unchanged during the latter half of 1966, while real money balances activity declined.

Income-expenditure theorists in their macroeconomic models often use nominal balances when the analysis requires real balances. This substitution of a nominal quantity (which can be easily changed) for a real quantity (with a determinate equilibrium value) has two consequences: it suggests that an increase in nominal balances will always tend to lower market interest rates; it also implies that changes in market rates correspond to, and reflect, changes in real rates. This procedure is sometimes justified by a special interpretation of the demand for money, an interpretation that is often attributed to Keynes' General Theory.

It is therefore useful to recall the transformation of the demand for money in Keynes' General Theory. Instead of defining a demand for a quantity of real balances, the demand for money (or real balances) was transformed into the liquidity preference function and a basic determinant of the interest rate: the liquidity preference function together with the (real) quantity of money determines the interest rate; and
since Keynes assumed explicitly that the price level was given, he could move from nominal to real balances to determine the market (or nominal) interest rate, the real interest rate (or return on capital), and the equilibrium quantity of real balances. The post-Keynesian income models follow the General Theory in treating the demand for money as a liquidity preference function, but they do not determine explicitly the equilibrium quantity of real cash balances. The failure to define an equilibrium value for the real money stock opens up the possibility of treating both the real and nominal money stock as policy variables, and as close substitutes.

The substitution of nominal balances for real balances in many post-Keynesian income-expenditure models has extremely important consequences. To assume that nominal and real balances may be interchanged is to assume that the authorities have the power to print real capital and wealth; it exaggerates the control of the authorities over real interest rates (and rates of return); and it necessarily abstracts from any direct effects of money on prices (note that the link between the money stock and prices requires that we distinguish between nominal and real values). This tendency to abstract from the price level, to freely substitute nominal and real variables, and to equate market interest rates with real rates (of return) reflects the analytical failure to define equilibrium conditions for real balances, and is a striking feature of the post-Keynesian income models.

In sharp contrast to the income-expenditure theory, we have the following postulates concerning real balances in the modern quantity theory: (1) the money demand function defines the demand for real cash balances; (2) the quantity of real cash balances is an endogenous variable and not under the control of the monetary authorities (except for the very short run); and (3) changes in nominal balances will generally have effects on market interest rates, on income, and on prices. For the analysis of transition periods it assumes that an increase in nominal balances will have a compound effect on interest rates—including a short-run liquidity (Keynes) effect, an income effect, and a longer-run (Fisher) price expectation effect. The modern quantity theory also assumes that the demand for money is quite stable, and that a velocity function (derived from the money demand function) may provide a useful link between changes in money and changes in money income; and, in contrast to the earlier quantity theory, postulates a stable velocity function, but allows marginal velocity to differ from average velocity.

Taken together, these quantity theory propositions have two important implications. They suggest: (1) that the monetary authorities do not control real interest rates or the stock of real balances, even if they can always control the stock of nominal money and thereby influence nominal or market interest rates; (2) that money is an important variable for explaining changes in prices, since the equilibrium quantity of real balances links changes in nominal money with changes in the price level. Accordingly, the modern quantity theory uses the money demand function to predict the level of money income and prices if output is given, or changes in money income if output varies with changes in the money stock.

The modern quantity theory and income-expenditure theory thus differ sharply in their analysis of the money demand function. In the modern quantity theory it serves as a velocity function relating either money and money income, or marginal changes in money and money income (if both output and marginal velocity vary with the money stock); in the income-expenditure theory, it serves as a liquidity preference theory of in-

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22 For an elaboration of this theme see D. Fand, "Keynesian Monetary Theories, Stabilization Policy and the Recent Inflation," op. cit., Section II on "The Demand for Money and Liquidity Preference: Real Balances and Interest Rates," which discusses the changing role of real cash balances in the Keynesian and quantity theories, the shifting emphasis from the price level to the level of employment, and the transformation of the money demand function into a liquidity preference function.

terest rates, or of changes in interest rates (if the price level is given and determined independently of the monetary sector). Accordingly, the modern quantity theory focuses on discrepancies between actual and desired real balances, distinguishes between (exogenous) nominal balances and (endogenous) real balances, emphasizes monetary aggregates rather than interest rates, and highlights nominal money as the operational policy variable; the income-expenditure theory focuses on discrepancies between actual and full-employment output, abstracts from price level changes, emphasizes an interest rate transmission mechanism, views the monetary aggregates as endogenous variables, and highlights the full-employment surplus as the operational policy variable. 24

Viewed as general theories of income determination, both theories have deficiencies. The modern quantity theory seeks to explain prices, or money income, but often abstracts from the level of employment; the income-expenditure theory seeks to explain the levels of employment, but often abstracts from the price level; this difference in focus mirrors the change in the analytical roles of real balances and interest rates in the two theories. The quantity theory emphasis on real balances as an endogenous variable implies that the attempt by the monetary authorities to raise the money stock may cause prices to rise, and also cause nominal and real interest rates to diverge. In contrast, the income-expenditure theory, by de-emphasizing the endogeneity of real balances, implies that real balances and interest rates can be controlled (within limits) by the authorities—an impression that is reinforced by their failure to distinguish between nominal and real rates.

The analysis of money, interest rates, and prices in the post-Keynesian income theories may explain several of the troublesome features of recent stabilization policy: the use of market interest rates as an indicator of monetary policy; the tendency to minimize the price level consequences of excessive monetary growth; the failure to recognize the impact of inflationary expectations on market interest rates; the reluctance to distinguish between nominal and real quantities; and the conviction that the rise in market interest rates since 1966 was due to an increased demand for money, and not the result of excessive growth in the money supply. 25

The failure of income-expenditure theorists to consider the impact of accelerated (excessive) monetary growth on rising (or high) market interest rates, and to distinguish between market and real interest rates, is especially relevant for analyzing the post-1965 inflation and the stabilization difficulties since June 1968. The surprising failure of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of June 1968 to cool the economy thus far could be explained by noting that the fiscal "refrigeration" effect was offset by the monetary "boiler" effect. 26 The authorities, while fighting inflation with the surcharge, also wished to lower interest rates and move toward a tighter fiscal and easier monetary policy during this period, and this led to a very substantial increase in the monetary aggregates.

Many who favored monetary expansion after the June tax package based their case on the desirability (and social necessity) of lowering market interest rates. In retrospect, it seems difficult to suppose that an increase in nominal money will raise real balances, lower interest rates, curtail disintermediation, facilitate residential construction, and somehow not raise aggregate demand or prices. But an increase in the

24 The mnemonic statements that money is or is not important do not bring out the essential monetary differences between the income and quantity theories. In some ways the income-expenditure theory attaches greater significance to money than does the quantity theory. Thus, the income-expenditure theory assumes that it is often possible to permanently lower interest rates, or rates of return, by an increase in nominal money, while the quantity theory is more inclined to view nominal money changes as having a permanent effect mainly on money income and prices. Yet because quantity theorists are often analyzing situations where inappropriate monetary policies may have caused severe difficulties (e.g., in the 1930's), they may foster the impression that errors in monetary policy are always associated with such drastic consequences.

One other paradox may be noted. Many income-expenditure theorists treat the nominal money stock as an endogenous variable because they believe that this approach assumes less and is therefore more accurate. But while this treatment of the money stock is most appropriate in this formal sense, it may apparently also lead to substantive errors. For example, the large scale econometric models treat the nominal money stock as an endogenous variable, but do not restrict the movements in real balances by well-defined equilibrium conditions. The assumption that an increase in nominal balances will increase real balances may have been responsible for some of the forecasting errors and policy mistakes in 1968. This assumption may involve a more serious error, substantively and analytically, than treating the nominal money stock, formally, as an exogenous variable.

25 For a recent, and very useful, statement of the income theory approach to stabilization, incorporating a commitment to economic growth and viewing it as a key aspect of government policy, see W. Heller (ed.), Perspectives on Economic Growth (Random House, 1968). Because the contributors to this volume are outstanding, it may not be inappropriate to mention that the chapters dealing with stabilization policy and monetary theory provide examples illustrating the several questionable tendencies just summarized. Obviously these tendencies are not just limited to those whose understanding of the income theory may be questioned. It is for this reason that I do not regard these characteristics as analytical errors, but think of them as "methodological commitments" that may have become burdensome, and perhaps analytically oppressive.

26 See the cogent analysis by A. Wojnilower, "Blowing Hot and Cold," First Boston Corporation (September 1968).
money stock which takes place in the midst of an inflation will not only raise prices but also raise market interest rates. Nevertheless, if true, it suggests that an incredibly optimistic theory—based on a refusal to acknowledge the endogeneity of real cash balances and its implications for diverging nominal and real rates—may have contributed directly to the inflationary pressures which are still continuing; and it may also have contributed to our 1966 stabilization difficulties, if the authorities believed that monetary expansion would bring about lower interest rates.\(^\text{27}\)

The stabilization difficulties that we have experienced since 1965 may be related to two questionable propositions about money, which are implicit in many income-expenditure models: (1) that the authorities can affect real balances if they can control the nominal stock of money; and (2) that the authorities can influence real rates through central bank operations which change nominal market rates. Although both of these propositions are generally accepted, they have only a limited validity, and may lead to serious policy errors when applied to a high-pressure economy such as the United States in the post-1965 period.

In an underemployed economy, nominal quantities and nominal rates may move with real quantities and real rates, and real balances may be sufficiently flexible to be treated as a policy variable. But in a high-pressure economy with rising prices, nominal and real quantities no longer coincide; the real (value of the) money stock cannot be treated as a policy variable, and an increase in the money stock will not only raise prices but will raise market interest rates as well. A similar question arises regarding the behavior of interest rates. In a slack economy market interest rates and real rates move together; but in a high-employment economy with rising prices, market rates and real rates may diverge (see accompanying table). Indeed, in a period of price inflation, constant real rates are necessarily associated with rising market rates, so that movements in the market rates cannot always correspond to real rates.

The endogeneity of the real (value of the) money stock, as indicated by the divergence between nominal and real balances and by the divergence between real and nominal interest rates, is thus a manifestation of an economy approaching full utilization. And we need to investigate empirically when movements in interest rates and in money balances begin to diverge, and whether the divergence between real and nominal interest rates is related to the divergence between real and nominal balances.\(^\text{28}\)

Many investigators have commented on the monetary lag, and have suggested that because of this lag we would expect very sharp movements in interest rates—as the initial response to changes in the money stock. It is not clear how the monetary lag may be affected by the divergence between market and real interest rates and between nominal and real balances. Knowledge of the conditions when real and nominal balances diverge, of the process that causes interest rates to diverge, and of the mechanism through which the monetary lag operates, should be useful in improving stabilization policy. It would also help rec-

\(^{27}\) The fear of overkill articulated by influential sources in the summer of 1968 may have served to reconcile the views of those who favored the tax increase primarily as a stabilization measure to cool the inflation with the views of those who favored the tax increase to shift the policy mix to achieve lower interest rates and stimulate socially desirable capital expenditures.

\(^{28}\) Somewhere between the slack economy and the inflationary high-pressure economy there is a change in the relation between nominal and real balances and between nominal and real rates. Responsible policy officials must therefore identify and take account of the divergence between nominal and real rates, especially if they follow an interest rate criterion and use money market rates in the implementation of monetary policy decisions.
concise the income-expenditure and modern quantity theories and thus help complete the work initiated by Keynes by providing us with a truly general theory of employment, interest and money.

The Non-Monetary Theories of Price Level and Inflation

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that we do not have a satisfactory theory of the price level or of inflation. The post-Keynesian income and modern quantity theories provide different income determination models: the income-expenditure theory emphasizes the consumption function and other income-expenditure relationships; while the modern quantity theory emphasizes the demand for money and portfolio adjustments.29 As theories of national income both theories have limitations, as we have just noted, and neither theory provides us with an articulated theory of the price level and a basis for allocating a given change in national income into the fraction due to real output and the fraction due to price level changes.

The modern quantity theory, in the absence of an explicit theory of the price level, nevertheless assumes a link between money and prices, and views movements in the absolute price levels and inflationary (or deflationary) pressures as reflecting current and past changes in the money stock. The income-expenditure theory de-emphasizes any direct link between monetary assets and prices, and highlights non-monetary factors in explaining upward movements in the price level and inflation. This is particularly evident in the recent large scale econometric models (Brookings, Michigan, Wharton, FRB-MIT), which do not incorporate monetary (or fiscal) variables directly to explain the price level; they base the prediction equations for the absolute price level on concepts and empirical regularities that may be appropriate for micro-analysis and for the determination of relative price movements.30

29The capital-theoretic orientation of the post-Keynesian quantity theory, emphasizing portfolio choice and the substitutability of money for other assets, has been heavily influenced by the Keynesian Liquidity Preference theory. Unlike the older quantity theory based either on the payoffs relations of the transactions approach or the store of value relations of the Cambridge approach, it follows the Keynesian theory in treating the demand for money as a problem in capital theory, focussing on the composition of the balance sheet and the selection of assets. See J. Tobin, "A Dynamic Aggregative Model," Journal of Political Economy, April 1955, and "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk," Review of Economic Studies, February 1958; and M. Friedman (ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, op. cit.

30In their progress report on the Federal Reserve-MIT model, F. DeLeeuw and E. Gramlich summarize the findings of the econometric models as follows: "The evidence from several of the large econometric models—the Wharton School Model, the Commerce Department Model, the Michigan Model, and to a lesser extent the Brookings Model—suggests that monetary forces are rather unimportant in influencing total demand. See F. DeLeeuw and E. Gramlich, "The Channels of Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1969.

As an illustration, consider the recent (preliminary) FRB-MIT model of the price-wage-labor sector which follows the other large scale models in basing prices on unit labor costs, other markup factors, and introduces additional variables to pick up the influence of demand shifts or oligopoly pricing.31 This is essentially a non-monetary theory of the price level. It seems to suggest that a general excise or uniform sales tax (10 per cent on all commodities) would raise prices; yet an income tax, designed to yield the same dollar amount, would presumably lower prices and certainly not cause them to rise. But a conclusion that a uniform excise tax raises the price level, while an income tax which produces equivalent revenue would lower prices seems paradoxical. Moreover, since there are no explicit specifications given for the money stock we have the following strange results:

1. an excise tax may be inflationary even when the revenue is impounded and the stock of money is reduced; and

2. an income tax is deflationary when the stock of money is maintained, or even when allowed to grow at an accelerated rate. This paradox illustrates the difficulties of explaining absolute price level movements with concepts that are appropriate for relative price analysis, and of using an

31F. DeLeeuw and E. Gramlich in "The Channels of Monetary Policy", op. cit., describe it as follows: "Prices are assumed to be a variable markup over wages, with excise taxes completely shifted onto consumers. The variables determining the markup are the productivity trend which allows producers to maintain profit shares even though wages rise faster than prices, farm and import prices which measure other costs, and the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments, which indicates demand shifts."

aggregative theory that does not incorporate any direct influence of money on prices.\textsuperscript{32}

The drift towards non-monetary theories of the absolute price level is not a new development in the 1960's; it has been going on steadily since the end of World War II. And though these theories may have descriptive (or analytical) relevance in suggesting either the initiating factors, or the process in particular price level movements, they are not easily integrated into a coherent set of anti-inflationary policies. Moreover, if the absolute price level is indeed a function of unit labor costs, markup factors, new or unfilled orders, and other non-monetary factors, then it does sharply limit the scope of the traditional stabilization measures which are geared to a demand inflation. In addition, the focus given to the non-monetary aspects by the theorists of the "new inflation" may have also diverted attention from the "classical inflation" due to expansive monetary-fiscal policies. The conjuncture of all these factors may help explain our inability to identify and deal effectively with the post-1965 inflation in the United States.

The following six-stage sketch of inflation theory, which summarizes its evolution since World War II, illustrates the shift in emphasis away from the effects of aggregate demand on prices, toward an emphasis of the effects of costs and aggregate supply. The purging of monetary variables from inflation (and price level) theory is also pointed out. One inference emerging from this sketch is that more attention needs to be given to the monetary aggregates and their effect on aggregate demand, if we wish to improve our ability to forecast price level developments and deal more effectively with inflation.\textsuperscript{33}

(1) The "inflationary gap" analysis developed by Keynes during World War II focused on an economy where prices were rising because of an excess of aggregate demand over supply. Unlike the classical quantity theory formulation, it did not assume any particular link from money to aggregate demand, but was intended as an improved theory of an excess-demand inflation. This approach fell into disfavor when the postwar employment forecasts for 1946 and 1947, based on inflationary gap analysis, turned out very badly, and it was widely recognized that the income-expenditure relations were not properly specified in monetary terms. Not surprisingly, this analysis went out of style at the end of the 1940's.

(2) Since the early 1950's, the post-Keynesian income models have typically emphasized the role of aggregate demand in employment while de-emphasizing its impact on price level movements. One of the earliest cost inflation theories — the wage-push model — was accepted by many neo-Keynesians as an explanation of the creeping inflation of the 1950's; and it seemed to be a consistent application of the Keynesian doctrine that a cut in the money wage will cause prices to fall (by the same amount) and will not, therefore, stimulate employment in the depressions. The Keynesian view that the real wage is determined independently, and not influenced by changes in the money wage, would also seem to suggest that rising prices are due to rising wages. Later versions of cost inflation models stressed markup pricing, sectoral shifts, and administered (non-market clearing) prices. And since creeping inflation was generally associated with a reduction in aggregate supply due either to rising factor costs or to shifts in demand, it seemed to follow quite naturally that a reduction in aggregate demand was not an appropriate policy for fighting inflation.

The wide acceptance of the thesis that the creeping inflation of the 1950's (viewed as the typical inflation of advanced industrial countries) was basically an aggregate supply phenomenon had two important consequences: it rationalized the view that monetary policy should play only a very minor role in fighting inflation and it also lent support to the view that the stabilization authorities should focus directly on the behavior of wages and prices and explore new stabilization techniques such as incomes policies, wage-price guidelines, and possibly including indicative planning and other techniques of supply management.\textsuperscript{34}

(3) Reinforcing the ideal that creeping inflation was an aggregate supply phenomenon, and requiring therefore a national wage-guidepost (or incomes) policy, was the growing skepticism about whether monetary policy could play any constructive role in stabilization. First, there was a general concern that a restrictive monetary policy would reduce output but not succeed in lowering prices; second, it was suggested that the monetary authorities may not always be able to control the stock of


\textsuperscript{33}Professor C. Haberler is an outstanding exception to this tendency, His Inflation: Its Causes and Consequences (Washington, 1966), first published in 1961, emphasized the need for coordinated monetary and fiscal policy in fighting a demand inflation.


\textsuperscript{34}See the Joint Economic Committee volume on The Relation of Prices to the Economic Stability and Growth (Washington, 1958) for a fairly comprehensive compendium of non-monetary inflation theories that were developed to explain the creeping inflation of the 1950's.
privately held liquid assets through their control of the money stock; and finally, that aggregate demand was functionally related to the total volume of liquid assets and not to one component of this total — such as the narrow money stock.36

(4) The cost inflation models assume that creeping inflation (unlike galloping inflation) is an aggregate supply phenomenon and not due to an increase in aggregate demand. They differ only in the specific mechanism that they single out: some focus on unions and wage-push; others on markup pricing, on market power and bargaining strength, and on administered prices. But they all assume an autonomous rise in factor costs, a reduction in aggregate supply, and a rise in prices, even though aggregate demand is stable. Similarly, although the demand-shift inflation model does not initiate the process with an autonomous rise in factor costs, it follows the cost models in explaining the price rise without introducing any notion of excess demand.

(5) At the close of the 1950’s, Samuelson, Solow, and others developed the “trade-off” analysis of creeping inflation. They start with a Phillips Curve — a function relating unemployment and percentage changes in money wage rates — and derive from this a trade-off function — which relates unemployment and the rate of price change. They suggest that the unemployment rate at a stable price level may be unbeareably high and socially unacceptable, and that we may have to accept a given degree of inflation (a specified rise in the price level) if we wish to lower the unemployment rate. If this trade-off function, incorporating a dynamic money-illusion effect, applies to the steady-state and is not just a temporary phenomenon, it implies that the degree of inflation is related to the level of unemployment that society will tolerate. It also suggest that we may have inflationary recessions — even substantial unemployment does not necessarily guarantee us a stable price level. From an analytical point of view this theory is a radical departure from traditional analysis in assuming that real variables (the level of employment and of output) are not independent of nominal variables (the price level), even in the long run.37


36 Although the trade-off function between unemployment and inflation is widely accepted, its interpretation does pose several questions for inflation theory: Are the trade-off estimates, interpreted as long-run steady-state relations, consistent with our accumulated experience with inflation? Are the trade-off estimates, which assume a long learning period, consistent with our theories of anticipated inflations and expectational behavior? Does the trade-off analysis suggest any role for monetary policy in avoiding or in combating inflation by shifting the trade-off function? And is such a role consistent with the growing volume of empirical studies of the monetary sector?

This review of inflation theory illustrates the proliferation of non-monetary price level and cost inflation theories since the end of World War II, stressing (a) autonomous increases in factor costs, (b) shifts in demand, (c) administered prices and market power, (d) the trade-off function between unemployment and price level changes, and (e) markets in disequilibrium. These “new inflation” theories reflect a growing consensus among income-expenditure theorists throughout this period that monetary variables are not the causal, independent, or active factors affecting output, employment, or prices. The widespread acceptance of these new inflation theories, both in the academic world and in business circles, seemed to vindicate the monetary views of the in-

come-expenditure theorists, and helped explain the experiments—in the United States and in Western Europe—with new inflation weapons such as incomes policies, wage-price guideposts, indicative planning and other elements of supply management.

Nevertheless, the failure to introduce monetary variables in the analysis of the price level and in inflation theory does seem strange. Whatever relevance or validity these non-monetary theories may have had in explaining, or in providing, effective policies for coping with the creeping inflation of the 1950's, they are clearly inappropriate for the inflation of the 1960's. A credible explanation of our recent inflation surely must take account of excess demand and the high rates of monetary expansion since 1965. Whether or not this rate of monetary expansion was inevitable, given the Vietnam War, it surely played a major and substantial role in our recent inflation.

The tendency to exclude any direct influence of money on prices and to stress real (non-monetary) factors in explaining the absolute price level has generated an intellectual climate in which it is easy to neglect the behavior of the monetary aggregates. And when income-expenditure theorists highlight the effect of monetary policy on interest rates, they necessarily minimize the effect on prices, for this is implicit in allowing real balances to behave as if they were a policy variable. In consequence, when they were faced with the need to explain the creeping inflation and price level movements of the 1950's, they sought to locate the cause among the aggregate supply variables such as wage-push, markups, sellers' inflation, or in demand shifts. Admittedly, this inflation theory was not designed to serve as the analytical model for analyzing a demand inflation such as that we have experienced since the Vietnam escalation in 1965. Nevertheless, the stressing of real factors in the theory of the price level has made it difficult for many income-expenditure theorists to see the relevance of the substantial growth in the money stock in the recent inflation, even while freely conceding that it is a classical demand inflation. Our experience since 1965 suggests that we direct our attention to the money stock and its effect on aggregate demand and prices. It also suggests that the emphasis given to real factors in explaining the post-1965 inflation and to discretionary fiscal policy for coping with it, and the relative neglect of the monetary aggregates, is an inheritance from the past that needs to be re-examined.38


Fiscal Policy Assumptions and Related Multipliers

The theory of fiscal policy highlights the direct income-generating effects of government deficits and surpluses and the stabilization aspects of the cumulative multiplier expansion process; but the theory often ignores the interest rate or capital market effects, and invariably abstracts from any associated money stock effects. The simplest presentation may be summarized as follows: an increase in government spending is viewed as a direct demand for goods and services; reductions in tax rates are viewed as directly affecting consumer spending, investment, and aggregate demand; and the initial increase in spending is viewed as setting off a cumulative expansion as given by the multiplier process.49 More advanced discussions go beyond the 45° diagram, introduce the Hicksian IS-LM analysis to account for the capital market effects of changes in fiscal policy; but even this more advanced analysis typically abstracts from the money creation aspects that may be associated with a cumulative expansion.

A widely quoted statement describing the "Workings of the Multiplier" in the Economic Report of the President for 1963 illustrates this tendency to omit the capital market and money creation aspects.49 The direct income-generating effects of the deficit are stressed, but no indication is given whether the rise in income requires stable interest rates, an elastic monetary policy, or a deficit financed through the banking system. Thus, the case for a discretionary tax cut and a reduction in the full-employment surplus, as presented by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in 1963, does not bring in any explicit discussion of the method in which the deficit is financed. Their position is stated as follows:

"Tax reduction will directly increase the disposable income and purchasing power of consumers and business, strengthen incentives and expectations, and raise the net returns on new capital investment. This will lead to initial increases in private consumption and investment expenditures. These in-

49 The volume of readings, American Fiscal Policy: Experiment for Prosperity (Prentice-Hall, 1967), edited by L. Thow, is a good example. With very few exceptions, the individual papers either abstract from, or ignore, monetary factors, and do not cite any empirical evidence to justify the strategic role assigned to discretionary changes in the full-employment surplus. It appears that such justification was not felt necessary, because the very substantial growth in GNP since 1964 was widely interpreted as the result of the 1964 tax cut and reduction in the full-employment surplus.

creases in spending will set off a cumulative expansion, generating further increases in consumption and investment spending and a general rise in production, income and employment.

The analysis of the 1964 tax cut presented by Arthur Okun in 1965 explicitly justifies the omission of any capital market or monetary effects. Although Okun accepts the view that significant changes in the cost or availability of credit would have an important influence on business investment, he does not make allowance for these factors in his quantitative estimates of the multiplier. He rationalizes his procedure as follows:

... in practice, dealing with the period of the last year and a half, I cannot believe that the omission of monetary variables can make a serious difference. By any measure of interest rates or credit conditions I know, there have been no significant monetary changes that would have either stimulated or restrained investment to a major degree.

He does concede that “the maintenance of stable interest rates and stable credit conditions requires monetary action” and that at least to this extent, “monetary policies have made a major contribution to the advance.” But in his view, “that contribution is appropriately viewed as permissive rather than causal.” Okun’s analysis, presented in August 1965, attributing the GNP expansion to the tax-cut multiplier, was a strict fiscal policy interpretation, in contrast to other (monetary and eclectic) interpretations that were presented at that time. His analysis was not modified when it was published in 1968.

If the fiscal approach, with its multiplier analysis, emphasizes the deficit or surplus and relegates both the interest rate and the money creation aspects to a secondary role, the monetary approach emphasizes the money stock effects. To the monetarist, the impact of fiscal actions will depend crucially on how the government deficit is financed: expenditures financed either by taxing or borrowing involve a transfer of resources (from the public to the government), with both interest rates and wealth effects on private portfolios, but the net effect of a temporary change in fiscal policy on spending may be ambiguous. Similarly, the effect of a reduction in taxes on private demand, financed through borrowing, will depend on the extent to which it is viewed as a permanent, or temporary, tax cut, and its effect on market interest rates. Accordingly, the direct income-generating effects of a deficit—the pure fiscal effect—may be quite small and uncertain. On the other hand, if the deficit is financed through money creation by the banking system— if the deficit is monetized—the effect is unambiguously expansionary.

Many income theorists recognized that the multiplier analysis based on the 45° diagram was inadequate, and modified their analysis to take account of interest rate effects through the Hicksian IS-LM framework. But even this modification, while a step in the right direction, does not really make allowance for the money creation aspects of deficits. What is needed is a macroeconomic model, where the monetary effects of the deficit are taken up by introducing an explicit government budget restraint. Recent studies along these lines suggest that many of the standard propositions about the multiplier need to be revised.

Aside from these theoretical reasons, the need to separate out the monetary effects from the fiscal effects has been highlighted by the recent Andersen-Jordan study, testing the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal actions in stabilization. Their re-

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43Okun, in a note added in June 1967 to his 1965 analysis of the tax cut, does concede that “any analysis of fiscal impact that considered the more recent period could no longer treat monetary policy as a passive supporting force, nor could it continue to ignore the influence of higher levels of aggregate demand on prices.” See W. W. Heller (ed.), op. cit., pp. 27-28.


results, while preliminary and subject to further testing, do suggest that the theory of fiscal policy (in the income-expenditure framework), with its emphasis on discretionary changes in the full-employment surplus as the key stabilization instrument, may be incorrect or only partially correct. Their findings also suggest that the tax and expenditure multipliers, as estimated in many income models, tend to confound a ceteris paribus fiscal action (excluding money stock effects), with a mutatis mutandis fiscal action (incorporating both monetary and fiscal effects).

The need to revise the standard multiplier theory and to develop more discriminating empirical tests of the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal actions is recognized even among fiscal policy advocates. There is a significant modification of the multiplier theory in the Economic Report of the President for 1969, stressing two points in particular: (1) "the results of this multiplier process are affected by the amount of unused resources available in the economy"; and (2) monetary policy does affect the magnitude of the multiplier.

Developments in financial markets may influence the magnitude of the multiplier. Increases in demands for goods and services will tend to enlarge credit demands. Unless monetary policy permits supplies of funds to expand correspondingly, interest rates will rise and credit will become less readily available. In that event, some offsetting reduction is likely to take place in residential construction and other credit-sensitive expenditures. Generally this will be a partial offset, varying according to how much the supply of credit is permitted to expand.46

There is therefore a growing consensus that multiplier theory needs to separate out the monetary effects from the pure fiscal effects, in order to develop meaningful tests of the relative contribution of monetary and fiscal policy in stabilization. In particular, we need to define and measure monetary variables so as to separate out exogenous changes in the money stock, resulting from actions taken by the monetary authorities—from endogenous money stock changes—resulting from shifts in the demand for money, so as to remove the identification problem in a manner that is acceptable to the income-expenditure theorists. We also need to define a pure ceteris paribus fiscal action with restrictions on the growth rate for the monetary aggregates that is acceptable to the monetarists. A revision of multiplier theory along these lines would enable us to distinguish analytically, and estimate, ceteris paribus fiscal and monetary multipliers, and thus bridge some of the gap between the income-expenditure theory and the quantity theory. But it requires that we find an acceptable method to separate out endogenous and exogenous changes in the money stock, and to estimate empirically the money stock effects of deficits and surpluses.

Fiscal deficits are obviously often associated with, if not directly responsible for, substantial increases in the monetary aggregates. Our recent experience reminds us once again that a fiscal deficit, financed by the banking system, will tend to accelerate the growth in the money stock; while a fiscal surplus, whether impounded or used to retire debt, will tend to decelerate the money stock growth. And if the fiscal deficit is financed in part through accelerated monetary expansion, as was the case since the Vietnam escalation in 1965, the growth in GNP reflects the combined effects of fiscal and monetary action.

Monetary policy, measured in terms of the money stock, typically changes in the same direction as fiscal policy. Accordingly, what we observe in most periods (like the 1964 tax cut) is the effect of a combined action incorporating both monetary and fiscal elements. It is therefore fortunate for the development of stabilization theory that they were working in opposite directions on two occasions in recent years—thus providing an interesting test case. In 1966 a sharp increase in the deficit was matched by a very substantial tightening in monetary policy; and the crunch in the latter half of 1966 and the mini-recession in early 1967 clearly demonstrate the power of monetary policy. Similarly in 1968, the very substantial increase in the full-employment surplus enacted in the June 1968 Revenue and Expenditure Control Act (and giving rise to widespread fear of overkill) was apparently offset by the preceding and subsequent growth in the monetary aggregates. In these cases, the monetary forces seem to have been the stronger ones, not relatively minor (or permissive) factors that can only accommodate (or validate) fiscal policy actions. Hence there has been renewed interest in their relative contribution to stabilization.

This, then, brings us to our first question: How do we define the ceteris paribus fiscal action if monetary policy and fiscal policy often move in the same direction? The income-expenditure theorists, who define this

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as a fiscal action with interest rates held constant, are calibrating monetary policy in a manner which is consistent with their view of the transmission mechanism. On this definition, a ceteris paribus fiscal deficit may require a very substantial increase in the stock of money; and appears to the monetarist as a mutatis mutandis effect. To the monetarist, a ceteris paribus deficit requires a given money stock growth rate, which may lead to a rise in the interest rate; and to fiscal policy advocates, this appears as an offsetting action since the rise in interest rates (which they use to calibrate the posture of monetary policy) is restrictive and tends to offset the income-generating effects of the deficit. The ceteris paribus effect for deficits or surpluses, as defined by the monetarist, will necessarily differ from the definition adopted by the fiscal policy advocates. This point is illustrated in a recent study of monetary and fiscal influences on economic activity for the period 1919-69. The evidence summarized in Table I indicates that when we regress economic activity on fiscal policy, the relation is fairly good. If, however, we include a monetary activity on fiscal policy, the relation is fairly strong, as defined by the monetarist, is either statistically insignificant or has the wrong sign. The evidence summarized in Tables I and II illustrates the problem of separating out the fiscal effect from the effect due to the monetary aggregate.

This difference in concepts helps explain the existence of a fairly pronounced communications gap. What a monetarist regards as a ceteris paribus deficit may entail a rise in interest rates, and will therefore appear as an offsetting action to the fiscal advocate; what a fiscal advocate regards as a ceteris paribus fiscal effect may entail accelerated growth in the money stock, and will therefore appear as a mutatis mutandis monetary effect to the monetarist. This applies especially to the analysis of the 1964 tax cut.

The money stock effects of deficits and surpluses need to be quantified if we are to obtain a realistic formulation of the government budget restraint. Once this is done we may be able to estimate the differential effects of non-monetized and monetized deficits, and obtain acceptable estimates of fiscal multipliers— for the ceteris paribus and for the mutatis mutandis cases. We would also like to derive such estimates for the monetarist who calibrates monetary actions in

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**Table I**

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<tr>
<th>Time Periods</th>
<th>Logs</th>
<th>a0</th>
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<th>a2 ΔE (sum)</th>
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<th>D-W</th>
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<tr>
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<td>.36</td>
<td>5.62</td>
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<td>11/1939 — 11/46</td>
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<td>-2.12</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.66</td>
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<td>11/1947 — 11/52</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/1953 — 11/69</td>
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<td>8.85</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
<td>.47</td>
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Note: Regression coefficients are the top figures; their "t" statistics appear below each coefficient, enclosed by parentheses. R² is the percent of variations in the dependent variable which is explained by variations in the independent variable. D-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic.

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**Table II**

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<th>Time Periods</th>
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<th>a2 ΔE (sum)</th>
<th>R²</th>
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Note: Regression coefficients are the top figures; their "t" statistics appear below each coefficient, enclosed by parentheses. R² is the percent of variations in the dependent variable which is explained by variations in the independent variable. D-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic.

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**Table III**

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<th>Time Periods</th>
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<th>R²</th>
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<td>11/1919 — 1/1969</td>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/1919 — 11/29</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/1929 — 11/39</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>-7.97</td>
<td>.39</td>
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<td>11/1939 — 11/46</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>-2.12</td>
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<td>.66</td>
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<td>11/1947 — 11/52</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>13.82</td>
<td>-3.37</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/1953 — 11/69</td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
<td>.47</td>
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Note: Regression coefficients are the top figures; their "t" statistics appear below each coefficient, enclosed by parentheses. R² is the percent of variations in the dependent variable which is explained by variations in the independent variable. D-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic.

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Michael Keran, "Monetary and Fiscal Influences on Economic Activity—The Historical Evidence" in the November 1969 issue of this Review.
terms of the money stock growth, and for the fiscal advocates who calibrate monetary policy in terms of interest rates. Once this is done, we may be able to translate the results obtained in these two frameworks. This should help bridge the communication gap, and it may also help reconcile the two opposing points of view.48

Conclusion

In this paper we have discussed four issues in monetary theory which seem central to many of the recent discussions and debates concerning monetary policy. The first issue is the extent to which the central bank can control the nominal money stock. This issue has been raised by those who find it more natural to formulate Federal Reserve policy in terms of money market and instrument variables, by those who follow the interest rate transmission mechanism specified by the income-expenditure theory and prefer an interest rate criterion for policy making, and by those who believe that the money stock is, in part, an endogenous variable and therefore question whether it can serve as an indicator or target variable. We have tried to formulate these different viewpoints in terms of a money supply function, and reported results of empirical tests which compared the short-run money supply functions (excluding feedbacks from the real sector) with a longer-run, reduced form money supply function (allowing for feedbacks). Our preliminary findings seem to suggest that the central bank has sufficient control of the money stock to make it conform to a given set of guidelines, but that its control may be weaker (and less precise), the shorter the time period available to achieve a given objective. This would suggest that the degree of precision expected of the monetary authorities is not independent of the time period that they have to achieve the policy guidelines.

48A technique that enabled us to separate out exogenous changes in the money stock due to monetary policy from endogenous changes induced by the real sector would also enable us to estimate a ceteris paribus fiscal action in terms of exogenous money stock behavior. This approach would, in principle, be acceptable to the fiscal advocates. See K. M. Carlson and D. S. Karnosky, op. cit.

The second question that we have explored is the relation between nominal and real quantities in the income-expenditure theory and modern quantity theory. The stabilization difficulties that we have experienced in the last several years may be related to two propositions about money which have been widely accepted in many of the income models. These are: (1) that the authorities can influence real balances if they can control nominal balances; and (2) that the authorities can influence real interest rates (and rates of return) by operations which change nominal market rates. Both of these propositions may lead to serious policy errors when applied to a high-pressure economy such as the United States in the post-1965 period.

The third topic that we have considered is various theories of the price level and related frameworks for analyzing inflation. We find that there has been a tendency since World War II to divorce money from prices, to stress real factors in explaining the absolute price level, and to neglect even substantial movements in the monetary aggregates. Moreover, when income theorists highlight the short-run effect of money on interest rates — the liquidity effect — and treat it as a permanent effect, they necessarily minimize the effect on prices. This corresponds to treating real balances as if it were a variable that could be influenced by the monetary authorities. Having ruled out any direct link between money and prices, income theorists necessarily explain the post-1965 rise in the price level by bringing in aggregate supply variables, other real sector developments, Vietnam escalation, and inappropriate fiscal policy, but continue to abstract from the very substantial growth in the money stock and other monetary aggregates.

The fourth problem that we have considered is that of defining ceteris paribus and mutatis mutandis fiscal effects. A ceteris paribus fiscal deficit — holding money stock growth constant — allows interest rates to rise and will therefore appear as an offsetting action to a fiscal advocate; while a ceteris paribus fiscal deficit — holding interest rates constant — allows money stock growth rates to increase, and appears as a mutatis mutandis effect to the monetarist. These concepts need to be defined both for the monetarists and the fiscal advocates, in order to translate the results obtained in the two frameworks. This may help bridge some of the communications gap in stabilization theory, and also help reconcile the two points of view.

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