When and How To Exit Quantitative Easing?

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Since the onset of the financial crisis in late 2007, the Federal Reserve has injected an astronomical amount of money into the economy through its large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs. According to former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke (2009, p. 5), the essence of LSAP is “credit easing” (CE)—that is, reducing the cost of private borrowing by direct purchases of privately issued debt instead of government debt. However, given that the government has no intention to hold private debt on its balance sheet forever, at some point the Fed must sell it.

The goal of this article is to answer the following questions about the likely effects of the Fed’s exit strategies:

- Will the Fed’s exit from quantitative easing (QE) undo the gains of LSAPs (if any)?
- Do the timing and pace of the exit matter?

Should the exit be state dependent, and how would the economy respond to a fully anticipated exit compared with an unanticipated exit?

In this article, I use a calibrated general equilibrium model to shed light on these questions. The model’s framework features explicit asset purchases by the government that mimic the real-world scenario. In this article, QE, CE, and LSAPs are considered synonymous. To highlight the general equilibrium effects of QE and facilitate the study of exit strategies, I use a real model in which long-run inflation is fully anchored, consistent with the fact that the U.S. inflation rate has remained stable and below the 2 percent target since the implementation of QE in 2008. In the real model, all transactions and payments are conducted by the exchange/transfer of goods, so there is no need to distinguish monetary authority from fiscal authority. More specifically, I assume there is a consolidated government that can purchase private assets using revenues raised by lump-sum taxes or sales of public debt.¹

My basic findings can be summarized as follows. Assuming that inflation is fully anchored, the longer and more massively the Fed can hold private debt on its balance sheet before the adverse financial shocks dissipate, the more likely QE will be able to stimulate aggregate investment and employment. In other words, QE is unlikely to have any significant effect on the economy if its scope is too small and too transitory. However, when the aggregate shocks are not permanent, QE may lower the steady-state output if the Fed never exits QE. Consequently, not only does an optimal timing of the Fed’s exit exist (depending on the persistence of the financial shocks), but the pace of the exit and whether the exit is anticipated or unanticipated also matter. In particular, it is optimal for the exit to be completely unanticipated by the public to preserve the maximum gains on aggregate output and employment achieved under QE. However, once the exit starts, it is better for it to be quick rather than gradual. Accordingly, it would be a mistake for the Fed to pre-announce or discuss in advance the timing of an exit from QE soon after it was implemented; this sort of announcement would shorten the effective duration of QE anticipated by the public. On the other hand, if the exit is too gradual, the long-run adverse effects of QE would arise and thus offset the benefits from QE gained in the earlier periods.

My model is a fairly standard, off-the-shelf model based on the recent macro-finance literature.² A key feature of this class of models is that an endogenously determined distribution of heterogeneous creditors/debtors (instead of households’ time preferences per se) pins down the real interest rate and asset prices in the asset market through the demand and supply of privately issued debt. QE influences the real economy by affecting the allocation (distributions) of credit/debt in asset markets. Two key assumptions in the model dictate my results:

(i) Debtors are relatively more productive than creditors—in other words, more productive agents opt to issue debt and less productive agents opt to lend.

(ii) Financial markets are incomplete—that is, agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks and are borrowing constrained.

Under these fairly standard assumptions, the following properties emerge naturally from the model. First, the demand for liquid assets increases despite their low returns relative to
capital investment. Second, when the cost of borrowing is reduced, marginal creditors self-select to become debtors, which can raise the quantity of aggregate debt but also unambiguously lower the average quality (efficiency) of loans.

Given these core properties, it is clear that QE’s main effect on aggregate output is changing the distribution of credit/debt in the financial market—that is, QE pushes more creditors to become debtors, which in turn increases the total quantity of loans but at the same time decreases the average efficiency of loans. When economic activities depend not only on the extent and scope of credit but also on the quality of loans, such a trade-off between quantity and quality implies two things: (i) Aggregate output and employment are insensitive to small-scale temporary asset purchases even with relatively large changes in the real interest rate and asset prices (Wen, 2013). And (ii) QE’s positive quantitative effect on aggregate investment may dominate its adverse qualitative effect in the short run to mitigate negative financial shocks if asset purchases are sufficiently large and persistent relative to the magnitudes of financial shocks. This property renders QE much less effective if its exit is fully anticipated. On the other hand, since permanent QE may reduce the steady-state output when financial shocks are not permanent, it is desirable to exit not only at a certain point in time, but also as quickly as possible once the exit starts.

THE MODEL

The key actors in the model are firms, which make production and investment decisions in an uncertain world. There is a credit market where firms can lend/borrow from each other by issuing/purchasing private debt. Firms face idiosyncratic uncertainty in the rate of return to their investment projects, modeled specifically as an idiosyncratic shock to the marginal efficiency of firm-level investment (as specified below). In any period, some firms opt to lend and some opt to borrow, depending on their draws of the idiosyncratic shock to the return on investment projects. The real interest rate will then be determined endogenously by the supply and demand of private debt.

Government

The consolidated government uses lump-sum taxes on household income to finance purchases of private debt. Total private debt purchased by the government in period $t$ is denoted by $B_{t+1}$ and the market price of private debt by $\frac{1}{1+r_t}$, where $r_t$ is the real interest rate on private debt. Total money supply at the end of period $t$ is denoted by $M_{t+1}$, the aggregate price level by $P_t$, and the inflation rate by $1 + \pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}$. The government budget constraint in each period is given by

$$G_t + \frac{1}{1+r_t} B_{t+1} = B_t + \frac{(M_{t+1} - M_t)}{P_t} + T_t,$$

(1)
where the left-hand side is total government expenditures and the right-hand side is total government revenues. Government outlays include government spending \( G_t \) and new purchases of private debt \( B_{t+1} \) at price \( \frac{1}{1+r_t} \). Total government revenues include debt repayment \( B_t \) from the private sector, real seigniorage income \( \frac{(M_{t+1} - M_t)}{P_t} \), and lump-sum taxes \( T_t \).

**Firms' Problem**

There is a continuum of firms indexed by \( i \in [0,1] \). A firm \( i \)'s objective is to maximize the present value of its discounted future dividends,

\[
V_i(i) = \max E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} d_{t+1}(i),
\]

where \( d_t(i) \) is firm \( i \)'s dividend in period \( t \) and \( \Lambda_t \) is the representative household's marginal utility, which firms take as given. The production technology is given by the constant returns to scale function

\[
y_i(i) = A_t k_i(i)^{\alpha} n_i(i)^{1-\alpha},
\]

where \( A_t \) represents the aggregate technology level and \( n_i(i) \) and \( k_i(i) \) are firm-level employment and capital, respectively. Firms accumulate their own capital stock through the law of motion,

\[
k_{t+1}(i) = (1-\delta) k_t(i) + \varepsilon_t(i) x_t(i),
\]

where investment \( x_t(i) \) denotes investment and is irreversible,

\[
x_t(i) \geq 0;
\]

and \( \varepsilon_t(i) \) is an i.i.d. idiosyncratic shock to the marginal efficiency of investment. In each period \( t \), a firm needs to pay wages \( W_t n_t(i) \), decide whether to invest in fixed capital, and distribute dividends \( d_t(i) \) to households. Firms' investment is financed by internal cash flow and external funds. Firms raise external funds by issuing one-period debt (bonds), \( b_{t+1}(i) \), which pay the competitive market interest rate \( r_t \). Note that \( b_{t+1}(i) < 0 \) when a firm holds bonds issued by other firms (i.e., \( b_{t+1}(i) \) can be either positive or negative).

A firm's dividend in period \( t \) is then given by

\[
d_t(i) = y_t(i) + \frac{b_{t+1}(i)}{1+r_t} - i_t(i) - w_t n_t(i) - (1-P_t) b_t(i),
\]

where the probability of default or the aggregate default risk of private debt is denoted by \( P_t \).

For ease of exposition, we temporarily set \( P_t = 0 \) and defer further discussion to the section entitled “State-Contingent QE.” Firms cannot pay negative dividends,
which is the same as saying that fixed investment is financed entirely by internal cash flow 
\((y_t(i) - W_t(i))\) and external funds net of loan repayment \(\left(\frac{b_{t+1}(i)}{1+r_t} - b_t(i)\right)\). The idiosyncratic 
shock to investment efficiency has the cumulative distribution function \(F(e)\).

Loans are subject to collateral constraints. That is, firm \(i\) is allowed to pledge a fraction 
\(\theta \in [0,1]\) of its fixed capital stock \(k_t(i)\) at the beginning of period \(t\) as collateral. In general, the 
parameter \(\theta\) represents the extent of financial market imperfections or the tightness of the 
financial market. At the end of period \(t\), the pledged collateral is priced by the market value 
of newly installed capital, so the market value of collateral is simply Tobin's \(q\), denoted by \(q_t\), 
which is equivalent to the expected value of a firm that owns collateralizable capital stock 
\(\theta k_t(i)\). The borrowing constraint is thus given by

\[
(8) \quad b_{t+1}(i) \leq \theta q_t k_t(i),
\]

which specifies that any new debt issued cannot exceed the collateral value \((q_t)\) of a firm with 
the pledged capital stock \(\theta k_t(i)\). When \(\theta = 0\) for all \(t\), the model is identical to one that prohibits 
external financing.

Firms affect both the supply and demand of private debt, and they may also affect the 
demand for money when the real rate of return on money dominates that on private debt. To 
simplify the analysis, I start with the equilibrium condition that 
\[
\frac{1}{1+r_t} < 1+\pi
\]

so that firms hold only private debt and no money. When this condition is violated (i.e., when 
\(\frac{1}{1+\pi} = 1+r_t\)), the two assets become perfect substitutes. In this case, firms are indifferent between holding money 
and private debt, and their portfolios are determined in equilibrium by the aggregate supply 
of each asset. This situation is called a “liquidity trap.”

The Household’s Problem

There is a representative household, and it is assumed that the household is subject to the 
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint for consumption purchases, \(C_t \leq \frac{M_t}{P_t}\). Since firms may 
also hold money as an alternative store of value, the CIA constraint implies that the household 
is always the residual claimant of the aggregate money stock whenever the CIA constraint 
bounds. Because there is a liquidity premium on the privately issued bonds and households do 
not face idiosyncratic risk and incomplete financial markets, the rate of return to private bonds 
is dominated by that of equity. Hence, the household does not hold private bonds in equilibrium. The representative household chooses nominal money demand \(M_{t+1}\), consumption 
plan \(C_t\), labor supply \(N_t\), and share holdings \(s_{t+1}(i)\) of each firm \(i\) to solve
subject to the constraints,

\[ C_t \leq \frac{M_t}{P_t} \]

where \( T_t \) denotes lump-sum income taxes, \( s_t(i) \in [0,1] \) denotes firm \( i \)’s equity shares, and \( V_t(i) \) denotes the value of the firm (stock price). Let \( \Lambda \) be the Lagrangian multiplier of budget constraint (11); the first-order condition for \( s_{t+1}(i) \) is given by

\[ V_t(i) = d_t(i) + E, \beta \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} V_{t+1}(i) \]

Equation (12) implies that the stock price \( V_t(i) \) of firm \( i \) is determined by the present value of the firm’s discounted future dividends, as in equation (2).

**COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM**

Given (i) the initial money balance of the household \( M_0 \), (ii) the initial level of government holdings of private debt \( B_0 \), and (iii) the initial distributions of private debt \( b_t(i) \) and capital stocks \( k_t(i) \) across firms, a competitive equilibrium consists of the sequences and distributions of quantities \( \{C_t, N_t, M_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), \( \{x_t(i), n_t(i), y_t(i), k_{t+1}(i), b_{t+1}(i)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) for \( i \in [0,1] \) and the sequences of prices \( \{P_t, W_t, V_t(i), r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) such that

(i) Given prices \( \{W_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), the sequences \( \{x_t(i), n_t(i), y_t(i), k_{t+1}(i), b_{t+1}(i)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) solve problem (2) for all firms subject to constraints (3) through (8).

(ii) Given prices \( \{P_t, W_t, V_t(i)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), the sequences \( \{C_t, N_t, M_t, s_{t+1}(i)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) maximize the household’s lifetime utility (9) subject to its budget constraint (11) and the CIA constraint (10).

(iii) All markets clear:

\[ \int b_{t+1}(i) \, di = B_{t+1} \]

\[ s_{t+1}(i) = 1 \quad \text{for all} \quad i \in [0,1] \]

\[ N_i = \int n_t(i) \, di \]

\[ C_t + \int x_t(i) \, di + G_t = \int y_t(i) \, di \]
where equation (13) states that the net supply of private bonds issued by all firms equals the total purchases of private bonds by the government. Note that if $B_{t+1} = 0$, then the government holds zero private debt and all bonds issued by firms are circulated only among themselves with zero net supply/demand.

**Firms' Decision Rules**

Under constant returns to scale technology, a firm's labor demand is proportional to its capital stock. Hence, a firm's net cash flow (revenue minus wage costs) is also a linear function of its capital stock,

$$y_t(i) - W_t n_t(i) = \alpha A_t \left( \frac{(1-\alpha) A_t}{W_t} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} k_t(i) \equiv R(W_t, A_t) k_t(i),$$

where $R_t$ depends only on the aggregate state. With this notation of $R_t$, we have the following two propositions:

**Proposition 1** The decision rule for investment is characterized by an optimal cutoff $\epsilon_i^*$ such that a firm undertakes capital investment if and only if $\epsilon_i(i) \geq \epsilon_i^*$:

$$x_t(i) = \begin{cases} 
R_t + \frac{\theta q_i}{1+r_t} k_t(i) - b_t(i) & \text{if } \epsilon_i(i) \geq \epsilon_i^* \\
0 & \text{if } \epsilon_i(i) < \epsilon_i^*
\end{cases}$$

where the cutoff $\epsilon_i^*$ is a function of the aggregate state space only, is independent of the individual firm's history, and is a sufficient statistic for characterizing the distribution of the firm's actions.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.

**Proposition 2** The equilibrium interest rate of private debt satisfies the following relation:

$$\frac{1}{1+r_t} = \beta E_t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} Q(\epsilon_{t+1}^*),$$

where

$$Q(\epsilon_t^*) \equiv \int_{\epsilon_t < \epsilon_t^*} dF(\epsilon) + \int_{\epsilon_t > \epsilon_t^*} \frac{\epsilon_t(i)}{\epsilon_t} dF(\epsilon).$$

**Proof.** See Appendix B.
**Aggregation**

**Proposition 3** Define aggregate capital stock as \( K_t = \int k_i(i) di \), aggregate employment as \( N_t = \int n_i(i) di \), aggregate output as \( Y_t = \int y_i(i) di \), and aggregate investment expenditure as \( I_t = \int \chi_i(i) di \). Since the cutoff \( \varepsilon^*_t \) is a sufficient statistic for characterizing the distribution of firms, the model’s equilibrium can be fully characterized as the sequences of aggregate variables \( \{C_t, K_{t+1}, I_t, Y_t, N_t, R_t, W_t, P_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), which can be solved by the following system of nonlinear equations (given the path of any aggregate shocks, money supply \( \{M_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), the distribution function \( F(\varepsilon) \), and the initial distributions of private debts \( b_0(i) \) and capital stocks \( k_0(i) \)):

\[
\begin{align*}
C_t &= \frac{M_t}{P_t} \\
\Lambda_t W_t &= N_t^\gamma \\
\frac{1}{C_t} &= \Lambda_t + \Theta_t \\
\Lambda_t &= \frac{\beta}{1+\pi} E_t(\Lambda_{t+1} + \Theta_{t+1}) \\
C_t + I_t + G_t &= Y_t \\
\frac{1}{\varepsilon^*_t} = \beta E_t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \left( R_{t+1} Q(\varepsilon^*_t) + \frac{\theta_{t+1}}{\varepsilon^*_t} \left[ \frac{Q(\varepsilon^*_t)^2}{1 + r_{t+1}^2} \right] + (1-\delta) \right) \\
\frac{1}{1 + r_t} &= \beta E_t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} Q(\varepsilon^*_t) \\
I_t &= \left( R_t + \frac{\theta_t}{(1 + r_t) \varepsilon^*_t} \right) K_t - B_t \left[ 1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t) \right] \\
K_{t+1} &= (1-\delta) K_t + Z(\varepsilon^*_t) I_t \\
R_t &= \alpha \frac{Y_t}{K_t} \\
W_t &= (1-\alpha) \frac{Y_t}{N_t}
\end{align*}
\]
\( Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha} \),

where 
\[
Q(\varepsilon^*_t) \equiv \max\left\{ \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon^*_t}, 1 \right\} dF(\varepsilon) \quad \text{and} \quad Z(\varepsilon^*_t) \equiv \left[ \int_{\varepsilon^*_t \leq \varepsilon} f(\varepsilon) d\varepsilon \right] \left[ 1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t) \right]^{1/2}.
\]

**Proof.** See Appendix C.

Equations (21) through (24) are the household's first-order conditions; equation (25) is the aggregate resource identity derived from the household's budget constraint; equations (26) through (28) are derived from the firm's decision rules based on the law of large numbers; equation (29) is the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock, where \( Z(\varepsilon^*_t) \) denotes aggregate investment efficiency; equations (30) and (31) relate the firm's marginal products to factor prices; and equation (32) is the aggregate production function.

**MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF QE**

In the model, QE affects aggregate output indirectly through its direct impact on the distribution of credit/debt. In particular, QE affects aggregate output by influencing the aggregate capital stock (in the absence of a productivity change, employment demand is determined entirely by the capital stock, which determines the marginal product of labor). However, equation (29) shows that the level of aggregate capital stock depends on two margins: the volume of aggregate investment \( I \) and the average efficiency of firm-level investment \( Z \). The product \( ZI \) can be called the efficient level of aggregate investment.

QE affects both the volume and the efficiency level of investment in the economy by changing the distribution of credit/debt in the private asset market. On the one hand, QE can lower the interest rate \( r \) and raise the market value of the firm \( q \), thus boosting firm-level investment along the intensive margin (see equation (19)). In addition, because of a lower borrowing cost and a lower rate of return to saving (due to a lower interest rate), more creditors self-select to become debtors, thus boosting aggregate investment along the extensive margin (i.e., the cutoff, \( \varepsilon^* \), decreases). On the other hand, as more creditors self-select to become debtors, since these new investors (debtors) are less productive, the average rate of return to investment (as measured by the aggregate efficiency \( Z \)) declines, thus offsetting the positive impact of investment volume on the formation of aggregate capital (see equation (29)).

In other words, QE works by pushing more creditors to become debtors, which in turn increases the total demand for loans but decreases the average efficiency of loans. In addition, since the number of voluntary lenders is reduced, the increased aggregate demand for loans can be met only by the government's supply of credit through QE (or a lump-sum tax on the consumers). When the economy depends not only on the extent and scope of credit/debt but also on the quality of loans, such a trade-off between quantity and quality implies the following: (i) Aggregate output and employment may be insensitive to small-scale asset purchases even with relatively large changes in the real interest rate and asset prices. And (ii) the positive quantitative effect of QE on aggregate investment volume may or may not dominate the adverse...
qualitative effect on aggregate investment efficiency in the steady state. Thus, aggregate output may either increase or decrease under QE, depending on the time horizon and parameter values of the model.

**Calibration**

Let the time period be one quarter, the time discount rate $\beta = 0.99$, the rate of capital depreciation $\delta = 0.025$, the capital income share $\alpha = 0.36$, and the inverse labor supply elasticity $\gamma = 0.5$. In the United States, the total private debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio of nonfinancial firms doubled from 23 percent to 48 percent over the past half century. The model-implied private debt-to-output ratio is about 25 percent when $q = 0.1$ and about 50 percent when $q = 0.5$. Assume that the idiosyncratic shock $\varepsilon$ follows the power distribution

$$F(\varepsilon) = \left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon_{\text{max}}}\right)^{\eta}$$

with $\varepsilon \in [0, \varepsilon_{\text{max}}]$ and $\eta > 0$. The shape parameter is set to $\eta = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon_{\text{max}} - \varepsilon}$ to easily control the mean ($\bar{\varepsilon}$) and conduct mean-preserving experiments on the variance of idiosyncratic shocks by changing the upper bound $\varepsilon_{\text{max}}$. The distribution becomes uniform when the mean $\bar{\varepsilon} = \frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_{\text{max}}$. I choose the steady-state ratio of private asset purchases to GDP $\bar{b} = 0.4$ as the benchmark value. This large value is chosen to make the effects of QE large enough for the qualitative analysis. With this parameterization, the positive mitigating effect of QE on output is significant in the short run. However, although QE can mitigate the negative impact of financial shocks on GDP in the short run, it can also permanently lower the level of GDP in the steady state if QE never ends. In this case, it is easy to see the differential effects of anticipated exits compared with unanticipated exits on output and the optimal timing of exit. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter values.

**State-Contingent QE**

Three aggregate shocks are introduced into the benchmark model to evaluate the effects of the central bank's unconventional monetary policy for combating a simulated financial crisis. For this purpose, it is assumed that (i) the debt limit $\theta$ is a stochastic process with the law of motion,

$$\log \theta_t = (1 - \rho_\theta) \log \bar{\theta} + \rho_\theta \log \theta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\theta t};$$

(ii) total factor productivity (TFP) is a stochastic process with the law of motion,
and (iii) the default risk $P$ is a stochastic process with the law of motion,

$$\log P_t = (1-\rho_p)\log P_{t-1} + \rho_p \log P_{t-1} + \epsilon_t.$$

We introduce the default risk shock as follows. A firm $i$ solves

$$V_i(i) = \max E \sum_{r=0}^{\infty} \beta^r \frac{\Lambda_{i+r}}{\Lambda_i} d_{i+r}(i)$$

subject to

$$d_i(i) = R_k(i) - x_i(i) + \frac{b_{i+1}(i)}{1+r} - (1-P_t)b_t(i) \geq 0,$$

$$k_{i+1}(i) = (1-\delta)k_i(i) + \epsilon_i(i)i(i),$$

$$b_{i+1}(i) \leq \theta_i(1-P_t)q_i(i), \text{ and}$$

$$x_i(i) \geq 0,$$

where $P_t$ denotes the systemic default risk of private debt. When $P_t$ increases, each firm's existing debt level is reduced from $b_t(i)$ to $(1-P_t)b_t(i)$, which also reduces the firm's ability to pledge collateral by a factor of $(1-P_t)b_t(i)$. Thus, firms' ability to issue debt is severely hindered when the aggregate default risk rises. In the extreme case of a 100 percent default probability, firms are no longer able to issue debt, so the asset market shuts down and the real interest rate shoots up to infinity.

All three shocks—negative shocks to both $\theta_t$ and $A_t$ and a positive shock to $P_t$—can generate financial-crisis-like effects on output, consumption, investment, and employment: They all decline sharply. The real interest rate, however, decreases under a negative shock to either the credit limit $\theta_t$ or TFP (as in the United States) but increases under a positive shock to default risk (as in Europe during the recent debt crisis). The asset price ($q_t$) increases under $\theta_t$ and $P_t$ shocks but decreases under a TFP shock.

A state-contingent QE policy is specified as

$$\hat{B}_{i+1} = \rho_B\hat{B}_i + \sigma_x\hat{X}_i,$$

where $\rho_B \in [0,1]$ measures the persistence of QE, $\sigma_x = [\sigma_{\theta} \ \sigma_A \ \sigma_p]$ is a $1 \times 3$ row vector, and $\hat{X} = [\hat{\theta}_t \ A_t \ \hat{P}_t]$ is a $3 \times 1$ column vector. Notice that $\rho_B = 1$ implies that QE never ends.
Exit Strategies

Consider the following types of exit strategies:

• A one-time exit:

\[
\dot{B}_{t+1} = \dot{B}_t + \sigma \dot{X}_t \quad \text{for } t = 0, 1, ..., T-1;
\]

\[
\dot{B}_{t+1} = 0 \quad \text{for } t \geq T;
\]

where \( T \) is the number of periods of QE.

• A gradual exit:

\[
\dot{B}_{t+1} = \dot{B}_t + \sigma \dot{X}_t \quad \text{for } t = 0, 1, ..., T-1;
\]

\[
\hat{B}_{t+1} = \frac{N - j}{N} \dot{B}_t \quad \text{for } t = T \quad \text{and} \quad j = 1, ..., N;
\]

\[
\hat{B}_{T\geq N+h} = 0 \quad \text{for } h \geq 0;
\]

where \( T \) is the number of QE periods and \( N \geq 1 \) is the number of periods over which the exit will occur.

In both exit scenarios, I consider anticipated and unanticipated exits.

Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of output, total asset prices, the real interest rate, and total asset purchases by the government to a persistent credit crunch shock (\( \theta \)). Three different scenarios are compared for each variable: (i) no government intervention (no QE, shown by dark-blue dashed lines on the figure), (ii) no exit (light-blue dotted lines), and (iii) a fully anticipated one-time exit after 20 periods of QE intervention (red dash-dotted lines). Therefore, each panel shows three impulse responses.

Figure 1A shows clearly that the sharp drop in output under a credit crunch can be significantly mitigated by QE with or without an exit. However, the short-run mitigation effect is much stronger if there is no exit. On the other hand, there would be permanent output losses in the long run if there is never an exit from QE. This sharp contrast between the short- and long-run effects of QE on output is the consequence of the trade-off between the positive quantity effect of QE on aggregate investment volume and the negative quality effect of QE on average investment efficiency. Because the capital stock is relatively fixed in the short run, the quantity effect dominates in the short run because a higher total investment volume has a strong demand-side effect on the economy. In the long run, however, despite a larger volume of total investment, the average efficiency of investment is lowered by QE, leading to a lower (instead of a higher) effective capital stock. A lower capital stock in turn leads to lower labor demand and, hence, lower aggregate output. This interesting trade-off between the quantity and the quality of investment generates a dynamic trade-off between the short-run and long-
run mitigating effects of QE on the economy, leading to interesting and surprising implications for the optimal timing and manner of the exit strategies under different shocks with state-contingent QE policies.

Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of the same variables as in Figure 1 (output, total asset prices, the real interest rate, and total asset purchases by the government) to a persistent TFP shock. The pattern of the output responses to the TFP shock is similar to that under a credit crunch with respect to the mitigating effects of QE policies. Note that, as before, exiting QE in the 20th period has no visible impact on output, although such an impact is obvious in the other three variables. This result is also due to the trade-off between the quantity effect and the quality effect of QE on aggregate investment.

Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions of output, asset prices, the real interest rate, and total asset purchases by the government to a persistent default-risk shock. As before, I compare three different scenarios. Again, the broad pattern of the output responses to a default risk shock is similar to those under a credit crunch with respect to the mitigating effects of QE policies.

Figure 4 shows the differential effects of an unanticipated one-time exit and an anticipated gradual exit under a credit crunch, in addition to the other cases considered earlier. The dashed blue lines in each panel in Figure 4 are impulse responses of the different variables to the \( \theta_i \) shock with no QE. This case serves as the benchmark. Note that in this case, total asset purchases remain in the steady state (Figure 4B) and output decreases sharply by 2 percent on impact and then gradually returns to the steady state.

The red dotted lines in Figure 4 show the scenario for permanent QE with no exit. In this case, total asset purchases increase permanently from 0 percent to 500 percent above the steady-state level under QE (see Figure 4B). The output level drops by 0.6 percent on impact (see Figure 4A), showing a significant mitigating effect of QE. However, in the long run, output remains more than 0.1 percent below the steady state, suggesting that QE has an adverse long-run effect on output.

Two of the exit scenarios consider a one-time complete exit of QE in period 20 after QE is implemented. In one case, the exit is completely unanticipated (dash-dotted orange lines in Figure 4). In the other case, the exit is fully anticipated in period 0 (dashed green lines) as in Figure 1. In both cases, total asset purchases suddenly drop back to the steady-state level after 20 periods (see Figure 4B). However, output (see Figure 4A) behaves quite differently under the two scenarios: With an unanticipated exit, the negative impact of a credit crunch on output is significantly mitigated in the first 20 periods (as in the case with permanent QE with no exit), because in this case agents treat QE as a permanent policy with no exit before the unanticipated exit in period 20. With an anticipated exit, the mitigating effect of QE is much weaker in the first 20 periods (albeit still stronger than the case with no QE). Because of the sudden unanticipated one-time exit of QE, output drops sharply in period 20, unlike the case with an anticipated one-time exit.

Finally, consider the scenario with an anticipated but gradual exit of QE starting in period 20, with the total exit time equal to 40 periods. The diagonal dashed line in Figure 4B shows that total asset purchases start to decline in period 20 and gradually reach the steady state in
Figure 1
Impulse Response to $\theta$ With and Without an Exit Strategy
Figure 2
Impulse Response to $A_t$ With and Without an Exit Strategy

A. Output (percent)

B. Total Asset Purchases (percent)

C. Real Interest Rate (percent)

D. Asset Prices (percent)
Figure 3
Impulse Response to $P_t$ With and Without an Exit Strategy

A. Output (percent)

B. Total Asset Purchases (percent)

C. Real Interest Rate (percent)

D. Asset Prices (percent)
Figure 4
Effects of Different Exit Strategies

A. Output (percent)

B. Total Asset Purchases (percent)

C. Real Interest Rate (percent)

D. Asset Prices (percent)
period 60. Because the exit of QE is gradual, QE generates a larger mitigating effect on output than an anticipated one-time exit in the initial 10 periods (see Figure 4A). However, output performs worse than in the case of a one-time anticipated exit afterward because the long-run adverse effect of QE begins even before the exit of QE takes place. Clearly, since the exit is nonetheless finished in finite time periods, output does not suffer from permanent losses as in the case of permanent QE.

To summarize, these scenarios suggest that (i) QE can mitigate the negative impact of financial shocks on output in the short run if it is aggressive enough; (ii) there is an optimal timing to exit with respect to maximizing the mitigating effect of QE, which is around 35 to 40 periods under the current parameter configuration; (iii) an unanticipated exit works better than an anticipated exit, everything else equal; and (iv) a one-time exit is likely to work better than a gradual exit provided the timing of the exit is not too early compared with the optimal timing.\(^4\)

**CONCLUSION**

Despite the popularity of QE among central banks since the financial crisis, few studies exist to explicitly model and study the macroeconomic effects of QE and its various exit strategies. This article fills this void by constructing a general equilibrium model featuring explicitly large-scale private asset purchases. I show that both the timing and the manner in which central banks unwind and reverse their asset purchase programs matter greatly for the economy. An anticipated exit that is too early can render QE ineffective in mitigating the financial crisis. On the other hand, an exit that is too late may also damage the economy because highly persistent (or permanent) QE promotes risk-taking behavior that is too intense (i.e., it encourages too many less-productive firms to undertake investment) and generates long-run inefficiency. \(\blacksquare\)
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1

Applying the definition in equation (18), the firm’s problem can be rewritten as

\[
\text{max}_{\{i_t(k_t,\pi_t,\lambda_t),k_{t+1}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{\Lambda_t}{\Lambda_0} \left( R_t k_t(i_t) - i_t(i_t) + \frac{b_{t+1}(i_t)}{1+r_t^c} - b_t(i_t) \right)
\]

subject to

\[
k_{t+1}(i_t) = (1-\delta) k_t(i_t) + \varepsilon_t(i_t) i_t(i_t)
\]

\[
i_t(i_t) \geq 0
\]

\[
i_t(i_t) \leq R_t k_t(i_t) + \frac{b_{t+1}(i_t)}{1+r_t^c} - b_t(i_t)
\]

\[
b_{t+1}(i_t) \leq \theta_t q_t k_t(i_t).
\]

Notice that if \( r_t > \frac{1}{1+\pi_t} - 1 \), firms do not hold money. On the other hand, if \( r_t = \frac{1}{1+\pi_t} - 1 \), firms are indifferent between holding private debt and money. Which case prevails depends on the steady-state supply of debt and the inflation rate (Wen, 2013). I proceed by assuming

\[
\frac{1}{1+\pi} < 1+r < \frac{1}{\beta}
\]

equilibrium and refer readers to Wen (2013) for the other cases.

Denoting \( \{\lambda_t(i_t),\pi_t(i_t),\mu_t(i_t),\varphi_t(i_t)\} \) as the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (A.2) through (A.5), respectively, the firm’s first-order conditions for \( \{i_t(i_t),k_{t+1}(i_t),b_{t+1}(i_t)\} \) are given, respectively, by

\[
1 + \mu_t(i_t) = \varepsilon_t(i_t) \lambda_t(i_t) + \pi_t(i_t),
\]

\[
\lambda_t(i_t) = \beta E_t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \left\{ [1+\mu_{t+1}(i_t)] R_{t+1} + (1-\delta) \lambda_{t+1}(i_t) + \theta_{t+1} q_{t+1} \varphi_{t+1}(i_t) \right\},
\]

\[
\frac{1+\mu_t(i_t)}{1+r_t^c} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \left[ 1+\mu_{t+1}(i_t) \right] \right\} + \varphi_t(i_t).
\]

The complementary slackness conditions are \( \pi_t(i_t)i_t(i_t) = 0, [R_t k_t(i_t) - i_t(i_t) + b_{t+1}(i_t)/(1+r_t^c) - b_t(i_t)]\mu_t(i_t) = 0, \) and \( \varphi_t(i_t)[\theta_t q_t k_t(i_t) - b_{t+1}(i_t)] = 0. \)
Proof. Consider two possible cases for the efficiency shock \( \varepsilon_i(i) \).

Case A: \( \varepsilon_i(i) \geq \varepsilon_i^* \). In this case, firm \( i \) receives a favorable shock. Suppose this shock induces the firm to invest, resulting in \( i_i(i) > 0 \) and \( \pi(i) = 0 \). By the law of iterated expectations, equations (A.6) and (A.7) then become

\[
\frac{1 + \mu_i(i)}{\varepsilon_i(i)} = \beta E_t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \left[ \left[ 1 + \mu_{t+1} \right] R_{t+1} + (1-\delta) \bar{X}_{t+1} + \theta_{t+1} q_{t+1} \sigma_{t+1} \right].
\]

(A.9)

Since the multiplier \( \mu_i(i) \geq 0 \), this equation implies

\[
\varepsilon_i(i) \geq \left[ \beta E_t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \left[ \left[ 1 + \mu_{t+1} \right] R_{t+1} + (1-\delta) \bar{X}_{t+1} + \theta_{t+1} q_{t+1} \sigma_{t+1} \right] \right]^{-1} \equiv \varepsilon_i^*.
\]

(A.10)

Thus, equation (A.7) implies \( \lambda_{t}(i) = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i} \). Since \( \pi(i) = 0 \), equation (A.6) then becomes

\[
\frac{1 + \mu_i(i)}{\varepsilon_i(i)} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^*}.
\]

(A.11)

Hence, \( \mu_i(i) > 0 \) if and only if \( \varepsilon_i(i) > \varepsilon_i^* \). It follows that under Case A firm \( i \) opts to invest at full capacity,

\[
i_i(i) = R_t k_i(i) + \frac{b_{t+1}(i)}{1+r_t} - b_i(i),
\]

(A.12)

and pays no dividend. Also, since \( \mu_i(i) \geq 0 \), equation (A.8) implies

\[
\varphi_i(i) \geq \frac{1}{1+r_t} - \beta E_t \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \left[ \left[ 1 + \mu_{t+1} \right] \right] \equiv \varphi_i^*,
\]

(A.13)

where the right-hand side defines the cutoff \( \varphi_i^* \), which is independent of \( i \). Note that \( \varphi_i^* \geq 0 \) because it is the value of the Lagrangian multiplier when \( \mu_i(i) = 0 \). Hence, equation (A.8) can also be written as

\[
\varphi_i(i) = \frac{\varepsilon_i(i) - \varepsilon_i^*}{\varepsilon_i^*} \frac{1}{1+r_t} + \varphi_i^*.
\]

(A.14)

Because \( \varphi_i^* \geq 0 \), \( \varphi_i(i) > 0 \) when \( \varepsilon_i(i) > \varepsilon_i^* \), which means that under Case A firms are willing to borrow up to the borrowing limit \( b_{t+1}(i) = \theta q k_i(i) \) to finance investment. Therefore, the optimal investment equation (A.12) can be rewritten as

\[
i_i(i) = \left[ R_t + \frac{\theta q_t}{1+r_t} \right] k_i(i) - b_i(i).
\]

(A.15)
Case B: \( \varepsilon_i(i) < \varepsilon_i^* \). In this case, firm \( i \) receives an unfavorable shock, so the firm opts to underinvest, \( i(i) < R_i k_i(i) + \frac{b^r_{t+1}}{1+r_i^*} - b_t^i \); then the multiplier \( \mu_i(i) = 0 \). Equation (A.6) implies that \( \pi_i(i) = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i(i)} - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^*} > 0 \). Thus, the firm opts not to invest at all, \( i(i) = 0 \). Since \( \int_0^1 b_{t+1}(i) di = 0 \) and \( b_{t+1}(i) = \theta q_i k_i(i) > 0 \) when \( \varepsilon_i(i) > \varepsilon_i^*(i) \), there must exist firms indexed by \( j \) such that \( b_{t+1}(j) < 0 \) if \( \varepsilon_j(j) < \varepsilon_j^* \). It then follows that \( q_i(j) = q_i^* = 0 \) under Case B. That is, firms that receive unfavorable shocks will not invest in fixed capital but instead will opt to invest in financial assets in the bond market by lending a portion of their cash flows to other (more productive) firms.

A firm’s optimal investment policy is thus given by the decision rules in Proposition 1, and the Lagrangian multipliers must satisfy

\[
\pi_i(i) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \varepsilon_i(i) \geq \varepsilon_i^* \\
\frac{1}{\varepsilon_i(i)} - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^*} & \text{if } \varepsilon_i(i) < \varepsilon_i^* 
\end{cases}
\]

(A.16)

\[
\mu_i(i) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\varepsilon_i(i) - \varepsilon_i^*}{\varepsilon_i^*} & \text{if } \varepsilon_i(i) \geq \varepsilon_i^* \\
0 & \text{if } \varepsilon_i(i) < \varepsilon_i^* 
\end{cases}
\]

(A.17)

\[
\varphi_i(i) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\varepsilon_i(i) - \varepsilon_i^*}{\varepsilon_i^*} \frac{1}{1+r_i^*} & \text{if } \varepsilon_i(i) \geq \varepsilon_i^* \\
= \mu_i(i) \frac{1}{1+r_i^*} & \text{if } \varepsilon_i(i) < \varepsilon_i^* \\
0 & \text{if } \varepsilon_i(i) < \varepsilon_i^* 
\end{cases}
\]

(A.18)

Using equations (A.16) to (A.18) and equations \( \lambda_i(i) = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^*} \) and (A.7), the cutoff \( \varepsilon_i^* \) can be expressed as a recursive equation:

\[
\frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^*} = \beta E_i \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_i} \left\{ R^i_{t+1} Q(\varepsilon_i^*) + \theta_{t+1} \frac{Q(\varepsilon_i^*) - 1}{\varepsilon_i^*} + \frac{(1-\delta)}{\varepsilon_i^*} \right\}
\]

(A.19)

which determines the cutoff as a function of aggregate states only. Finally, equations (A.16) to (A.18) also imply that all the Lagrangian multipliers \( \{\lambda_i(i), \pi_i(i), \mu_i(i), \varphi_i(i)\} \) depend only on aggregate states and the current idiosyncratic shock \( \varepsilon_i(i) \). Hence, their expected values \( \{\bar{\lambda_i}, \bar{\pi_i}, \bar{\mu_i}, \bar{\varphi_i}\} \) are independent of individual history and \( i \).
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. Using equation (A.17), equation (A.8) can be rewritten as

\[(B.1) \quad \frac{[1+\mu_i(i)]}{r_i^e} = \beta E_t^{\Lambda_{t+1}^e}Q(\varepsilon_t^*) + \varphi_i(i).\]

Evaluating this equation for firms with \(\varepsilon_t(i) < \varepsilon_t^*\) yields equation (20).

Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 3

Proof. By definition, the aggregate investment is \(I = \int i_{ij}(j) dj\). Integrating equation (19) gives equation (28). The aggregate capital stock evolves according to

\[(C.1) \quad K_{t+1} = (1-\delta) K_t + \int_{\varepsilon_t(j) > \varepsilon_t^*} i_{ij}(j) \varepsilon_t(j) dj,\]

which by the firm's investment decision rule implies

\[(C.2) \quad K_{t+1} = (1-\delta) K_t + \left( R_t + B_t \right) \int_{\varepsilon_t(j) > \varepsilon_t^*} \varepsilon_t(j) dj\]

\(= (1-\delta) K_t + I_t \left[ 1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*) \right]^{-1} \int_{\varepsilon_t(j) > \varepsilon_t^*} \varepsilon_t(j) dj.\)

Defining \(Z(\varepsilon_t^*) \equiv \left[ \int_{\varepsilon_t(j) > \varepsilon_t^*} \varepsilon_t dF(\varepsilon) \right] \left[ 1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*) \right]^{-1}\) as the measure of aggregate (or average) investment efficiency gives (29). Equation (18) implies \((1-\alpha) \left[ \frac{Y_t}{N_t} \right]^{1-\sigma} A_t^\sigma = w_t.\) Since the capital-to-labor ratio is identical across firms, it must be true that \(\frac{k(i)}{n(i)} = \frac{K_t}{N_t}.\) It follows that the aggregate production function is given by \(Y_t = A_t K_t^{1-\sigma} N_t^{1+\sigma}.\) By the property of constant returns to scale, the defined function \(R(w_t, A_t)\) in equation (18) is then the capital share, \(R_t = \alpha \left( \frac{Y_t}{K_t} \right)^{1-\sigma},\)

which equals the marginal product of aggregate capital. Because \(\int_b^1 b(i) \, di = B_t\) and the equity share \(s_{1,1}(i) = 1\) in equilibrium, the aggregate dividend and profit income are given by

\(D_t + \Pi_t = \left[ Y_t - I_t - w_t N_t \right] + \left[ \frac{B_t}{1+r_t^e} - B_t \right].\) Hence, given the government budget constraint, the household resource constraint becomes \(C_t + I_t + G_t = Y_t,\) as in equation (25).
NOTES

1 To simplify the analysis, public debt is not modeled here. Interested readers are referred to Wen (2013) for the case when LSAPs involve both public and private debt.


3 However, the liquidity trap is not addressed in this article; interested readers are referred to Wen (2013). Ignoring the liquidity trap has no effect on the conclusions here because exiting QE tends to increase the interest rate and, thus, relax the constraint of the zero lower bound on the economy.

4 An obvious future project is to mathematically design an optimal state-contingent exit strategy that can maximize the mitigating effects of QE, which is beyond the scope of this article.

REFERENCES


