A Simple General Equilibrium Model of Large Excess Reserves

Huberto M. Ennis
Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

June 15, 2015

Abstract

I study a non-stochastic, perfect foresight, general equilibrium model with a banking system that may hold large excess reserves when the central bank pays interest on reserves. The banking system also faces a capital constraint that may or may not be binding. When the rate of interest on reserves equals the market rate, if the quantity of reserves is large and bank capital is not scarce, the price level is indeterminate. However, for a large enough level of reserves, the bank capital constraint becomes binding and the price level moves one to one with the quantity of reserves.

1. Introduction

In September 2012, the Federal Reserve instituted a policy of buying $40 billion of mortgage-backed securities every month for an indefinite time. In January 2013, $45 billion of longer-term Treasury securities were added to the monthly purchases under the program. As a result, the total amount of reserves held by depository institutions (as reported in the Fed’s H.4 statistical release) grew at an average rate of approximately $75 billion per month during 2013, reaching $2.5 trillion at the beginning of 2014. The difference between reserves growth and asset purchases was accounted for by increases in currency in circulation (and other minor items in the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet). The program concluded in October 2014 after reserves had reached a maximum of $2.8 trillion during the summer months of that year.

For the time of the life of the program, the Federal Open Market Committee consistently reasserted its long-standing commitment to price stability, targeting a 2% inflation rate. The creation of nominal reserves, then, was not intended to be accompanied with an increase in the price level that could attenuate the associated changes in the total real value of different asset classes. Rather, it was thought of as a swap of one type of asset (securities) for another type of asset (reserves), all in real terms.

Reserves, however, can only be held by a select group of financial institutions; mainly, banks. Hence, with stable prices, the growth in total reserves translates into growth of the real value of deposits. This is because the banks pass on the interest rate on reserves to their customers, and the customers then use this interest income to save or spend, depending on their preferences. Thus, the growth in reserves leads to an increase in the demand for loans, which in turn leads to an increase in the supply of loans, which leads to a further increase in the demand for deposits. This process continues until the price level adjusts back to its original level. Therefore, in this model, the price level is indeterminate when the rate of interest on reserves equals the market rate.

However, for a large enough level of reserves, the bank capital constraint becomes binding and the price level moves one to one with the quantity of reserves. This is because the capital constraint begins to bind and prevents the banks from expanding their lending to the same extent as before. As a result, the price level is determined by the level of reserves and the capital constraint.

1 The motivation for this work comes, in part, from my research collaboration with Alex Wolman. His thinking is likely to be (and hopefully is) reflected in these notes and I am grateful to him for sharing his ideas on this subject with me. I would also like to thank for comments Philippe Bacchetta, Marco Bassetto, Petra Gerlach, Marvin Goodfriend, Eric Leeper, Ed Nosal, Neil Wallace and the participants at the “Financial Reform and Quantitative Easing in General Equilibrium Conference” at ASU, the 2014 MMM at the University of Missouri, the 2014 SED meetings in Toronto, the SNB Research Conference 2014, the Mad-Money conference at the University of Wisconsin, and a seminar at the Atlanta Fed. All remaining errors are exclusively my own. The views in this paper do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, or the Federal Reserve System. Author’s email address: huberto.ennis@frb.org.
an asset that primarily resides on the balance sheets of banks. When reserves increase, either the balance sheet of banks grows or some other bank assets adjust to compensate.

The U.S. banking system is large. As of December 2012 total assets at commercial banks (as reported in the Fed’s H.8 statistical release) were $13.1 trillion, with $1.7 trillion of cash assets (more than 90% being reserves) and $2.7 trillion of securities (68% of which were Treasury and Agency securities – see Figure A4 in the appendix). Furthermore, the average growth rate of total assets in the banking system over the last 20 years has been close to 0.5% per month, which in December 2012 would amount to around $65 billion (see Figures 1 and 2).

While it seems plausible that the large U.S. banking system could absorb a growing real value of reserves, at least for some time, a natural question to ask is: How long can such a process continue without any major impact on banks’ lending capacity and, eventually, on the economy’s price level? To answer this question it is useful to study a general equilibrium model of an economy that includes a system of banks with sophisticated balance sheets. This is the objective of this paper.

The model is a dynamic economy with four types of agents and a central bank. Households consume and make deposits in the banking system. Entrepreneurs take loans from banks to fund productive projects. Expert investors provide bank capital to banks and banks intermediate funding between households, expert investors, and entrepreneurs. The central bank sets the rate of growth of monetary assets in the economy, may or may not pay interest on reserves, and can impose lump-sum taxes/subsidies on households.

Aside from the goods produced by entrepreneurs undertaking their projects, households and expert investors receive an endowment of goods every period. There is also an endowment of productive assets every period which deliver goods to their holders the following period. The claims on the productive assets are securities on agents’ balance sheets. All agents can, in principle, hold securities.

Households do not like to consume their own endowment and trade goods with other households using currency (Lucas, 1990). The monetary assets issued by the central bank are endogenously divided every period between currency and bank reserves. Banks maximize profits and face three constraints: (1) a bank capital constraint, (2) a reserve requirement constraint, and (3) a liquidity constraint. There is free entry in banking and, hence, banks make zero profits in equilibrium.2

2Ireland (2013) and Hornstein (2010) are two recent papers closely related to mine (see also Williamson, 2012, and Martin, McAndrews, and Skeie, 2013). In Ireland’s (2013) model reserves play a unique technological role in the “production” of deposits which pins down the real demand for reserves in equilibrium. Hornstein (2010) considers a liquidity constraint that is always binding and does not discuss price level determination in his model. Both Ireland and Hornstein do not study the role of bank capital, which is important for my analysis. For a detailed comparison of the models, see Part 3 of the Appendix.
I study the model’s stationary competitive equilibrium. The main result is that when the central bank is paying interest on reserves at the market rate, if the quantity of reserves is large and bank capital is not scarce, the price level is indeterminate and belongs to a closed interval.\(^3\) For a large enough level of reserves, the bank capital constraint becomes binding and the price level becomes determinate and moves one for one with the quantity of reserves. This result suggests that there is a limit to central bank purchases of securities financed with reserves when the intention is to not induce increases in the price level: After some point, if excess reserves become large enough, more reserves are associated with higher price levels.

The main components that drive the results in this paper are the ability of the central bank to pay interest on reserves and the fact that the central bank only controls the total amount of monetary assets (currency plus reserves) but does not control the split between the two (an endogenous variable in the model). These are not only important, but also realistic features of an environment that is intended to think about the U.S. economy.

In a nutshell, the logic behind the indeterminacy result is as follows: When the central bank pays interest on reserves at the market rate and the capital, reserves, and liquidity constraints of banks are not binding, banks are indifferent both between holding securities and reserves and between funding their operations with more deposits or more capital. This indifference creates the indeterminacy: Different equilibria result from banks holding more or less reserves funded by more or less bank deposits. Given Lucas-type price level determination, more reserves in the banking system imply less currency in circulation and a lower price level.\(^4\)

The questions in this paper mainly involve long-run trends and large, relatively persistent, changes in the levels of the various components of a monetary policy. For this reason, I choose to work with a non-stochastic, perfect foresight model. However, as will become clear in the analysis, a stochastic extension of the model may be useful for understanding, for example, the short-run effects of central bank asset purchases. This subject is left for future research.\(^5\)

Even though there are multiple moving parts, I call the model “simple” because I keep the problems of the agents and their interactions as simple as possible, while still being able to obtain some useful insights about the possible answers to the questions that I am concerned with. For example, in the model banks do not solve an explicit information problem. Instead, they are assumed to be the necessary intermediaries of funds between entrepreneurs and other agents. Furthermore, the reason for banks to hold reserves is kept very simple: either reserves are not dominated in rate of return or the exogenously imposed reserve requirement is binding. Similarly, bank capital is either a non-dominated source of funding or the exogenously imposed bank capital constraint is binding. These are strong assumptions, and various alternatives to them already exist in the literature. However, the origin of banks’ demand for reserves and capital does not appear to be of first order importance for the mechanisms discussed in this paper and the simplicity associated with the adopted assumptions makes them an acceptable compromise in a first attempt to answer some basic questions.\(^6\)

---

\(^3\) In their seminal contribution, Sargent and Wallace (1985) show a similar result using an overlapping generations endowment economy with money (see also Smith, 1991). The logic behind their result, however, is very different from the one studied here. The real rate of interest is pinned down in my model, but it is indeterminate in Sargent and Wallace’s analysis. Also, Sargent and Wallace do not consider the endogenous division of monetary assets between currency and reserves, which plays an important role in this paper. See Part 3 of the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the connection between this paper and Sargent and Wallace (1985).

\(^4\) This indeterminacy is fundamentally different from the indeterminacy identified by Sargent and Wallace (1975) in a model with rational expectations when the monetary authority targets the nominal interest rate in the economy. The monetary authority in my model follows a “money supply rule” (in the terminology of Sargent and Wallace) which is sufficient to rule out price-level indeterminacy in Sargent and Wallace’s model. See the detail discussion in Part 3 of the Appendix. See also Bassetti and Phelan (2014) for a modern analysis of multiplicity of equilibria under interest rate rule and large quantities of excess reserves.

\(^5\) Ireland (2013) studies quantitatively the short-term response to shocks of an economy where the central bank pays interest on reserves. Examples of papers addressing the general equilibrium impact of central bank asset purchases are Curdia and Woodford (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Forster (2011). Prominent precursors to this general line of research are Díaz Giménez et al. (1992) and Goodfriend and McCallum (1997). None of these papers addresses the price level indeterminacy that is the main objective of my paper.

\(^6\) Lacker (1997) studies a model where reserves play a fundamental role in the payment system and investigates the
The issues discuss in this paper are potentially relevant to understand not just recent events in the U.S. but also in Europe and Japan. The large increases of the quantity of monetary assets pursued by the Bank of Japan during the 1990s have been widely documented in the literature (see, for example, Spiegel, 2006). More recently, the European Union and several other countries in Europe have engaged in similar policies (see, for example, Fawley and Neely, 2013 and Joyce et al., 2012). The most recent example is the January 2015 announcement by the European Central Bank of a program to buy €60 billion a month of government and private sector bonds for a period at least 18 months (until September 2016). Just as in the U.S., the ECB program is effectively open-ended.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the baseline model. In Section 3, I define equilibrium. In Section 4, I study stationary equilibrium, first when the central bank does not pay interest on reserves and then when it does. I use the case of no interest on reserves to develop an understanding of the workings of the model. Payment of interest on reserves is crucial for addressing the issues described above, and it is the subject of the second part of Section 4. This is where the main contribution of the paper can be found. In Section 5, I consider two extension of the model that introduce more flexibility on the decision of banks to hold securities when the interest rate on reserves is below market rates. One case is the situation where the banks’ liquidity constraint is binding and the other is the situation when deposits provide a transaction-based convenience yield to households. In Section 6, I provide a brief conclusion.

2. The model

Time is discrete and goes on forever. Let $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ denote time. There is a central bank and four types of agents in the economy: private households, expert investors, entrepreneurs, and bank managers. Private households are dynasties that live forever. Expert investors, entrepreneurs, and bank managers live for two periods, and a new generation of them is born every period. There is a measure one of each type of agent. There is a perishable good every period and a stock of monetary assets that become reserves when and if a bank deposits some of these assets at the central bank.

Before moving into the specific details associated with the economic decisions of each of the different types of agents in the model, let me briefly describe how these agents will interact in equilibrium. All transactions take place in competitive markets. Every period, each member of the new generation of bank managers has the ability to form a two-period-lived bank that uses deposits and bank capital to finance entrepreneurs. Expert investors are able to provide bank capital to bankers, relying on some endowed expertise that allows them to invest effectively in banking. Households make deposits with banks, and entrepreneurs take loans only from banks. In other words, by assumption, households cannot directly make loans to entrepreneurs and all lending to entrepreneurs must be intermediated through banks.

2.1 Private households

In every period $t$, each household receives an endowment of goods $w_{ht}$ and an endowment of one-period zero-coupon securities of size $s_t$. Each of these securities pays one unit of the good next period and they represent private productive assets in the economy.

Households cannot consume their own endowment. Following Lucas (1990), think of the household as having two members. One member of the household trades securities $s_{ht}$, makes nominal deposits $d_t$, pays lump-sum taxes $\tau_{ht}$ to the government, and buys the consumption good $c_t$. The consequences of paying interest on reserves in such a model. Bianchi and Bigio (2014) also provide a micro-founded role for bank reserves and a quantitative analysis of some of the issues involved. Williamson (2012) is a prominent example of a paper that studies the recent experience of U.S. monetary policy (including payment of interest on reserves) in a general equilibrium model with explicit microfoundations for the demand of monetary assets and the role of the banking system (see the discussion in Part 3 of the Appendix). Berentsen and Monnet (2008) also present a model within the tradition of the money search literature and study a channel system for the implementation of monetary policy. Naturally, the floor of the channel involves a central bank deposit facility that pays interest on reserves. Goodfriend (2002) is a common reference for a discussion of monetary policy implementation using interest on reserves.
other member of the household sells the endowment in exchange for (and only for) cash. The cash obtained from selling the endowment cannot be used until the following period. Denote by \( m_t \) the cash holdings of a household at the end of period \( t \).

Utility from household consumption in period \( t \) is given by a strictly increasing and strictly concave function \( v(c_t) \). All households discount the future at factor \( \beta \). The nominal rate of return on deposits is \( i_{dt} \) and the price of private securities is \( q_t \). The real value of money (the inverse of the price level) at time \( t \) is denoted with \( \tau_t \). Then, the problem of the private households is:

\[
\max_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t),
\]

subject to

\[
c_t + \phi_t d_t + \phi_t n_t + q_t s_{ht} = \phi_t (1 + i_{dt-1}) d_{t-1} + s_{ht-1} + q_t s_t + \phi_t m_{t-1} - \phi_t \tau_{ht},
\]

\[
\phi_t m_t = w_{ht} + \phi_t n_t,
\]

\[
c_t, n_t, d_t \geq 0,
\]

where \( n_t \) represents excess cash that the household decides not to deposit or spend on consumption and securities during period \( t \). Using the first order condition with respect to \( n_t \) it is easy to see that whenever \( i_{dt} > 0 \) we have that \( n_t = 0 \) is optimal. I will restrict attention to this case in what follows.

The other first order conditions from the household optimization problem can be summarized as:

\[
-\phi_t u'(c_t) + \phi_{t+1} (1 + i_{dt}) \beta u'(c_{t+1}) \leq 0,
\]

\[
-q_t u' (c_t) + \beta u' (c_{t+1}) = 0,
\]

and the first inequality should hold with equality whenever \( d_t > 0 \) is satisfied. We can interpret the inverse of \( q_t \) as the gross real return on households savings at time \( t \); that is, \( 1/q_t \equiv 1 + r_{qt} \) is the (gross) real rate of interest available to the household in period \( t \).

Whenever \( d_t \) is positive in equilibrium a Fisher-type equation holds:

\[
1 + i_{dt} = (1 + r_{qt}) \frac{\phi_t}{\phi_{t+1}},
\]

which tells us that the equilibrium gross nominal interest rate on deposits equals the gross real interest rate multiplied by the gross inflation rate. In Section 5.2, I extend the model to allow for a situation where deposits provide a convenience yield to households, and hence their real return in the market can be lower than the real return on securities.

2.2 Expert investors

Every period \( t \), each expert investor has an endowment of goods \( w_{et} \) and some expertise that allows him to lend resources to the banks in the form of bank capital. Experts live for two periods and their period utility function is given by \( v(x_t) \), where \( x_t \in \mathbb{R}_+ \) and \( v(x) \) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, smooth function. Experts can save by holding securities \( s_{et} \) (but cannot short them) or by allocating resources to bank capital. They discount the future at factor \( \beta < 1 \).

I assume that at each time \( t \) there is a competitive market for bank capital. Let \( r_{kt} \) be the real rate of return that is set in that market at time \( t \). Experts, then, take as given \( q_t \) and \( r_{kt} \) and solve the following optimization problem:

\[7\]Lucas’ (1990) household has three members, one buying consumption goods, one selling the endowment, and one trading securities. We choose a simpler setup as a first step, but it would be interesting to extend the analysis to consider three-member households and study, as Lucas does, the possibility of liquidity effects in the securities market.
max \( v(x_{1t}) + \beta v(x_{2t+1}) \),

subject to

\[
\begin{align*}
x_{1t} + q_t s_{et} + k_{et} &= w_{et}, \\
x_{2t+1} &= s_{et} + (1 + r_{kt}) k_{et}, \\
s_{et} &\geq 0, \quad 0 \leq k_{et} \leq w_{et}.
\end{align*}
\]

In general, I will restrict attention to situations where \( 1 + r_{kt} \geq 1/q_t \) in equilibrium, so that \( k_{et} > 0 \) for all \( t \). If \( 1 + r_{kt} > 1/q_t \) then we will have that \( s_{et} = 0 \). This is the case when bank capital is scarce in the economy. If instead, \( 1 + r_{kt} = 1/q_t \) then experts are indifferent between holding securities and bank capital and the supply of bank capital is infinitely elastic as long as \( k_{et} \in (0, w_{et}) \).

A particularly simple version of the experts’ problem is the one in which they are risk neutral and, hence, \( v(.) \) is linear. In that case, we have that whenever \( 1 + r_{kt} > 1/q_t \geq 1/\beta \) the experts dedicate all the endowment to bank capital and \( k_{et} = w_{et} \). This will be a situation in which the economy confronts an inelastic supply of bank capital.

More generally, define \( z_{et} = q_t s_{et} + k_{et} \). From the first order conditions we have that when \( 1 + r_{kt} \geq 1/q_t \), the following equation must hold:

\[
-v'(w_{et} - z_{et}) + \beta (1 + r_{kt}) v'((1 + r_{kt}) z_{et}) = 0,
\]

and when \( 1 + r_{kt} > 1/q_t \), then \( s_{et} = 0 \) and \( z_{et} = k_{et} \). This expression defines a correspondence \( k_e(r_{kt}) \) for \( 1 + r_{kt} \geq 1/q_t \). If, for example, experts have a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function with a coefficient of relative risk aversion between zero and one, then \( k_e(r_{kt}) \) is an increasing function of \( r_{kt} \) for all \( r_{kt} > 1/q_t - 1 \). In other words, experts supply more bank capital when the return on bank capital increases.

I have assumed that experts cannot short-sell private securities. Given this, when \( 1 + r_{kt} > 1/q_t \), experts adjust their supply of bank capital smoothly in response to changes in the rate of return \( r_{kt} \). This is not the case when short-selling is allowed.\(^8\) The short-selling constraint, then, is particularly helpful when one wants to consider a situation with an elastic supply of bank capital.

2.3 Entrepreneurs

There is a measure one continuum of entrepreneurs in the economy, each with an indivisible project and no endowment of goods. Entrepreneurs live for two periods, are risk neutral, and consume only in the second period. Each project requires the investment of one unit of resources (goods) in the first period and gives a return of goods in the second period. Projects are heterogeneous in rate of return. Let \( G(r) \geq 0 \) denote the measure of entrepreneurs with project return less than or equal to \( 1 + r \) where \( r \in [0, \varpi] \) and, hence, \( G(\varpi) = 1 \). I will consider values of \( \varpi \) large enough so that there are always projects that are profitable enough to deserve funding.

An entrepreneur \( j \) that receives at time \( t \) a loan from a bank with real interest rate \( r_{lt} \) must repay the loan at time \( t + 1 \) using the returns from the project. If \( r_j > r_{lt} \), then entrepreneur \( j \) can consume \( r_j - r_{lt} \). Given a loan rate \( r_{lt} \), all entrepreneurs with project return greater than \( r_{lt} \) will take a loan from a bank and undertake their project. The total demand for loans in the economy at time \( t \) is, then, a function of the loan rate at time \( t \) and is given by:

\[
L^D(r_{lt}) = \int_{r_{lt}}^{\varpi} dG(r) \equiv 1 - G(r_{lt}).
\]

Note that \( L^D(r_{lt}) \) is decreasing in \( r_{lt} \), because \( G(r_{lt}) \) is a distribution function (increasing in \( r_{lt} \)).

\(^8\)Even if we restrict bank capital to be less than or equal to experts endowments, when experts can short-sell securities, they use securities trading to smooth consumption over time and the sensitivity of bank capital to its return would be extreme: completely inelastic and equal to \( w_{et} \) for all \( r_{kt} > 1/q_t - 1 \) and infinitely elastic when \( r_{kt} = 1/q_t - 1 \).
2.4 Banks

I assume that bank managers are risk neutral and maximize profits. Each generation of bank managers have the ability to form new banks. At time $t$, each newly formed bank $j$ takes deposits $d_{jt}$ from households and capital $k_{jt}$ from expert investors. With the proceeds, banks make one-period loans to entrepreneurs $l_{jt}$, hold securities $s_{jt}$ and reserves $f_{jt}$. Each bank has a cost $\chi (l)$ that represents the managing cost of providing $l$ loans to entrepreneurs, and receives a real return $r_{jt}$ on each loan extended at time $t$ and repaid at time $t + 1$. The function $\chi$ is strictly increasing and strictly convex, twice continuously differentiable, with $\lim_{l \to 0} \chi (l) > 0$ (that is, there is a fixed cost of providing loans).

The bank can make deposits at the central bank to increase its reserves holdings. The nominal interest paid by the central bank at time $t$ on those reserves is equal to $i_{ort}$. If a bank needs to increase its holdings of reserves after all depositors have made their deposits in banks, the bank can access a competitive interbank market and borrow reserves $b_{jt}$ from other banks at rate $i_{ft}$.

Banks must hold enough reserves to satisfy a regulatory reserve requirement $\rho$ per unit of deposits and enough bank capital to satisfy a regulatory capital requirement $\kappa$ per unit of asset (i.e., a leverage ratio requirement). Aside from funding, bank capital serves no special role in the model. A simple extension in which banks perform a monitoring function (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) could be used to justify the need for bank capital. In the model here, when the cost of capital is higher than other financing means, banks will hold only enough capital to satisfy the capital requirement. If one thinks that capital requirements are a significant factor in explaining holdings of bank capital in the real world, then this simpler modelling choice may be an acceptable approach to study the issues that concern us here.

Securities and reserves can also be a source of “liquidity” for banks. First, assume that when a bank gives a loan for a project, it commits to providing extra funds if the project needs them. In other words, the bank gives a loan and a loan commitment (a line of credit). Also assume that, at the beginning of the second period of the bank’s life and before loans have been repaid, a proportion $\theta \in [0, 1]$ of depositors withdraw their deposits and a proportion $\xi \in [0, 1]$ of the entrepreneurs financed by the bank need an extra unit of resources to complete their project and, hence, draw on their line of credit with the bank. Finally, assume that banks have to also repay outstanding interbank loans at the beginning of the second period. These assumptions induce a demand for bank liquidity in the form of securities and reserves.

There is free entry in the business of banking and the population of potential bank managers is large enough to drive bank profits to zero in equilibrium. I denote by $\Gamma_t$ the measure of active bank managers in the economy.

A bank $j$ formed at time $t$ takes as given prices $(\phi_t, \phi_{t+1}, r_{lt}, i_{dt}, r_{kt}, i_{ft}, \theta_t)$ and the policy parameters $(i_{ort, t}, \kappa, \rho)$ and solves the following optimization problem:

$$
\max \ (1 + r_{lt}) l_{jt} + s_{jt} + \phi_{t+1} (1 + i_{ort, t}) f_{jt} - \phi_{t+1} (1 + i_{dt}) d_{jt} - (1 + r_{kt}) k_{jt} - \phi_{t+1} (1 + i_{ft}) b_{jt} - \chi (l_{jt}),
$$

subject to

$$
a_{jt} \equiv l_{jt} + q_t s_{jt} + \phi_t f_{jt} = \phi_t (d_{jt} + b_{jt}) + k_{jt},
$$

$$
k_{jt} \geq \kappa a_{jt},
$$

$$
f_{jt} \geq \rho d_{jt},
$$

$$
s_{jt} + \phi_{t+1} (1 + i_{ort, t}) f_{jt} \geq \theta \phi_{t+1} (1 + i_{dt}) d_{jt} + \xi l_{jt} + \phi_{t+1} (1 + i_{ft}) b_{jt},
$$

9As it will become clear later, this assumption is intended to capture the need for banks to hold liquidity not just to satisfy depositors’ potential demand for cash but also to satisfy liquidity needs that come associated with the standard lending activities of the bank (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002). This is not an essential assumption for the results, and most of the paper deals with the case when the loan commitment is not present (i.e., $\xi = 0$).

10The extra unit of loan given by the bank to the proportion $\xi$ of the entrepreneurs is paid back to the bank later in the same period at zero interest rate. For this reason, these extra loans do not appear in the objective function (profits) of the bank.
and non-negativity constraints on \( l_{jt}, s_{jt}, \) and \( d_{jt} \). The first constraint defines bank assets and gives a formal statement of the bank’s balance sheet identity (that is, total assets equal total liabilities plus capital). The second constraint reflects the fact that the bank must satisfy capital regulations. The third constraint is due to an exogenously imposed regulatory reserve requirement, and the fourth constraint is the liquidity requirement that can have technological origins associated with the regular business of banking (holding deposits and making loans) or can reflect further regulation by a banking authority.\(^{11}\) Note that we are assuming that banks cannot, or are not allowed to, short securities (i.e., \( s_{jt} \geq 0 \) for all \( j \) and all \( t \)). Also, the non-negativity constraints on \( l_{jt}, s_{jt}, \) and \( d_{jt} \), together with the other constraints, imply that both \( f_{jt} \) and \( k_{jt} \) are non-negative in the solution to the bank’s problem.

For some values of the rates of return faced by the bank, this decision problem allows for the possibility of an optimal banking arrangement fully funded by bank capital (i.e., a bank with no deposits). While this could be considered an interesting theoretical possibility, deposits are a distinctive characteristic of banks in the United States and for the practical questions of this paper it is reasonable to restrict attention to equilibrium situations where \( d_{t} > 0 \). In Part 4 of the appendix, I discuss the case of \( d_{t} = 0 \) for completeness.

Assuming that \( d_{t} > 0 \) and, to simplify notation, defining the real return on activity \( s \) as \( 1 + r_{st} = (\phi_{t+1}/\phi_{t}) \) with \( s = d, f, ior \) the problem of a banker \( j \) at time \( t \) is:

\[
\text{max } (r_{lt} - r_{dt}) l_{jt} + (r_{qt} - r_{dt}) q_{t} s_{jt} + (r_{ior,t} - r_{dt}) \phi_{t} f_{jt} - (r_{kt} - r_{dt}) k_{jt} - (r_{ft} - r_{dt}) \phi_{t} b_{jt} - \chi (l_{jt}),
\]

subject to

\[
k_{jt} - \kappa (l_{jt} + q_{t} s_{jt} + \phi_{t} f_{jt}) \geq 0, \]

\[
\phi_{t} f_{jt} - \rho \left( l_{jt} + q_{t} s_{jt} + \phi_{t} f_{jt} - \phi_{t} b_{jt} - k_{jt} \right) \geq 0, \]

\[
s_{jt} + (1 + r_{ior,t}) \phi_{t} f_{jt} - \theta (1 + r_{dt}) \left( l_{jt} + q_{t} s_{jt} + \phi_{t} f_{jt} - \phi_{t} b_{jt} - k_{jt} \right) - \xi l_{jt} - (1 + r_{ft}) \phi_{t} b_{jt} \geq 0, \]

and \( s_{jt} \geq 0 \). I refer to this problem as Problem A in the rest of the paper.

Let \( \lambda_{t}, \mu_{1t}, \) and \( \mu_{2t} \) be the Lagrange multipliers for the three constraints in Problem A, respectively. All three multipliers are greater than or equal to zero, by definition. Then, the first order conditions for the bank’s problem are:

\[
l_{jt} : \quad (r_{lt} - r_{dt}) - \chi' (l_{jt}) - \kappa \lambda_{t} - \rho \mu_{1t} - [\theta (1 + r_{dt}) + \xi] \mu_{2t} = 0, \]

\[
q_{t} s_{jt} : \quad (r_{qt} - r_{dt}) - \kappa \lambda_{t} - \rho \mu_{1t} + [(1/q_{t}) - \theta (1 + r_{dt})] \mu_{2t} \leq 0, \]

\[
\phi_{t} f_{jt} : \quad (r_{ior,t} - r_{dt}) - \kappa \lambda_{t} + (1 - \rho) \mu_{1t} + [(1 + r_{ior,t}) - \theta (1 + r_{dt})] \mu_{2t} = 0, \]

\[
k_{jt} : \quad -(r_{kt} - r_{dt}) + \lambda_{t} + \rho \mu_{1t} + \theta (1 + r_{dt}) \mu_{2t} = 0, \]

\[
b_{jt}^{f} : \quad -(r_{ft} - r_{dt}) + \rho \mu_{1t} + [\theta (1 + r_{dt}) - (1 + r_{ft})] \mu_{2t} = 0. \]

I will use these conditions in the characterization of equilibrium presented below. It is clear from the first order condition with respect to capital that these equations are consistent only with the case in which \( r_{kt} \geq r_{dt} \). If \( r_{kt} < r_{dt} \), it is easy to show that the bank would finance itself all with capital (that is, \( d_{t} = 0 \)). So, assuming that \( d_{t} > 0 \) implies that one is considering only equilibrium situations where \( r_{kt} \geq r_{dt} \), but the reverse is not true. Even if \( r_{kt} > r_{dt} \), the bank may choose to finance all its operations with capital. That is, the assumptions that result in \( d_{t} > 0 \) are stronger. I will provide conditions that guarantee that deposits are positive in all the equilibrium situations being considered.

\(^{11}\) As a technological condition, the specification of the liquidity constraint is based on the following timing of payments: The payoffs produced by securities and reserves become available before the bank needs to have access to liquid funds to satisfy the liquidity demands of depositors and borrowers. Borrowed funds also become due at the same time and, hence, also absorb liquidity. This implies that interbank borrowing can be used to finance bank assets but, at the same time, increases the demand for liquid assets when liquidity is scarce.
2.5 The central bank

At every time \( t \), the central bank controls the total supply of monetary assets \( MA_t \) in the economy. The sum of cash and reserves \( M_t + F_t \) must equal \( MA_t \) for all \( t \). The central bank can also buy and sell private securities in the market. Denote with \( S_{c,t} \) the central bank’s holdings of private securities. Finally, the central bank charges taxes (or makes transfers) to households for a total of \( T_t \) at each time \( t \).12

The budget constraint of the central bank is given by:

\[
\phi_t [M_{t-1} + (1 + i_{or,t-1}) F_{t-1}] + q_t S_{c,t} = \phi_t MA_t + S_{c,t-1} + \phi_t T_t,
\]

for all \( t \) and with \( M_0, F_0, \) and \( S_{c,0} \) given. To simplify the exposition, I am not considering explicitly the case when the central bank can issue bonds (although allowing \( S_c \) to be negative would suffice). This is not important for the results. If one wanted to have the central bank buying private securities at the same time that is issuing bonds, it is straightforward to add notation to introduce government issued, one-period discount bonds to the analysis. As long as agents consider private securities and government bonds to be equivalent assets, nothing substantial emerges from such an extension of the model.

To fix ideas, it is interesting to consider a few special cases of this constraint. For example, if the central bank is paying interest on reserves and does not tax agents in the economy, nor does it own any securities, then it must be the case that the monetary assets in the economy are growing. This can be seen by using \( MA_t = M_t + F_t \) to substitute in the expression of the central bank’s budget constraint when \( S_{ct} \) and \( T_t \) are equal to zero for all \( t \). In that case, we have that:

\[
MA_t - MA_{t-1} = i_{or,t-1} F_{t-1} > 0.
\]

Another interesting case is when the central bank holds no securities and is paying interest on reserves while keeping the stock of monetary assets constant. In that case, we have that:

\[
T_t = i_{or,t-1} F_{t-1} \quad \text{for all } t,
\]

that is, the central bank pays its interest expense with revenue from taxation. This makes clear that we are abstracting from the issues that arise when the central bank has to rely on the fiscal authority to fund the payment of interest on reserves. This matter has received a good amount of attention in the recent literature (see, for example, Hall and Reis, 2013, and Carpenter et al., 2015). In principle, following for example Hall and Reis (2013), some notation could be set up to deal with central-bank remittances to the fiscal authority within this model. In this paper, for simplicity, the central bank and the fiscal authority are considered to be fully integrated.

Finally, consider the case when the central bank is not paying interest on reserves, nor taxing any agent, and is also not holding any securities at time \( t - 1 \). Suppose now that the central bank conducts a one-time open market operation at time \( t \) to purchase \( S_{ct} \) securities financed with monetary assets. Then, the central bank’s budget constraint implies that:

\[
\phi_t (MA_t - MA_{t-1}) = q_t S_{ct} > 0,
\]

that is, the increase in (central bank issued) monetary assets will exactly equal the nominal amount the central bank pays for the securities. In the following period, the central bank’s budget constraint will be:

\[
\phi_{t+1} (MA_{t+1} - MA_t) = -S_{ct} < 0,
\]

---

12 Here, we are considering a consolidated budget constraint for the central bank and the fiscal authority. The key implicit assumptions are that the fiscal authority can charge lump-sum taxes/subsidies to agents and that those taxes are adjusted to accommodate the decisions of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy coordination is an important issue that has received considerable attention in the literature (see, for example, Sims, 2013). Cochrane (2014) discuss these issues extensively with a special focus on the situation when the central bank is paying interest on reserves.
so that monetary assets will decrease one period after the open market operation. To keep the size of the monetary assets from declining, the central bank would need to conduct a new open market operation (that is, the central bank needs to roll over its holdings of maturing assets).\textsuperscript{13}

3. Equilibrium

I use a standard definition of competitive equilibrium, with free entry in banking. An equilibrium is a feasible allocation of resources and assets, and a set of prices and interest rates such that, given those prices and interest rates, the quantities associated to the equilibrium allocation solve the optimization problems for the corresponding agents, the central bank’s budget constraint is satisfied, and banks make zero profits. I use capital letters to denote aggregate, economy-wide values of the relevant quantities in the equilibrium allocation.

I restrict attention to symmetric equilibrium in which all operating banks make identical decisions. Denote by \((l_{bt}, s_{bt}, f_{bt}, d_{bt}, k_{bt}, b_{bt}^j)\) the solution to the optimization problem of the representative bank. Then, for example, since we have that all banks provide the same amount of loans to entrepreneurs, the total supply of loans in the economy is given by:

\[ L_t = \Gamma_1 l_{bt}. \]

In the same way, we can aggregate across banks to compute banks’ total demand for securities, \(S_{bt} = \Gamma_1 s_{bt}\), reserves, \(F_t = \Gamma_1 f_{bt}\), deposits, \(D_t^D = \Gamma_1 d_{bt}\), capital, \(K_{bt} = \Gamma_1 k_{bt}\), and interbank loans, \(B_{bt}^j = \Gamma_1 b_{bt}^j\).

Since there is a measure one of households, the supply of deposits in the economy is given by \(D_t = d_t\), where \(d_t\) is the level of deposits that corresponds to the solution of the individual-household optimization problem. Similarly, \(C_t = c_t\), \(S_{ht} = s_{ht}\), \(M_t = m_t\), and \(S_t = s_t\).

Aggregating across expert investors we have that \(X_{1t} = x_{1t}\), \(X_{2t} = x_{2t}\), and \(S_{et} = s_{et}\). We also have that the aggregate endowment of goods in the economy in period \(t\) is \(W_t = W_{ht} + W_{et} = w_{ht} + w_{et}\).

The total output obtained from projects at time \(t\) is given by:

\[ Y_t = \int_{r_{t-1}}^{r_t} (1 + r) \, dG(r), \]

and the total consumption of entrepreneurs at time \(t\) is given by:

\[ Z_t = \int_{r_{t-1}}^{r_t} (r - r_{t-1}) \, dG(r) \]

There are seven market clearing conditions. Securities market clearing is given by \(S_{bt} + S_{ht} + S_{et} + S_t = S_t\). Loans market clearing is given by \(L_t = L^D(r_{ht}) = 1 - G(r_{ht})\). Deposit market clearing is \(D_t^D = D_t\), and bank capital market clearing is \(K_{bt} = K_{et} = K_t\). The interbank market clears when \(B_{bt}^j = 0\) because interbank loans are in zero net supply.\textsuperscript{14} Market clearing for monetary assets imply that \(M_t + F_t = M\Lambda_t\).

Total (nominal) revenue from taxes is given by \(T_t = \tau_{ht}\). Using Walras Law, we have that, in equilibrium, the goods market clears; that is:

\[ C_t + X_{1t} + X_{2t} + Z_t + L_t + \Gamma_{t-1}(l_{bt-1}) = W_t + S_{t-1} + Y_t. \]

\textsuperscript{13}Since we are going to concentrate attention only on stationary equilibria, we do not discuss here any policy rule potentially followed by the central bank in the short run. The properties of those policy rules, however, are important for the stability of stationary equilibria. See Hornstein (2010) for a detailed treatment of this issue.

\textsuperscript{14}For a macroeconomic model where the interbank market plays an active role see, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
Recall from the household problem that restricting attention to equilibria with $d_t > 0$ for all $t$ implies that $r_{dt} = r_{qt}$ for all $t$ in those equilibria.

3.1 Price level determination

As is common in monetary models, the demand for currency $M_t$ is pinned down whenever $i_{dt}$ is (strictly) positive. As we saw when introducing the households’ problem, if $i_{dt} > 0$, then $n_t = 0$ and $\phi_t M_t = W_{ht}$ in equilibrium. From the money market clearing condition we have that $M_t = MA_t - F_t$. Hence, we have that:

$$\phi_t (MA_t - F_t) = W_{ht}.$$  

After a change in $MA_t$, if $F_t$ changes in the same amount (given $W_{ht}$), the price level could remain unchanged. In other words, if all the extra monetary assets are held by the banks in the form of reserves, then the price level in the model does not need to adjust to changes in the supply of monetary assets. It is important, however, to understand that increases in reserve holdings $F_t$ when the price level is constant (when $\phi_t$ is constant) imply that banks are holding a stock of reserves with a higher total real value. So, in that case, the question would be whether banks can accommodate the real value of the extra reserves, and what are the implications of that adjustment, if any, for the real allocation of resources.

4. Stationary equilibrium

Even though I try to keep the model as simple as possible, there are still several moving parts that interact in general equilibrium. Since our interest is in the long-run level of prices consistent with equilibrium, rather than their short-run behavior, studying stationary equilibrium is a natural first step that helps to simplify the analysis. For this purpose, assume that $W_{ht} = W_h$, $W_{ct} = W_c$, and $S_t = S$ for all $t$. Furthermore, let $MA_t = (1 + \gamma) MA_{t-1}$ for all $t$ with $\gamma \geq 0$ and $MA_0$ given. Also, let the real value of taxes $\phi_t \tau_{ht} \equiv \bar{\tau}_h$ and the nominal interest paid on reserves $i_{ior,t}$ be constant over time. Finally, assume that there is a unique solution to the equation:

$$\chi'(l) = \frac{\chi(l)}{l},$$  

and call that solution $l^* > 0$.

The main results of this section involve a situation where the liquidity constraint of banks is not binding. For concreteness, I assume from the outset that $\theta = \xi = 0$ in Problem A. In other words, I assume that banks do not face a liquidity constraint. All the results can be proved for positive values of $\theta$ and $\xi$ as long as the liquidity constraint is not binding. In Section 5, I come back to the case of positive values of $\theta$ and $\xi$ and discuss situations where the banks’ liquidity constraint is binding.

To further simplify the analysis, I also assume that experts are risk neutral and consume only in their second period of life. Given our concentration on equilibrium with positive bank deposits, from the consumer’s problem we have that when $d^*_t > 0$ for all $t$, then $1 + r^*_d = 1 + r^*_g = 1/\beta$ for all $t$. This implies that $r^*_d > 0$ and hence $n^*_t = 0$ for all $t$. Furthermore, in a stationary equilibrium $MA_t$ is constant and hence both (nominal) variables $M_t$ and $F_t$ are growing at rate $\gamma$. Since $n^*_t = 0$ for all $t$, we have that

$$\phi^*_t M_t = W_h = \phi^*_{t+1} M_{t+1},$$

\footnote{If $i_{ht} = 0$, then $n_t$ could be greater than zero and a continuum of possible values of $M_t$ are consistent with equilibrium. While this is an interesting monetary phenomenon that has attracted some attention in the literature, we do not discuss it here (see, for example, Woodford, 1994). If we want to consider the case when $i_{ht} = 0$, then assuming that $n_t = 0$ is consistent with equilibrium and allows us to abstract from this well-known monetary indeterminacy issue.}

\footnote{In Part 1 of the Appendix, I confirm that all the propositions in this section are valid for a non-empty set of positive values of the parameter $\theta$ and $\xi$.}
which implies that $\phi_{i+1}^*/\phi_i^* = 1/(1+\gamma)$.

Even after these simplifications, depending on parameter values, stationary outcomes can display several possible equilibrium configurations. I concentrate attention on the most relevant ones and start by considering the case when the central bank pays no interest on reserves (as the Fed did before October 2008). For that case, I show that at least one of the constraints in Problem A must be binding (Lemma 1) and consider the two possible situations: when reserve requirements are binding (Proposition 1) and when bank-capital constraints are binding (Proposition 2). Then, I turn attention to the case when the central bank pays interest on reserves and consider the situation when bank-capital constraints are binding (Proposition 3) and the situation when the reserves and capital constraints are not binding (Proposition 4). This last case is where price level indeterminacy arises.

4.1 No interest on reserves

If the central bank is not paying interest on reserves, then $i_{ior,t} = 0$ for all $t$ and $1 + r_{ior} = 1/(1+\gamma) \leq 1$ so the net real interest on reserves is negative whenever $\gamma$ is positive (that is, whenever inflation is positive). To hold reserves, banks have to fund them with either deposits or capital. If the return on reserves is lower than the cost of funding them, then it cannot be that banks hold more reserves than the ones they require to satisfy reserve requirements. The following lemma formalizes this logic.

**Lemma 1.** If $i_{ior} = 0$, then in any stationary equilibrium with $d > 0$ at least one of the constraints in Problem A is binding.

**Proof.** Suppose not. Then, from the first order conditions of the bank’s problem, we have that $r_{ior} = r_d = r_k = r_f$. But we know that $1 + r_d = 1/\beta$ and $1 + r_{ior} = 1/(1+\gamma) \leq 1 < 1/\beta$, so we reach a contradiction.

**Binding reserve requirements**

Consider first the case when only the reserve requirement constraint is binding. Recall that we are assuming that $\theta = \xi = 0$ so that banks do not have a liquidity need.

**Proposition 1.** Let $i_{ior} = 0$. Given a value of $\rho \in (0,1)$, there is a threshold value $\pi(\rho) \in (0,1)$, such that for all $\kappa < \pi(\rho)$ there exists a unique stationary (monetary) equilibrium where the bank reserve requirement constraint is binding and the bank capital constraint is not binding.

**Proof.** From the bank’s problem we have that in equilibrium:

$$r^*_k = r_d + \frac{\rho}{1-\rho}(r_d - r_{ior}) = r^*_f,$$

that is, the cost for the bank of funding its lending activities with capital or fed funds is the same as that of funding its lending with deposits. Given this, the objective of the bank can be expressed as $(r_l - r_k)l - \chi(l)$. Using the first order condition with respect to $l$ and the zero profit condition we have that the optimal value of $l$ equals $l^*$. Then, $r^*_l = r^*_k + \chi'(l^*)$ and $\Gamma^* = [1 - G(r^*_k)]/l^*$.

Since experts are risk neutral and $r^*_k > r^*_d$, we have that $\Gamma^* k^*_h = W_e$. Furthermore, $r^*_k > r^*_d$ implies that banks do not hold securities and $S_h = 0$. Now using the banks’ balance sheet conditions and aggregating across banks we have that:

$$\phi^*_l F^*_l = \rho \phi^*_l D^*_l = \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} (L^* - W_e), \quad (4)$$

and total assets in the banking system are given by:

$$L^* + \phi^*_l F^*_l = L^* + \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} (L^* - W_e),$$

---

17The value of money in this economy is not just determined by the demand for money by households. Every period, banks demand reserves to (at least) satisfy their reserve requirements. In a situation where households believe that money will not have value next period, they may not sell their endowment. In the model without banks, this would open the door to the possibility of a non-monetary equilibrium. Here, since banks always demand reserves when deposits are positive, the inverse of the price level in equilibrium is always positive.
where we are using that \( L^* = \Gamma^* l^* \). Define \( \kappa_t^* \) to be the equilibrium capital-to-loan ratio in the banking system. Since the real value of total deposits is positive in equilibrium, then \( L^* > W_e \) and \( \kappa_t^* = W_e / L^* < 1 \). Now make \( \pi(\rho) \) equal to the equilibrium capital-to-assets ratio. That is:

\[
\pi(\rho) = \frac{W_e}{L^* + \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} (L^* - W_e)} = \frac{(1-\rho) \kappa_t^*}{1-\rho \kappa_t^*}.
\]

Since \( \kappa_t^* < 1 \) we have that \( \pi(\rho) \in (0, 1) \) for all \( \rho \in (0, 1) \). Clearly, then, as asserted in the statement of the proposition, whenever \( \kappa < \pi(\rho) \) the bank capital constraint is not binding.

Using the equilibrium values just determined, aggregate household consumption can be shown to satisfy:

\[
G^* = W_h + S + r^*_l L^* - \Gamma^* \chi (l^*) - r^*_k W_e,
\]

and consumption of experts is given by \( X^*_2 = (1 + r^*_k) W_e \).

**Corollary 1.1 (Price level determination).** Given a sequence for \( MA_t \) set by the central bank, the price level in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is uniquely determined and proportional to the quantity of monetary assets.

**Proof.** Since \( \phi^*_t M_t = W_h \) and equation (4) hold, we have that the following equation must hold in equilibrium:

\[
\phi^*_t M_A = \phi^*_t M_t + \phi^*_t F^*_t = W_h + \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} (\Gamma^* l^* - W_e).
\]

Hence, there is an inverse relationship between the total amount of monetary assets and the inverse of the equilibrium price level.

It is important to understand that the central bank in this model sets the value of \( MA_t \) only; how much of \( MA_t \) is dedicated to currency and how much to reserves is endogenously determined. In the stationary equilibrium of Proposition 1, where reserve requirements are binding, there is a one-to-one link between the price level and the quantity of monetary assets supplied by the central bank. This result is in the spirit of the traditional Quantity Theory of Money. We will see later in Proposition 4 that there are situations in which this one-to-one equilibrium relationship between money and prices does not necessarily hold.

**Corollary 1.2 (Rates of return).** In the equilibrium of Proposition 1 we have that \( r^*_l > r^*_k = r^*_j = r^*_a = r^*_q > r^*_i \) and

\[
r^*_j = r^*_i + \frac{1}{1-\rho} (r^*_a - r^*_i). \]

**Proof.** Since \( \chi (l) \) is strictly increasing and \( r^*_j = r^*_k + \chi' (l^*) \) we have that \( r^*_i > r^*_k \). The rest of the proof is straightforward from the first order conditions to the bank’s problem and the fact that the multiplier \( \lambda_t \) (and \( \mu_t \)) are equal to zero and \( \mu_t \) is positive and constant for all \( t \).

Even though capital appears to be a more expensive source of funding than deposits (i.e., \( r^*_k > r^*_a \)), in effect for the bank it is not. Deposits are indirectly “taxed” by the imposition of reserve requirements and the policy of not paying interest on reserves (Lacker, 1987; and Kashyap and Stein, 2012). Once the implicit tax is taken into consideration, as the optimizing bank does, then both forms of funding (capital and deposits) have the same cost.

**Binding capital constraints**

Suppose now that \( \kappa > \pi(\rho) \) but strictly lower than unity, since we are considering equilibria where bank deposits are positive. We are now interested in a situation where the capital constraint is binding. Again, since \( \theta = \xi = 0 \) banks do not have a liquidity need.

---

18 It is possible (after some algebra) to provide conditions on \( \gamma, \bar{r}_h, \beta, W_e \), and \( G(r) \) so that \( \Gamma^* l^* > W_e \). This guarantees that deposits are positive, something we assumed from the beginning.
Lemma 2. When \( i_{ior} = 0 \), if the bank capital constraint is binding in a stationary equilibrium with \( d > 0 \), then the reserve requirement constraint must also be binding.

Proof. Suppose not. Then the bank’s first order condition with respect to reserves is \( r_{ior} - r_d = \kappa \lambda > 0 \). But we know that \( 1 + r_d = 1/\beta \) and \( 1 + r_{ior} = 1/(1 + \gamma) \leq 1/\beta \) so we reach a contradiction.  

Given the result in Lemma 2, we only need to consider the case when both the capital and the reserves constraints are binding. This is the situation characterized in the following proposition.

Proposition 2. Let \( i_{ior} = 0 \). Given a value of \( \rho \in (0, 1) \) and the threshold value \( \pi(\rho) \) (as defined in Proposition 1), for all \( \kappa \in (\pi(\rho), 1) \) there exists a unique stationary (monetary) equilibrium where the bank capital and the reserve requirement constraints are binding.

Proof. It is still the case that in equilibrium \( r^*_d = r^* \). Since we are considering the case when the capital and reserves constraints are binding, it is immediate from the first order condition of the bank’s problem that \( s^*_d = 0 \). Now, using the bank’s balance sheet condition and the capital and reserves constraints, both holding with equality, we have that bank capital and the real value of reserves are proportional to bank loans in equilibrium. That is:

\[
\phi^*_d l = \rho \phi^*_d d = \frac{\rho (1 - \kappa)}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} l_b, \quad \text{and} \quad \kappa = \frac{\rho (1 - \kappa)}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} l_b.
\]

To find the rest of the equilibrium values, define the weighted average of rates of return \( r_b \) as follows:

\[
r_b = r_d + \frac{\rho (1 - \kappa)}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} (r_d - r_{ior}) + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} (r_k - r_d).
\]

The objective of the bank can then be written as \((r_l - r_b) l - \chi (l)\). Taking first order conditions with respect to \( l \) and using the zero profit condition, we have that \( l = l^* \). Now using the market clearing condition for bank capital and for loans we have that:

\[
W_e = \Gamma^* k_b = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} \Gamma^* l^* = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} [1 - G (r^*_l)],
\]

which can be used to determine the equilibrium level of \( r^*_b \) and \( \Gamma^* \). Since \( r^*_b = r^*_l - \chi^* (l^*) \) we can use the definition of \( r_b \) to determine the equilibrium level of \( r^*_k \). The rest of the equilibrium values can be obtained by straightforward substitution.

Corollary 2.1 (Price level determination). Given a sequence for \( MA_t \) set by the central bank, the price level in the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is uniquely determined and proportional to the quantity of monetary assets.

Proof. Since \( \phi^*_d F_t = W_h \) and \( \phi^*_d F_t = [\rho (1 - \kappa) / \kappa] W_e \), we have that the following equation must hold in equilibrium:

\[
\phi^*_d M A_t = W_h + \frac{\rho (1 - \kappa)}{\kappa} W_e,
\]

and hence there is an inverse relation between the total amount of monetary assets and the inverse of the price level \( \phi_t \), as in the equilibrium of Proposition 1.

Corollary 2.2 (Rates of return). In the equilibrium of Proposition 2 we have that \( r^*_d > r^*_f > r^*_f > r^*_d \). Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate on interbank loans is given by:

\[
r^*_f = r^*_f + \frac{1}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} (r^*_d - r^*_d) + \frac{\rho k}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)} (r^*_k - r^*_d).
\]

Proof. Since \( r^*_f = r^*_f + \chi^* (l^*) \) and \( \chi^* (l^*) > 0 \) we have that \( r^*_f > r^*_f \). Recall that \( 1 + r^*_d = 1/\beta > 1/(1 + \gamma) = 1 + r^*_f \) then \( r^*_f > r^*_i \). Also, from the first order conditions for the bank’s problem we have \( r^*_k - r^*_d = \lambda^* + \rho t^*_d > 0 \) which implies that \( r^*_k > r^*_d \). Using the definition of \( r_b \) given in the proof
of Proposition 2 and given that $r_d^* > r_{d,or}$ and $r_k^* > r_d^*$ we have that $r_b^* > r_d^*$. Finally, we need to show that $r_k^* > r_f^* > r_d^*$. Again, from the first order conditions of the bank’s problem we have that $r_f^* - r_d^* = \rho \mu_1^* > 0$ and $r_k^* - r_d^* = \lambda^* + \rho \mu_1^* > \rho \mu_1^* = r_f^* - r_d^*$. Hence, we have that $r_k^* > r_f^* > r_d^*$ as desired.

A look at some relevant data (1995-2005)

I now discuss some U.S. data for a period when the Fed was not paying interest on reserves and contrast that data with the predictions from the model. Even though the Fed started paying interest on reserves in 2008, I stop the sample period for this section in 2005 to concentrate on a relatively stable time in financial markets. Figure 3 shows total and required reserves in the banking system. This data suggests that considering the case where reserve requirements are binding is a good first approximation for this time period.

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 4 shows that banks held around 20% of their assets in securities during this period of zero interest on reserves. This does not correspond well with the predictions of the model in Propositions 1 and 2. The reasons for this gap are clear: Securities and deposits play the same store-of-value role in the consumer’s problem; since consumers are pricing the securities in the market and they hold both securities and deposits in equilibrium, both saving instruments must have the same rate of return in equilibrium. A bank, on the other hand, to hold securities needs to hold more deposits and more reserves, which makes the benefits from holding securities ($r_1^*$) lower than the costs (as reserves pay no interest). There are two ways to modify the model to accommodate this fact: One way is to lower the cost of deposits for the bank by allowing deposits to provide a liquidity/transaction
service to consumers (as in Van den Heuvel, 2008, Stein, 2012, or Ireland, 2013). The other way is to have securities provide an extra benefit to banks, which can happen when the liquidity constraints of banks are binding. I pursue these alternative formulations in Section 5.

To look at rates of return during this period and compare them with the predictions of the model is complicated. For example, a possible approach to approximate the return on bank capital \( r_k \) is to consider the average return on equity for banks. However, banking in the model is riskless and the appropriate adjustment for risk to the observed return on equity is hard to determine. Subject to this caveat, Figure 5 shows some of the relevant rates of return to assess the comparison in corollaries 1.2 and 2.2. We see that the return on equity of banks is the highest of the rates of return involved. Also, the fed funds rate (which stands for \( r_f \) in the model) moves very closely with the rate on short term treasuries, the counterpart of \( r_q \) in the model.

Empirically approximating the effective interest rate on deposits is difficult. There are many different types of deposits and even within each type, different banks offer to their clients different bundles of services that may include special pricing for deposits (see also the discussion in Part 5 of the appendix). Based on an arbitrage argument, the model suggests that deposits and short-term Treasuries should yield comparable returns. That is, since \( r_d = r_q \) the yield on 3-month Treasuries can be considered a valid proxy for the interest rate on deposits. Finally, I include in the figure an estimate of \( i_b = (1 + r_q)(1 + \gamma) - 1 \) which I calculate using values for \( \rho = 0.05 \) and \( \kappa = 0.10 \) that are a reasonable approximation for the value of this ratios in the U.S. banking system (see Part 5 of the Appendix).

In summary, these observations suggest that in general, for the period between 1995 and 2005 in the U.S., the rate on deposits, bonds, and interbank loans were close while the rate on loans was higher and the return on bank capital even higher. I conclude that the ordering of rates of return during this period is most in line with the predictions in Corollary 2.2.

4.2 Interest on reserves

When the central bank pays interest on reserves, the strong result in Lemma 1 is no longer true. That is, there are situations where none of the constraints in Problem A are binding. This is an interesting case to study to the extent that, as we will see, such a situation is consistent with increases in monetary assets that are unmatched by changes in the price level. But, before turning to that particular case, I will discuss the implications of paying interest on reserves more generally.

As before, assume that \( \theta \) and \( \xi \) are equal to zero and let us start by considering those cases for which \( 1 + r_{ior} \in (1/(1+\gamma),1/\beta) \). For any interest on reserves within this range, if \( \kappa \) is small enough, a similar equilibrium to the one described in Proposition 1 exists. To see this, consider the ratio of capital to loans in the banking system, \( \kappa^* \), as defined in the proof of Proposition 1. Clearly, \( \kappa^* \) is a function of the interest paid on reserves because \( L^* \) is a decreasing function of \( r_k^* \), which in turn is a decreasing function of \( r_{ior} \) (see the proof of Proposition 1). Since \( 1 + r_{ior} = (1 + i_{ior})/(1 + \gamma) \), we have that a higher nominal interest rate on reserves implies a lower \( r_k^* \) and \( r_{ior}^* \) and a larger banking system (a larger \( L^* \)). In summary, then, for a given \( \rho \), one can define the equilibrium capital-to-loans ratio as a decreasing function of the interest rate paid on reserves; that is, \( \kappa^* (i_{ior}; \rho) \) is decreasing in \( i_{ior} \). In line with the proof of Proposition 1, define now the following threshold for the capital requirement \( \kappa \):

\[
\pi(\rho; i_{ior}) = \frac{(1 - \rho) \kappa^* (i_{ior}; \rho)}{1 - \rho \kappa^* (i_{ior}; \rho)}
\]  
(5)

It is now easy to verify that given a value of \( \rho \in (0,1) \), whenever \( \kappa < \pi(\rho; i_{ior}) \) there is a unique stationary (monetary) equilibrium where the reserves requirement is binding and the bank capital constraint is not binding.

As in Proposition 1 (see Corollary 1.2), we have that \( r_k^* = r_f^* > r_{ior}^* \) and we can express the nominal interest rate on interbank loans, the equivalent to the fed funds rate, as follows:

\[
i_f^* = i_{ior} + \frac{1}{1 - \rho} (i_d^* - i_{ior}) = \frac{1}{1 - \rho} i_d^* - \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} i_{ior}.
\]  
(6)
Clearly, the interest on reserves acts as a floor for the interbank rate. However, increases in the interest rate paid on reserves tend to decrease the interbank rate. This result is in sharp contrast with the standard result in the Poole model of demand for reserves, where the interest paid on reserves and the fed funds rate move (ceteris paribus) in the same direction (see, for example, Ennis and Keister, 2008).

The mechanism behind this relationship between equilibrium interest rates is clear. Paying higher interest on reserves makes reserves a better asset, which reduces the cost of funding via deposits (since deposits require holding reserves to satisfy reserve requirements). Unless the interbank rate falls, all banks would want to attract deposits and lend the funds out in the interbank market, which would be inconsistent with the clearing of that market.

To make this logic more evident, we can re-write expression (6) as follows:

$$i_d^* = \rho i_{ior} + (1 - \rho) i_f^*.$$ 

The left-hand side is the cost for the bank of attracting one extra unit of deposits; that is, $i_d^*$. The right-hand side is the benefits: To hold one extra unit of deposits, the bank has to hold $\rho$ units of reserves, which get a return of $i_{ior}$ and can lend the rest, $1 - \rho$, in the interbank market at rate $i_f^*$. Since the equilibrium level of $i_d^*$ is independent of $i_{ior}$ in this model, higher values for $i_{ior}$ result in lower equilibrium values of $i_f^*$.

When the capital constraint is not binding, the return on capital is the marginal cost of funding for the bank, which can be written as:

$$r_k^* = r_d^* + \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} (r_d^* - r_{ior}^*).$$

That is, the marginal cost of funding for the bank equals the cost of deposits plus the “implicit tax” on deposits originated in the fact that the interest rate on reserve is lower than the interest rate on deposits. Managing this tax is at the heart of the monetary policy prescriptions advanced, for example, by Kashyap and Stein (2012). Here, total lending is a decreasing function of the spread $r_d^* - r_{ior}^*$ and, hence, by changing this spread the monetary authority can influence banks’ lending activities.

If the capital ratio parameter $\kappa$ is greater than $\pi(\rho; i_{ior})$, then the equilibrium is analogous to that described in Proposition 2. Since $\pi(\rho; i_{ior})$ is decreasing in $i_{ior}$ we have that, for a given value of $\kappa$, higher levels of the rate of interest on reserves make it more likely that the capital constraint would be binding. This is a natural consequence of the fact that when only the reserve requirement is binding, higher levels of the rate of interest on reserves are associated with a banking system that has a larger balance sheet.

Interestingly, once the capital constraint becomes binding, this is no longer the case: Instead, higher levels of the interest rate on reserves do not change the size of the banking system but only induce changes in the equilibrium value of the various rates of return. In particular, a higher interest rate on reserves imply higher return on bank capital, $r_k$ (see Proposition 2).

So far, I have considered cases where the interest rate paid on reserves is the lowest among the prevailing rates in the economy. In such situations, reserve requirements are binding and banks do not hold excess reserves. To think about large holdings of excess reserves in the model, I need to consider values of the interest rate on reserves such that $r_{ior}^* \geq r_d^*$. I turn the attention to those cases next.

**Excess reserves**

We want to study situations where the banking system is holding plentiful of reserves, over and above the requirement. Assume again that $\theta = \xi = 0$. Abstracting from the liquidity constraints in this case is even less of a limitation: given the large quantity of reserves, the liquidity constraint is relatively slack, and conditions for it to not be binding are easy to establish.

**Lemma 3.** If $i_{ior} > i_d$ for all $t$, then in any stationary equilibrium with $d > 0$ the capital constraint is binding.
Proof. This is a direct implication of the first order conditions for Problem A. Given that $\phi_d d_t > 0$, the reserve requirement constraint implies that $\phi_t f_t \geq \rho \phi_t d_t > 0$ and the first order condition for bank reserve holdings is:

$$(r_{ior} - r_d) - \kappa \lambda + (1 - \rho) \mu_1 = 0,$$

where we are using that $\mu_2 = 0$, since we are considering the case when liquidity constraints are not binding. The only way that the first order condition for bank reserves can hold is if $\lambda > 0$, that is, if the capital constraint is binding.

Since we are particularly interested in situations with excess reserves, let us concentrate attention on the case when only the capital constraint is binding. Recall that from the consumer’s problem, with positive equilibrium deposits, the rates of return on deposits and securities satisfy $1 + r_d = 1 + r_q = 1/\beta$. Given that $\lambda > 0$, we have that $r_q < r_d + \kappa \lambda$, and hence the banking system does not hold securities; that is, $S^*_k = 0$ in equilibrium. Since the banking system is holding (excess) reserves, it must be the case that $r_{ior} > r_d$. Also from the bank’s problem, we have that:

$$r^*_k = r^*_d + \frac{1}{\kappa} (r^*_q - r^*_d) > r^*_q,$$

so experts do not hold securities in equilibrium and $K^*_e = W^*_e$ in equilibrium.

**Proposition 3.** Let $i_{ior} > i_d$. Given a value of $\rho \in (0, 1)$, there is a threshold value $\pi(i_{ior}, \rho) > 0$ such that for all $\kappa < \pi(i_{ior}, \rho)$ there exists a unique stationary (monetary) equilibrium where the bank capital constraint is binding and banks hold excess reserves.

Proof. Using the equilibrium values for the rates of return and the fact that the binding capital constraint implies that $\phi_t f_t = (k/\kappa) - l$ we have that the representative bank chooses loans to maximize $(r_l - r_{ior}) l - \chi (l)$. Together with the zero profit condition, this determines that $l = l^*$ and $L^*(i_{ior}) = 1 - G(r^*_q (i_{ior}))$ where $r^*_q (i_{ior}) = r^*_q + \chi'(l^*)$.

Define again $\kappa^*_k (i_{ior}) = W_e / L^*(i_{ior})$ and the threshold value $\pi(i_{ior}, \rho)$ as:

$$\pi(i_{ior}, \rho) = \min \left\{ 1, \frac{(1 - \rho) \kappa^*_k (i_{ior}, \rho)}{1 - \rho \kappa^*_k (i_{ior}, \rho)} \right\}.$$

Since $\kappa^*_k (i_{ior}, \rho) \in (0, 1)$, we have that $\pi(i_{ior}, \rho) > 0$.\(^{19}\) If only the capital constraint is binding, then $\phi_t f_t = (W_e / \kappa) - L^*$ and $\phi_t D_t = ((1 - \kappa) / \kappa) W_e$. When $\kappa < \pi(i_{ior}, \rho)$, we have that $\phi_t f_t > \rho \phi_t D_t$ so the reserve requirement is not binding. The rest of the equilibrium values can be easily obtained by straightforward substitution.

The condition that $\kappa \in (0, \pi(\rho; i_{ior}))$ can be translated into a condition over $\rho$; that is, $\rho \in (0, \pi(L^*(i_{ior})))$ (see Figure 6). When $\rho > \pi(\kappa; i_{ior})$ the reserve requirement is too high for the equilibrium in Proposition 3 to exist. Instead, the equilibrium has both the capital and the reserve requirement constraints binding (that is, no excess reserves; see Part 2 of the Appendix for a description of this case).

Proposition 3 has the capital requirement constraint binding. However, the proposition requires that the capital requirement $\kappa$ be below a threshold value; that is, the proposition requires that $\kappa$ is not too high. To understand this, note that given that $i_{ior} > i_d$ the bank would want to increase reserves by raising deposits as long as the capital constraint is not binding. Hence, in equilibrium, banks increase reserves and deposits until the capital constraint becomes binding (see Lemma 3). There is a level of capital for which the cost of capital is such that increasing deposits and capital is more costly than what the banks can receive by depositing those funds at the interest rate on reserves. At that level of bank capital in the banking system (which, in equilibrium, is equals $W_e$) and given that the capital constraints are binding, we have that the size of the banking system’s balance sheet (measured on the liability side) is:

$$\phi_t D_t + W_e = \frac{1}{\kappa} W_e$$

\(^{19}\)Note here that $r^*_q (i_{ior})$ is different than in Proposition 1, so the values of $\kappa^*_k$ and $\pi(i_{ior}, \rho)$ are also different.
which determines the size of total deposits in the banking system, \(((1 - \kappa) / \kappa) W_e\). The asset side of
the banking system’s balance sheet implies that \(\phi_i F_i = (W_e / \kappa) - L^*\). Hence, as long as,
\((W_e / \kappa) - L^* > \rho ((1 - \kappa) / \kappa) W_e\) we have that the reserve requirement constraint is not binding. This can
happen when \(\kappa\) is low or \(\rho\) is low, as illustrated in Figure 6.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Corollary 3.1 (Price level determination).} & \quad \text{Given a sequence for } MA_t \text{ set by the central bank,} \\
& \quad \text{the price level in the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is uniquely determined and proportional} \\
& \quad \text{to the quantity of monetary assets.} \\
& \quad \text{Proof.} \quad \text{Since } i_d > 0, \text{ we have that } \phi_i^* M_i = W_h. \text{ Using } \phi_i^* F_i^* = (W_e / \kappa) - L^* \text{ and} \\
& \quad \text{given that } L^* \text{ is independent of } MA_t \text{ and } \phi_i, \text{ we have that prices } \phi_i \text{ satisfy:} \\
& \quad \phi_i^* MA_t = W_h + \frac{1}{\kappa} W_e - L^* ,
\end{align*}
\]
and hence there is an inverse relationship between the total amount of monetary assets and the
inverse of the price level.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Corollary 3.2 (Rates of return).} & \quad \text{In the equilibrium of Proposition 3 we have that } r_k^* > r_{ior}^* > \\
& \quad r_d^* = r_f^* \text{ and } r_i > r_{ior}. \text{ Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate on interbank loans is given by:} \\
& \quad r_f^* = r_{ior}^* - \kappa (r_k^* - r_d^*).
\end{align*}
\]

This result is interesting because it tells us that even if the banking system is flushed with reserves,
when bank capital is scarce the equilibrium interest rate on interbank loans is lower than the rate
of interest on reserves.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Paying interest on reserves at ‘market rates’}

Suppose now that the central bank pays interest on reserves at a level such that \(r_{ior} = r_d\) in
equilibrium. Given that the return from holding reserves is the same as the cost of obtaining extra
deposits, if bank capital is scarce (and the bank capital constraint is binding) then the reserve
requirement constraint will also be binding. Holding reserves requires holding more (expensive)
capital and given that the return on reserves is the same as the cost of deposits, the return on
reserves is not sufficient to compensate for the higher cost in terms of bank capital. However, if

\textsuperscript{20}Bech and Klee (2011) provide a different (but complementary) argument to explain such a relationship among rates
of return. Their explanation is mainly based on limited competition in the interbank market when some participants
have no access to the payment of interest on reserves by the monetary authority.
bank capital is not scarce, then banks will be indifferent with respect to their holdings of reserves and may increase them by becoming bigger or by holding fewer securities. In the rest of this section, I formally describe the situations (i) when capital is not scarce (in Proposition 4), and (ii) when capital is scarce (in Proposition 5).

Proposition 4. Let $i_{i^{or}} = i_d$. Given a value of $\rho \in (0, 1)$ there is a threshold value $\pi (\rho, \beta) > 0$ such that for all $\kappa < \pi (\rho, \beta)$ there exists a continuum of equilibria where the bank capital constraint is not binding and banks hold excess reserves. The equilibrium set induces a continuum of possible initial (inverse of the) price level $\phi_0$ in the bounded segment $[\phi^L_0, \phi^U_0]$.

Proof. From the household’s problem we have $1 + r^*_q = 1/\beta$. If none of the constraints are binding in Problem A (the bank’s problem), then in equilibrium we must have that $r^*_k = r^*_q = r^*_{i^{or}} = r^*_d = r^*_b$.

The solution to the bank’s problem is such that for all $\kappa < \pi (\rho, \beta)$, this banking system has excess reserves. In fact, this level of reserves attains the maximum real value of reserves consistent with equilibrium. The level is given by:

$$\phi^*_t F^*_t = \rho \phi^*_t D^*_t.$$ 

From the household’s problem we have:

$$\phi^*_t D^*_t = \frac{1}{1 - \rho} (L^* - K^*_e),$$

and deposits are minimal when $K^*_e = W_e$. When $\kappa < \pi (\rho, \beta)$, we have that:

$$\phi^*_t D^*_t + K^*_e = \frac{1}{1 - \rho} (L^* - W_e) + W_e < \frac{W_e}{\kappa},$$

so the capital constraint is not binding.

The largest possible banking system has the largest possible deposits consistent with a non-binding capital constraint and bank capital less than or equal to $W_e$ so that capital is not scarce in equilibrium. Using the banking system balance sheet and the capital constraint, we have that:

$$\phi^*_t D^*_t + K^*_e \leq \frac{K^*_e}{\kappa},$$

must hold. So, the largest possible deposits are:

$$\phi^*_t D^*_t = \frac{1 - \kappa}{\kappa} W_e.$$ 

When $S^*_b = 0$, this banking system has excess reserves. In fact, this level of reserves attains the maximum real value of reserves consistent with equilibrium. The level is given by:

$$\phi^*_t F^*_t = \frac{W_e}{\kappa} - L^* > \rho \frac{1 - \kappa}{\kappa} W_e,$$

where the last inequality holds whenever $\kappa < \pi (\rho, \beta)$.

---

21 Imposing conditions on parameters so that $L^* > W_e$ is straightforward in this case. Essentially, the equation $1 - G \left[ \bar{\beta} + \lambda^* (\beta^e (\bar{\beta})) \right] > W_e$ must hold. This is simply a condition on parameters.
Since $1 + r_0^* = 1/\beta$ and $\gamma > 0$, we have that in these equilibria $i_d^*$ is positive. Then, it follows that:

$$\phi_i^* M_{A_t} = \phi_i^* (M_{i}^* + F_{i}^*) = W_h + \phi_i^* F_{i}^*,$$

which, for a given sequence of values of $M_{A_t}$ implies a one-to-one increasing relationship between the inverse of the price level and the real value of reserves. To obtain the limits of the interval of possible values of $\phi_0$ we need to consider the cases when the equilibrium level of real reserves is minimal and maximal. Denote by $\phi_i^L = (1 + \gamma)^t \phi_0^U$ the inverse of the price level that satisfies:

$$\phi_i^L = \frac{1}{M_{A_t}} \left[ W_h + \rho \left( L^* - W_e^* \right) \right],$$

and denote by $\phi_i^U = (1 + \gamma)^t \phi_0^U$ the inverse of the price level that satisfies:

$$\phi_i^U = \frac{1}{M_{A_t}} \left( W_h + \frac{W_e}{\kappa} - L^* \right).$$

It is easy to verify that when $\kappa < \pi (\rho, \beta)$ we have that $\phi_i^L < \phi_i^U$.

Household consumption in all these stationary equilibria is given by:

$$C^* = W_h + S + r_0^* L^* - \Gamma^* \chi (t^*) - r_{ior} W_e,$$

and consumption of experts is given by $X_2^* = (1 + r_{ior}) W_e$. 

As one moves from one extreme of the set of possible equilibrium price levels to the other, several adjustments in the banking system could be happening. The equilibrium associated with $\phi_0^L$ is a situation where the reserve requirements are not restricting the behavior of banks but, yet, there are no excess reserves in the banking system. This is also a situation where deposits are at their minimum value consistent with equilibrium.

Moving to situations with higher $\phi_0$ requires that banks hold more deposits, which results in a larger equilibrium banking system. Once deposits are not minimal, banks can hold either more reserves or more securities. In principle, they could also hold less capital, as long as the capital constraint does not become binding. Figure 7 shows a representation of the equilibrium set in the space of real deposits and real reserves. The equilibrium set is the triangle ABC. Two lines are plotted to delimit the set: one is the minimal reserves for each level of deposits $\phi_i^L F_{i}^* = \rho \phi_i^L D_{i}^*$ and the other is the maximal level of reserves for a given level of deposits, which is a representation of

![Figure 7](image-url)
the balance sheet condition when securities holdings are set to equal zero. Point A is associated with the price level implied by $\phi^L$ and point C with the price level implied by $\phi^U$. Just as an example, point B is an equilibrium where bank deposits are maximal but the bank is holding securities in the amount represented by the segment BC so that reserves are not maximal.

Proposition 4 implies that there is a disconnect between the quantity of monetary assets set by the central bank and the price level in the stationary equilibrium of the model when $r_{ior} = r_d$. There are two ways to look at this disconnect: On one side, as Proposition 4 demonstrates, there are multiple price levels consistent with the same amount of monetary assets. On the other side, for a given price level, there are multiple amounts of monetary assets consistent with an equilibrium with that price level. The next corollary establishes this fact formally.

**Corollary 4.1 (Monetary assets/price level disconnect).** Given a value for the initial (inverse of the) price level $\phi_0 \in (\phi^L, \phi^U)$, there is a continuum of values of $MA_0$ consistent with the equilibrium of Proposition 4.

**Proof.** Take $MA_0 = x$. Then, by Proposition 4 there exists $\phi^L(x)$ and $\phi^U(x)$ such that $\phi^L(x) < \phi^U(x)$ and

$$
\phi^L(x) = \frac{1}{x} \left[ W_h + \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} (L^* - W_e) \right], \quad \text{and} \quad \phi^U(x) = \frac{1}{x} \left( W_h + \frac{W_e}{\kappa} - L^* \right).
$$

These two equations define the functions $\phi^L(x)$ and $\phi^U(x)$ for all $x > 0$. Figure 8 plots this two functions.

![Figure 8](image)

Consider now a value $\tilde{\phi}_0 \in (\phi^L(x), \phi^U(x))$ as in Figure 8. We know from Proposition 4 that there is a stationary equilibrium with $MA_0 = x$ and price level $1/\tilde{\phi}_0$. Now define two threshold values:

$$
x^L(\tilde{\phi}_0) = \frac{1}{\tilde{\phi}_0} \left( W_h + \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} (L^* - W_e) \right), \quad \text{and} \quad x^H(\tilde{\phi}_0) = \frac{1}{\tilde{\phi}_0} \left( W_h + \frac{W_e}{\kappa} - L^* \right).
$$

By Proposition 4, for any $y \in (x^L(\tilde{\phi}_0), x^H(\tilde{\phi}_0))$ there are thresholds $\phi^L(y)$ and $\phi^U(y)$ such that for all $\tilde{\phi}_0 \in (\phi^L(y), \phi^U(y))$ there is a stationary equilibrium with $MA_0 = y$ and price level $1/\tilde{\phi}_0$. But, since $\phi^L(y) = \tilde{\phi}_0 x^L(\tilde{\phi}_0) < \tilde{\phi}_0 y < \tilde{\phi}_0 x^H(\tilde{\phi}_0) = \phi^U(y)y$, then $\tilde{\phi}_0 \in (\phi^L(y), \phi^U(y))$. Hence for each $y \in (x^L(\tilde{\phi}_0), x^H(\tilde{\phi}_0))$ there is an stationary equilibrium with $MA_0 = y$ and price level $1/\tilde{\phi}_0$. 

$\blacksquare$
To illustrate the policy implications of these results, consider the case of a central bank operating in a stationary equilibrium like the one described in Proposition 4. Suppose, now, that the central bank can make an unanticipated change to the size of its open market operations at time $t_1 > 0$. In particular, suppose that:

$$ MA_{t_1} = (1 + \gamma) MA_{t_1-1} + \Delta_{MA}, $$

and that:

$$ \Delta_{MA} = \frac{q_{t_1} S_{e}}{\phi_{t_1}} > 0, $$

where $\Delta_{S_e} = S_{c.t_1} - S_{c.t_1-1}$. With this notation, we are ready to state the next corollary.

**Corollary 4.2 (Unanticipated open market operations).** Consider an economy that, for all $t < t_1$, is in a stationary equilibrium as described in Proposition 4. Given a value for the initial (inverse of the) price level $\phi_0^* \in (\phi_L, \phi_U)$, there is a maximum size of an unanticipated open market operation at time $t_1 > 0$ that is consistent with maintaining a constant inflation equal to $\gamma$ in all periods (including $t_1$).

**Proof.** Take $MA_0 = x$. We have that $\phi_0^* \in (\phi_L(x), \phi_U(x))$ and since $\phi_t^* MA_t = \phi_t^* x$ for all $t < t_1$ (see Proposition 4) we have that:

$$ \phi_U(x) = W_h + \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} (L^* - W_e) < \phi_t^* MA_t < W_h + \frac{W_e}{\kappa} - L^* = \phi_U(x) x, $$

for all $t < t_1$.

To simplify notation, denote by $\tilde{\phi}$ the price level for period $t_1$ consistent with a constant inflation rate $\gamma$, that is $\tilde{\phi} = (1 + \gamma)^{-t_1} \phi_0^*$; and denote by $y$ the level of monetary assets at time $t_1$ consistent with a constant growth rate equal to $\gamma$, that is $y = (1 + \gamma)^{t_1} x$. If $\phi \in (\phi_L(y + \Delta_{MA}), \phi_U(y + \Delta_{MA}))$, then $\tilde{\phi}$ is consistent with equilibrium and the constant inflation rate $\gamma$ for all $t$ (including $t_1$) is also consistent with equilibrium. However, if $\tilde{\phi}$ is greater than $\phi_U(y + \Delta_{MA})$, then the inverse of the price level has to change so that $\phi_1^* \in (\phi_L(y + \Delta_{MA}), \phi_U(y + \Delta_{MA}))$, which immediately implies that $\phi_1^* < \tilde{\phi}$ and hence inflation at time $t_1$ is greater than $\gamma$.\textsuperscript{22}

To determine the values of $\Delta_{MA}$ that are consistent with a constant inflation rate $\gamma$ for all $t$ (including $t_1$) note that for $\phi \in (\phi_L(y + \Delta_{MA}), \phi_U(y + \Delta_{MA}))$ we need that:

$$ \phi_L(y) y = \phi_L(y + \Delta_{MA})(y + \Delta_{MA}) < \phi_U(y + \Delta_{MA}) < \phi_U(y + \Delta_{MA}) (y + \Delta_{MA}) = \phi_U(y) y, $$

and hence:

$$ \left( \frac{\phi_L(y)}{\phi} - 1 \right) y < \Delta_{MA} < \left( \frac{\phi_U(y)}{\phi} - 1 \right) y. $$

Since $\phi_U(y) y = \phi_U(x) x$, we have that $\phi(U)(y) = \phi(U)(x) / (1 + \gamma)^{t_1}$ and $\phi(U)(y) / \tilde{\phi} = \phi(U)(x) / \phi_0^*$. Then, we have that the maximum size of the open market operation at time $t_1$ consistent with a constant inflation rate $\gamma$ is the one that involves a percentage increase in monetary assets at time $t_1$ equal to $\tilde{\phi}$ given by:

$$ \tilde{\phi} = \left( \frac{W_h + \frac{W_e}{\kappa} - L^*}{\phi_0^* x} \right) - \phi_0^* x \left( 1 + \gamma \right). $$

Whenever $\Delta_{MA} > \tilde{\phi} MA_{t_1-1}$ inflation has to increase in period $t_1$ when the (‘larger’) open market operation occurs.

\textsuperscript{22}Using the budget constraint for the central bank, it can be shown that if $\phi_{t_1} = \tilde{\phi}$, then the real value of taxes $\phi_{t_1} T_{t_1}$ does not change at time $t_1$. However, if $\phi_{t_1} < \tilde{\phi}$ then the real value of taxes can actually be smaller, due to the extra seigniorage obtained as a result of the increase in inflation.

---

23
central bank pays interest on reserves at rate \( i_{vor} = i_d \). However, even when the central bank pays interest on reserves at rate \( i_{vor} = i_d \), bank capital can be scarce in equilibrium, and in that case the stationary equilibrium is unique, sharing similar properties to the equilibrium described in Proposition 2. I state this result formally in the next proposition.

**Proposition 5.** Let \( i_{vor} = i_d \). Given a value of \( \rho \in (0,1) \) and the threshold value \( \pi(\rho, \beta) > 0 \) defined in Proposition 4, for all \( \kappa > \pi(\rho, \beta) \) there exists a unique stationary equilibrium where the bank capital and the reserve requirement constraints are binding.

Proof. Let \( L^* = \Gamma^* l^* = \frac{1-(1-\kappa)}{\kappa} \) and the loan rate \( r^*_l \) be the rate that solves \( 1 - G(r^*_l) = L^* \). Since \( \kappa > \pi(\rho, \beta) \) we have that \( r^*_l > r^*_{ior} + \chi'(l^*) \). Now let \( r^*_h = r^*_l - \chi'(l^*) > r^*_{ior} \) where:

\[
 r^*_h = \left(1 - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho(1-\kappa)}\right) r^*_d + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho(1-\kappa)} r^*_k. 
\]

This implies that \( r^*_h > r^*_d = r^*_{ior} \) and these rates imply that the capital and reserve constraints are binding in the bank’s problem. Then, deposits are given by \( \phi^*_d D^*_e = ((1 - \kappa) / \kappa) W_e \) and reserves are \( \phi^*_r F^*_e = \rho ((1 - \kappa) / \kappa) W_e = (W_e / \kappa) - L^* \), which confirms the values of \( L^* \) and \( \Gamma^* \) postulated at the beginning of the proof. The rest of the equilibrium values can be obtained by simple substitution.

**Corollary 5.1 (Price level determination).** Given a sequence \( \{MA_t\}_{t=0} \) set by the central bank, the price level in the equilibrium described in Proposition 5 is uniquely determined and proportional to the quantity of monetary assets.

Proof. Since \( 1 + r^*_h = 1 + r^*_q = 1/\beta \), we have that \( i^*_d > 0 \) and \( \phi^*_t M_t = W_h \). Using \( \phi^*_t F^*_t = \rho ((1 - \kappa) / \kappa) W_e \) we have that prices \( \phi^*_t \) satisfy:

\[
 \phi^*_t M A_t = W_h + \frac{1 - \kappa}{\kappa} W_e, 
\]

and hence there is an inverse relationship between the total amount of monetary assets and the inverse of the equilibrium price level. ■

**Corollary 5.2 (Rates of return).** In the equilibrium of Proposition 5 we have that \( r^*_h > r^*_q > r^*_{ior} = r^*_d \) and \( r^*_l > r^*_k > r^*_d \). Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate on interbank loans is given by:

\[
r^*_y = r^*_{ior} + \frac{\rho \kappa}{1 - \rho(1 - \kappa)} (r^*_k - r^*_{ior}).
\]

A look at some relevant data (2005-2013)

In October 2008 the Federal Reserve started paying interest on reserves. At the same time, the Fed engaged in a series of programs (lending facilities and asset purchases) that resulted in a significant increase in the level of bank (excess) reserves, as illustrated in Figure 9 (see also Figures 1 and 2 in the Introduction). Keister and McAndrews (2009) provide a good discussion of the process of buildup in bank reserves during the financial crisis and its potential implications.

Figure 9 also plots the currency component of the money stock, as measured by the Federal Reserve in its H6 data release. This measure of currency is basically currency in circulation minus bank vault cash (which is accounted for in bank reserves) and can be taken as the empirical counterpart of the variable \( M_t \) in the model. At the same time that total monetary assets in the economy were growing substantially, the price level grew only moderately at an average rate that was below 2% (see Figure A5). This suggests that a situation like the one described in Proposition 4 where there is a disconnect between the amount of monetary assets and the price level may be relevant for understanding this period.

Since 2009, the fed funds rate has been persistently below the interest rate on reserves (see Figure 10). In principle, this is consistent with binding capital requirements, as indicated by Corollary.
3.2. Also consistent with that corollary is the fact that the short-term rate on securities (3-month Treasury bills) has been below interest on reserves.

In the model of this paper, the real rate of interest on deposits is pinned down by the real side of the economy, and in steady state it is given by $1/\beta$. Also, inflation is determined by the (long run) growth rate of monetary assets. In such situation, it is completely up to the central bank to set the interest on reserves such that it is equal, higher, or lower than the rate on deposits.\textsuperscript{23}

As I pointed out, the fact that the rate on 3-months Treasury bills is below the interest on reserves in Figure 10 (see also Figure A6 in the appendix for details) suggests a situation such as that described in Proposition 3. At the same time, the disconnect between the growth in monetary assets and prices seems consistent with Proposition 4. A crucial distinction between the two propositions is the state of the bank capital constraint.

Capital regulations in the United States are complex and undergoing a process of reform. For these reasons, it is hard to evaluate the extent to which bank-capital constraints may have been binding in the period 2009-2013. Expectations about future adjustments to the required ratios may have played a critical role. After a long period of gestation, a new rule was introduced in October 2013. The rule established a minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio (to risk adjusted assets) of 4.5%, with an added 2.5% conservation buffer. For tier 1 capital, the required ratio is 6% plus

\textsuperscript{23}Sargent and Wallace (1985) study a model where central-bank policy can change the equilibrium real rate of interest. In that case, a policy of setting the interest on reserves equal to the real rate does not pin down the equilibrium value of the real rate, and some policy induced indeterminacy arises. See Part 3 of the Appendix for a detailed discussion of the connection between this and Sargent and Wallace’s papers.
the conservation buffer, and for total capital, the required ratio is 8%. The leverage ratio was set at 4% with a supplement for off-balance sheet assets that may take it to as high as 5%. Figure 11 plots the ratio of capital to assets for different categories of capital and for the U.S. banking system as a whole. The figure suggests that bank capital holdings are not uniformly close to the regulatory constraint. Of course, it could be important to look at the distribution of these ratios across banks. The information provided in Ennis and Wolman (2014) on this respect supports a similar conclusion.

If capital constraints are not binding, then the situation described in Proposition 4 appears as the most relevant. Since rates of return are equalized in such an equilibrium, explaining why the fed funds rate and other short-term rates have been below the level of interest on reserves may require an alternative explanation (such as that advanced in Bech and Klee, 2011, for example). Interest rates in the U.S. have been very low during the period 2009-2013 and it seems inappropriate to over-stress the relatively small divergence between the yield on Treasury bills and the interest rate on reserves as a way to evaluate the validity of the different scenarios in the model. Rather, I conclude from this evidence that the situation in the U.S. during the period between 2009 and 2013 is not at odds with the scenario described in Proposition 4.

5. Banks’ securities holdings

As we saw from Figure 4, between 1995 and 2005, while the Fed was not paying interest on reserves, banks held around 20% of their assets in securities. In contrast, in the equilibrium of the model in the previous sections when \( i_{ior} = 0 \) and the liquidity constraint is not binding banks do not hold securities. The logic behind this outcome is clear: Since households price the securities and are holding deposits, then the interest rate on securities and deposits is equalized. Banks, however, would only hold securities if the return on them would be enough to compensate for the cost of attracting deposits and the cost of holding more reserves and/or more capital.

In this section, I discuss two ways to overturn this counterfactual result without affecting the logic behind Proposition 4. First, in Section 5.1 I consider the case when the liquidity constraint of banks is binding. Securities can be a source of liquidity for banks and when that liquidity is valuable, banks may hold securities even if their funding costs are higher than the market return on those securities. Second, in Section 5.2 I modify the model to introduce a convenience yield on deposits, which effectively lowers the funding cost for banks and allows banks to hold securities even if that requires holding more low-return reserves and/or expensive capital.

5.1 Binding bank liquidity constraints

Again, I restrict attention to stationary equilibrium and maintain the same general assumptions as in Section 4, including the assumptions that guarantee that bank deposits are positive in equilibrium. I consider first the case when the central bank is not paying interest on reserves.

Lemma 4. If \( i_{ior} = 0 \) and the liquidity constraint in Problem A is (strictly) binding (i.e., \( \mu_2 > 0 \)), then the reserves requirement constraint is also binding.

Proof. Suppose the reserves constraint is not binding. If the capital constraint is also not binding, then from the first order conditions of the bank problem, we have that:

\[
\rho q - r_d + [(1 + r_q) - \theta (1 + r_d)] \mu_2 \leq 0
\]

must hold. However, since from the household’s problem we have that \( r_q = r_d \) in equilibrium, this implies that \( \mu_2 \leq 0 \) which is a contradiction.

Suppose, instead, that the capital constraint is binding. From the first order condition of the bank’s problem we have that:

\[
-\kappa \lambda + (1 - \theta) (1 + r_d) \mu_2 \leq 0, \text{ and (7)}
\]

\[
-\kappa \lambda + [(1 + i_{ior}) - \theta (1 + r_d)] \mu_2 = r_d - i_{ior}. \text{ (8)}
\]
Condition (8) can be rewritten as:

\[-\kappa \lambda + (1 - \theta)(1 + r_d)\mu_2 = (1 + \mu_2)(r_d - r_{ior}).\]

Since the right-hand side of this expression is positive, this contradicts condition (7).

The logic behind this lemma is clear: Given that \( r_d = r_{q} \), the bank can always increase its holdings of securities financed with an increase in deposits or with a decrease in reserves and in that way relax the liquidity constraint without changing profits. Lemma A1 implies that we only need to consider two cases: one when the liquidity and reserves constraint are binding, and one when all three constraints (liquidity, reserves, and capital) are binding.

To simplify the presentation, assume that \( \xi = 0 \) so that loans do not require liquidity. Considering the general case of \( \xi \geq 0 \) is a straightforward extension. Also, assume that \( 1 - \rho > \theta > \rho \). This condition guarantees that the liquidity constraint can be binding in equilibrium.

**Proposition 6.** Let \( i_{ior} = 0 \). Given a value of \( \rho \in (0,0.5) \), for all \( \theta \in (\rho, 1 - \rho) \) there is a threshold \( \pi(\rho, \theta) \in (0,1) \) such that for all \( \kappa < \pi(\rho, \theta) \) there exists a unique stationary equilibrium where the bank reserve requirement and liquidity constraints are binding and the bank capital constraint is not binding.

**Proof.** In equilibrium, the reserves and liquidity constraints imply:

\[
\phi_{s} f_t = \rho \phi_d d_t, \quad \text{and} \quad (1 + r_q) qs_b + (1 + r_{ior}) \phi_{s} f_t = \theta (1 + r_d) \phi_d d_t.
\]

Substituting the first into the second constraint and rearranging terms, we get:

\[
(1 + r_q) qs_b = [\theta (1 + r_d) - \rho (1 + r_{ior})] \phi_d d_t > 0,
\]

which implies that the bank is holding securities in its balance sheet. In fact, both reserves and securities holdings by banks are proportional to deposits. To simplify notation, define the following variable

\[
\zeta \equiv \frac{1 + r_d}{(1 - \rho - \theta)(1 + r_d) + \rho(1 + r_{ior})}
\]

Using the reserves and liquidity constraints and the balance sheet identity for the bank, we can write the bank’s objective as \((r_l - r_k^*) l - \chi(l)\), with \( r_k^* \) satisfying:

\[
r_k^* = r_d + (r_d - r_{ior}) \rho \kappa.
\]

Then, the level of lending for each bank satisfies \( r_l^* - r_k^* = \chi'(l^*) \) and from the zero profit condition we have that \( l = l^* \). Loan market clearing implies that \( \Gamma^* = [1 - G(r_l^*)]/l^* \). Since \( 1 - \rho > \theta \), we have that \( r_k^* > r_d \) and hence experts dedicate all their resources to bank capital. Aggregating across banks, we obtain the banking system’s balance sheet identity:

\[
L^* + qS_b^* + \phi_{s}^* F_t^* = \phi_{s}^* D_t^* + W_e.
\]

Since equilibrium reserves and securities holdings are proportional to deposits, we obtain that total bank deposits are given by \( \phi_{s}^* D_t^* = \zeta (\Gamma^* l^* - W_e) \). Since we are interested in the case of positive deposits, we required that \( L^* = \Gamma^* l^* > W_e \). It is easy to give conditions on parameters so that this inequality is satisfied. The threshold \( \pi(\rho, \theta) \) is given by:

\[
\pi(\rho, \theta) = \frac{\kappa_l^*}{1 + (\theta + \rho) \zeta (1 - \kappa_l^*)},
\]

where \( \kappa_l^* = W_e / L^* \) and \( \theta \equiv \frac{\eta(1 + r_d) - \rho (1 + r_{ior})}{1 + r_q} \). The real quantity of total reserves in the banking system is \( \phi_{s}^* F_t^* = \rho \kappa (\Gamma^* l^* - W_e) \). Since the implied nominal interest rate on deposits is positive, we have that \( \phi_{s}^* M_t = W_h \) and, in equilibrium:

\[
\phi_{s}^* M_t^* + \phi_{s}^* F_t^* = W_h + \rho \kappa (\Gamma^* l^* - W_e),
\]
which tells us that there is a one to one relationship between the total amount of monetary assets and the equilibrium price level (the inverse of $\phi_1$). For a given sequence of $MA_t$, there is a unique sequence of $\phi_1^*$ consistent with a stationary equilibrium. Finally, note that in equilibrium we have $r_k^* > r_d^* > r_{ior}^*$, where the equality between $r_d^*$ and $r_{ior}^*$ can be verified using the first order conditions for the bank’s problem.

Proposition 6 deals with the case when only the reserve and liquidity constraints are binding. The next proposition considers the case when all three constraints (reserves, liquidity, and capital) are binding.

Proposition 7. Let $i_{ior} = 0$. Given a value of $\rho \in (0, 0.5)$, for all $\theta \in (\rho, 1 - \rho)$ there is a threshold $\pi(\rho, \theta) \in (0, 1)$ such that for all $\kappa > \pi(\rho, \theta)$ there exists a unique stationary equilibrium where the banks’ reserve requirements, the bank liquidity constraints, and the bank capital constraints are binding.

Proof. When the capital constraint is binding, we can write banks’ deposits and holdings of securities and reserves as a function of bank capital. Using the constraints in Problem A, we obtain:

$$\phi_1^* f_t^* = \rho \phi_1^* d_t^* = \frac{1 - \kappa}{\kappa} k_b^*,$$

and

$$qs_b^* = \frac{\theta (1 + r_d) - \rho (1 + r_{ior})}{1 + r_d} \frac{1 - \kappa}{\kappa} k_b^*.$$

Now using the balance sheet condition we can express loans as a function of bank capital:

$$l^* = \frac{[(1 - \rho) - \theta] (1 + r_d) (1 - \kappa) + \kappa [(1 + r_d) - \rho (1 + r_{ior})] + \rho (1 + r_{ior})}{(1 + r_d) \kappa}.$$  

Using this expression, we can show that the bank’s objective function can be expressed as $(r_l - r_b^A) l - \chi (l)$ where $r_b^A$ is given by:

$$r_b^A = r_d + \frac{(1 - \kappa) \rho (r_d - r_{ior}) + \kappa (r_k^* - r_d)}{\kappa \omega},$$

and using the bank’s zero profit condition, we conclude that $l = l^*$. Since, from the first order conditions of the bank’s problem, it is evident that $r_k^* > r_d^*$ then we have that the equilibrium rate of return on loans $r_l^*$, the size of the banking system $\Gamma^*$, and the level of capital per bank $k_b^*$ satisfy the following equations:

$$\Gamma^* l^* = \omega \Gamma^* k_b^* = \omega W_e = 1 - G (r_l^*).$$

These derivations determine the real allocation of resources in the economy.24

As before, the real quantity of total reserves in the banking system does not depend on any nominal quantity and is given by $\phi_t^* F_t^r = \frac{1}{\kappa} \omega W_e$. Furthermore, as the implied nominal interest rate on deposits is positive, we have that $\phi_t^* M_t = W_h$ and, in equilibrium:

$$\phi_t^* M A_t = \phi_t^* M_t + \phi_t^* F_t^r = W_h + \rho \frac{1 - \kappa}{\kappa} W_e,$$

so that for any given sequence of $MA_t$ there is a unique sequence of $\phi_t^*$ consistent with a stationary equilibrium.

Propositions 6 and 7 consider the situation when $i_{ior} = 0$. It is relatively straightforward to prove similar results when $i_{ior} < i_d$. The more interesting cases arise when $i_{ior} = i_d > 0$. Proposition 4 considers the situation when $i_{ior} = i_d$ and none of the constraints in the problem of the bank.

---

24Note that $\omega$ is a function of $\kappa$. It is easy to show that, as should be expected, $\omega (\kappa) \rightarrow 1/\kappa^*_f$ as $\kappa \rightarrow \pi(\rho, \theta)$ where both $\kappa_f^*$ and $\pi(\rho, \theta)$ are defined as in Proposition 6. In other words, the equilibrium with a binding capital constraint converges to the equilibrium with a non-binding capital constraint as the coefficient $\kappa$ converges to the threshold $\pi(\rho, \theta)$ from above.
are binding. It is easy to show that when \( i_{ior} = i_d \) the liquidity constraint cannot be the only one binding. Under some conditions, the capital and the liquidity constraints can be binding while the banks are still holding excess reserves. This is in contrast with the result in Proposition 5, which suggested that banks would not hold excess reserves if the capital constraint is binding (and the liquidity constraint is not). The important logic here is that, from the perspective of a bank dealing with a binding liquidity constraint, reserves and securities are equivalent assets when the central bank pays interest on reserves at the market rate (so that \( r_{ior} = r_d = r_g \)). Most importantly, this asset indifference can act as a source of price level indeterminacy even when bank capital is binding in the model.\(^{25}\)

### 5.2 Convenience yield on deposits

As an alternative, I now provide a minimal modification of the model presented in Section 2 that results in the possibility of banks holding securities in equilibrium even if bank liquidity constraints are not binding. The basic idea is to capture the fact that deposits provide a liquidity/transaction service to depositors (as in Van den Heuvel, 2008; Stein, 2012; or Ireland, 2013). When this is the case, depositors will be willing to hold deposits even if the return on deposits is lower than the return on securities. The spread between these two rates of return, then, can compensate banks for the full balance sheet cost of holding securities.

Suppose that there are two goods in the economy, the consumption good introduced in Section 2, and a ‘big-ticket item’ that can only be paid with deposits. I call these goods 1 and 2, respectively. Every period \( t \) each household receives an endowment \( (w^1_h, w^2_h) \) of the goods, and \( s \) units of the one-period securities. As before, households do not consume their own endowment. Suppose that each household has three members. At the beginning of the period, two members of the household leave to sell the endowment of the goods in the market. The remaining member of the household trades securities, makes deposits, pays taxes, and buys good 1 from other households. Once the securities market closes, the household purchases good 2 and pays for those goods with deposits.

The problem of the household is:

\[
\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c^1_t) + v(c^2_t)],
\]

subject to

\[
\begin{align*}
    c^1_t + \phi_1 \tilde{d}_t + \phi_t n_t + q_t s_{ht} &= \phi_t (1 + i_{dt-1}) d_{t-1} + s_{ht-1} + q_t s_t + \phi_t m_{t-1} - \phi_t r_{ht}, \\
    \phi_{2t} c^2_t &= \phi_2 (d_t - x_t), \\
    \phi_t m_t &= w^1_{ht} + \phi_t n_t, \\
    \phi_t d_t &= \phi_{2t} w^2_{ht} + \phi_t x_t, \\
    c^1_t, c^2_t, n_t, x_t &\geq 0,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \phi_{2t} \) is the relative price of good 2 in terms of good 1 and \( \tilde{d}_t \) is the amount of deposits held by the household when banks close in period \( t \). Let us define the benchmark nominal interest rate \( i_t \) as:

\[
1 + i_t = \frac{\phi_t}{\phi_{t+1}} (1 + r_{gt}).
\]

Using the first order conditions for the household’s problem, it is easy to show that whenever \( i_t > 0 \) we have that \( n_t = 0 \). Also, in similar fashion, if \( r_{dt} < r_{gt} \) then \( x_t = 0 \). Finally, the optimal values of \( c^1_t \) and \( c^2_t \) satisfy the following two conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
    -u'(c^1_t) + \frac{1}{\phi_{2t}} v'(c^2_t) &= 0, \\
    -q_t u'(c^1_t) + \beta u'(c_{t+1}^1) &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{25}\)For a related result, see the discussion of Hornstein (2010) in Part 3 of the Appendix.
The market clearing condition for good 2 is $c^g_2 = w^2_{h,t}$. The rest of the model is unchanged from the one presented in Section 2 and analyzed in Sections 3 and 4.

Note that now, even if the return on deposits is lower than the return on securities, we have that $d_t = \phi_2 w^2_{h,t}/\phi_2 > 0$; that is, the household wants to hold deposits to be able to purchase the big-ticket item, good 2. This is in sharp contrast with the equilibrium of the model in the previous sections. To illustrate how the modified model works, I characterize a stationary equilibrium when the central bank is not paying interest on reserves and only the reserve requirements are binding. This equilibrium parallels that in Proposition 1 of Section 4. As in that case, then, I adopt basic stationarity assumptions: Endowments are constant, and monetary assets grow at rate $\gamma$. To simplify the analysis, assume again that $\theta$ and $\xi$ are equal to zero, so that the liquidity constraint is always satisfied. Generalizing the result to positive values for $\theta$ and $\xi$ is straightforward using the same logic as in Part 1 of the Appendix.

Before stating the proposition, I make one extra technical assumption and introduce one extra piece of notation. Assume the utility function $u(c)$ has relative risk aversion strictly lower than one for all $c$ and $u'(c)c \to 0$ as $c \to 0$. Finally, define $L^\omega = 1 - G \left[ \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} + \chi'(l^\ast) \right]$.

**Proposition 8.** Fix $W_e < L^\omega$ and assume that $i_{ior} = 0$. There is an interval $\Omega_{w2}$ of values of $W^2_h$ and a threshold value $\bar{\pi} \in (0,1)$ such that for all $\kappa < \bar{\pi}$ and $W^2_h \in \Omega_{w2}$ there exists a stationary equilibrium where banks hold securities and the banks’ reserve requirement constraint is binding, while the bank capital and bank liquidity constraints are not binding.

*Proof.* Using the household’s problem, we have that $q^* = \beta$ and $r^*_q = (1 - \beta)/\beta$. Also, we have that $\phi^*_2 = u'(W^2_h)/u'(C^*_1)$ where we have used the market clearing condition for good 2 and denote by $C^*_1$ total equilibrium consumption of good 1.

As in Section 4, stationarity implies that $\phi^*_{i+1}/\phi^*_{i} = 1/(1 + \gamma)$ and since $i_{ior} = 0$ we have that $r^*_{ior} = -\gamma/(1 + \gamma)$. These rates of return imply that $n^* = 0$ in the household’s problem and $\phi^* M^*_f = W^1_h$.

Assume now that $S^*_h > 0$ and that the bank capital constraint is not binding. We will verify that this is the case later in the proof. Now, since $r^*_q > r^*_{ior}$, the reserve requirements must be binding and $r^*_k = r^*_f = r^*_q$. Furthermore, we have that $r^*_d = (1 - \rho) r^*_q + \rho r^*_q$ and:

$$r^*_d = (1 - \rho) r^*_q + \rho r^*_q,$$

which implies that $r^*_d < r^*_q$ because $r^*_q$ is negative. From the household’s problem, these rates of return imply that $x^* = 0$ and hence:

$$\phi^*_t D^*_t = \phi^*_2 W^2_h.$$

Given that reserve requirements are binding, $\phi^*_t F^*_t = \rho \phi^*_t D^*_t = \rho \phi^*_2 W^2_h$ and hence

$$\phi^*_t M^*_t = \phi^*_2 M^*_t + \phi^*_t F^*_t = W^1_h + \rho \phi^*_2 W^2_h,$$

which, given values for $MA_t$ for all $t$, uniquely determines a sequence of values for $\phi^*_t$. Using the bank’s zero profit condition we have that $l = l^\ast$, and from the market clearing condition for loans we have $\Gamma^* = (1 - G(\gamma^*))/\Gamma^*$, which implies $L^* = L^\omega$.

Since $r^*_k = r^*_q$, experts are indifferent between holding securities and supplying bank capital. For concreteness, assume that $K^*_e = W_e$ and define $\bar{\pi} = W_e/ (\phi^*_2 W^2_h + W_e) \in (0,1)$ and $\Omega_{w2}$ as follows:

$$\Omega_{w2} = \left\{ W^2_h \in \left[ \frac{W_e}{1 - \rho} < u'(W^2_h) W^2_h < u'(C^*_1) \frac{\beta (S - S_e) + L^* - W_e}{1 - \rho} \right] \right\},$$

30
where it is important to note that $C_1^*$ is independent of $W^2_h$. Given the properties of the function $v(c)$, the set $\Omega_{w^2}$ is non-empty. Aggregating across banks, the balance sheet condition for the banking system is:

$$L^* + q^* S^*_b = (1 - \rho) \phi^*_2 W^2_h + W_e,$$

and when $W^2_h \in \Omega_{w^2}$ we have that $q^* S^*_b > 0$. Finally, when $\kappa < \overline{\pi}$ the bank capital requirement is not binding in equilibrium. This completes the proof.

Note that in this equilibrium of the modified model, the interest rate on deposits gets determined in the solution to the bank’s problem and the quantity of deposits, in the solution to the household’s problem. The opposite was true in the model of Section 2. Aside from this fundamental difference, the analysis of equilibrium is very similar in both models. The point here was to show that a minimal modification based on an idea that is common in the literature (i.e., the convenience yield on deposits) moves the model closer to the data in terms of having banks hold securities on their balance sheets even when the interest rate paid on reserves is below market rates.

As for the situation characterized in Proposition 4, note that once the central bank can pay interest on reserves at market rates and none of the constraints in the bank’s problem are binding, then $r^*_h = r^*_k$ and the household choice of $x^*$ can be positive. Households become indifferent on the margin between holding deposits or securities, and so do banks. For this reason, the basic logic behind Proposition 4 still applies to that case.

6. Conclusions

I have constructed a relatively simple general equilibrium model of a macro economy with a banking system and non-trivial bank balance sheets. The model is consistent with traditional price level determination (Lucas, 1990) when the central bank pays no (or low) interest on reserves. However, when the central bank pays interest on reserves at ‘market’ rates, banks hold excess reserves and the price level can be indeterminate. In other words, there is a disconnect between the total amount of monetary assets issued by the central bank and the value of the equilibrium price level: A higher quantity of monetary assets does not necessarily imply a higher price level.

However, the range of values that the price level may take is linked to the quantity of monetary assets. Hence, not all price levels are consistent with equilibrium for a given quantity of monetary assets. As higher levels of monetary assets are considered, eventually the price level needs to increase to remain in the interval that makes it consistent with equilibrium. These results suggest that it may be possible for a central bank to increase monetary assets for some time without impacting the price level, but that eventually, as monetary assets continue to increase, the price level would need to increase to accommodate the nominal liabilities issued by the central bank that are used for transaction purposes and as reserves in banks’ balance sheets.

The two key elements of the model that drive these results are an endogenous split of total monetary assets between bank reserves and currency in circulation, and the modeling of the explicit potential costs faced by banks from expanding the size of their balance sheets given that reserves can only be held by banks. The model was kept as simple as possible while incorporating these two dimensions that seem essential for understanding the role that bank excess reserves play in the process of price level determination. The analysis in this paper was limited to the non-stochastic stationary equilibrium, for simplicity. However, an extension considering a stochastic version of the model, where central bank policy can be studied in a more systematic way, seems a promising next step on the research agenda pursued in this paper.

Appendix

The appendix has five parts. In the first part, I show that the results in Section 4 can be extended to a situation where the liquidity constraint of banks is considered explicitly. In Part 2, as a complement to Proposition 3, I consider equilibrium when both capital and reserves constraints on
banks are binding even for relatively high interest on reserves. In Part 3, I discuss in detail some of
the related literature. In Part 4, I briefly discuss the case when banks fund lending only with capital
(and no deposits). Finally, in Part 5 I provide additional discussion of U.S. data that is useful to
evaluate the empirical relevance of the results in the model.

Part 1: Bank liquidity demand

In this part of the appendix, I show that the results in Section 4 are robust to considering situations
where \( \theta \) and \( \xi \) are positive. In other words, there is a non-empty set of parameter values for which
the results in Section 4 continue to hold even when \( \theta \) and \( \xi \) are positive and, hence, banks have a
non-negligible liquidity requirement.

For Proposition 1, define \( \bar{\theta}(\rho) \) as the ratio:

\[
\bar{\theta}(\rho) = \frac{\rho (1 + r_{ior})}{1 + r_d}.
\]

Clearly \( \bar{\theta}(\rho) \in (0, 1) \). Now, for each pair \((\rho, \theta)\) define:

\[
\xi(\theta; \rho) = \min \left\{ \frac{[(1 + r_{ior}) \rho - \theta (1 + r_d)]}{(1 - \kappa^*_i)}, 1 \right\}.
\]

When \( \theta < \bar{\theta}(\rho) \), we have that \( \xi(\theta; \rho) > 0 \) and for all \( \xi < \xi(\theta; \rho) \) the bank liquidity constraint is not
binding in equilibrium.

For Proposition 2, define for each triple \((\theta, \rho, \kappa)\) the threshold value:

\[
\tilde{\xi}(\theta; \rho, \kappa) = \min \left\{ \frac{[(1 + r_{ior}) \rho - \theta (1 + r_d)]}{1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)}, 1 \right\}.
\]

Again, when \( \theta < \bar{\theta}(\rho) \) we have that \( \tilde{\xi}(\theta; \rho, \kappa) > 0 \). Using the expressions for reserves and bank capital
to substitute in the liquidity constraint, it is easy to verify that, if \( \theta < \bar{\theta}(\rho) \) and \( \xi < \tilde{\xi}(\theta; \rho, \kappa) \), then
the bank liquidity constraint is not binding.

For Proposition 3, define \( \bar{\xi}(i_{ior}, \kappa) \) as the ratio:

\[
\bar{\xi}(i_{ior}, \kappa) = \frac{(1 + r_{ior}) (\kappa^*_i - \kappa)}{(1 + r_d) (1 - \kappa) \kappa^*_i},
\]

and the threshold value \( \tilde{\xi}(\theta; i_{ior}, \kappa) \) as:

\[
\tilde{\xi}(\theta; i_{ior}, \kappa) = \min \left\{ \frac{1}{\kappa} \left[ (1 + r_{ior}) (\kappa^*_i - \kappa) - \theta (1 + r_d) (1 - \kappa) \kappa^*_i \right], 1 \right\}.
\]

Assuming, as we are, that \( \kappa^*_i < 1 \) (so that banks have positive deposits), when \( \kappa < \pi(i_{ior}, \rho) \) we
have that \( \kappa < \kappa^*_i \) and hence \( \bar{\xi}(i_{ior}, \kappa) > 0 \). Also, when \( \theta < \bar{\xi}(i_{ior}, \kappa) \) we have that \( \tilde{\xi}(\theta; i_{ior}, \kappa) > 0 \).
Hence, for all \( \kappa < \pi(i_{ior}, \rho) \) there is a non-empty set \( \Omega(i_{ior}, \kappa) \) given by:

\[
\Omega(i_{ior}, \kappa) = \left\{ (\theta, \xi) \mid 0 < \theta < \bar{\xi}(i_{ior}, \kappa) \text{ and } 0 < \xi < \tilde{\xi}(\theta; i_{ior}, \kappa) \right\},
\]

such that when \( (\theta, \xi) \in \Omega(i_{ior}, \kappa) \) and \( \kappa < \pi(i_{ior}, \rho) \) the banks’ liquidity constraint is not binding
in the equilibrium of Proposition 3.

For Proposition 4, note that the liquidity constraint is satisfied in equilibrium if

\[
(1/\beta) (q^* S_b^* + \phi^*_i F_i^* - \theta \phi^*_i D_i^*) \geq \xi L^*;
\]

where we have used that \( 1 + r_{ior}^* = 1 + r_d^* = 1/\beta \). Also, in equilibrium \( q^* S_b^* + \phi^*_i F_i^* \geq \rho \phi^*_i D_i^* \) since
holdings of reserves must satisfy the reserve requirement and banks cannot short securities. So, we
have that the liquidity constraint is satisfied whenever:

\[
(1/\beta) (\rho - \theta) \phi^*_i D_i^* \geq \xi L^*.
\]
This expression also tells us that the liquidity constraint will be satisfied for all equilibria if it is satisfied for the equilibrium with minimal level of deposits. Going back to the proof of Proposition 4, the minimal level of deposits in equilibrium is given by \((L^* - W_c) / (1 - \rho)\).

Now, define \(\xi(\theta; \rho, \beta)\) as:
\[
\xi(\theta; \rho, \beta) = \min \left\{ \frac{(1/\beta)(\rho - \theta)(1 - \kappa^*)}{1 - \rho}, 1 \right\},
\]
which is essentially the same threshold defined for Proposition 1 but when \(i_{ior}\) is such that \(1 + r_{ior} = 1 + r_d^* = 1/\beta\). When \(\rho > 0\) and \(\theta < \rho\) we have that \(\xi(\theta; \rho, \beta) > 0\) and for all \(\kappa < \pi(\rho, \beta)\) there is a non-empty set \(\Omega(\rho, \beta)\) given by:
\[
\Omega(\rho, \beta) = \left\{ (\theta, \xi) \mid 0 < \theta < \rho \text{ and } 0 < \xi < \xi(\theta; \rho, \beta) \right\},
\]
such that when \((\theta, \xi) \in \Omega(\rho, \beta)\) and \(\kappa < \pi(\rho, \beta)\) the banks’ liquidity constraint is not binding in the equilibria of Proposition 4.

For Proposition 5, define the threshold value \(\bar{\xi}(\theta; \rho, \kappa, \beta)\) as:
\[
\bar{\xi}(\theta; \rho, \kappa, \beta) = \min \left\{ \frac{(1/\beta)(\rho - \theta)(1 - \kappa)}{1 - \rho(1 - \kappa)}, 1 \right\},
\]
which is essentially the same threshold defined for Proposition 2 but when \(i_{ior}\) is such that \(1 + r_{ior} = 1 + r_d^* = 1/\beta\). Again, then, when \(\rho > 0\) and \(\kappa > \pi(\rho, \beta)\) we have that there is a non-empty set \(\Omega(\rho, \kappa, \beta)\) given by:
\[
\Omega(\rho, \kappa, \beta) = \left\{ (\theta, \xi) \mid 0 < \theta < \rho \text{ and } 0 < \xi < \bar{\xi}(\theta; \rho, \kappa, \beta) \right\},
\]
such that when \((\theta, \xi) \in \Omega(\rho, \kappa, \beta)\) and \(\kappa < \pi(\rho, \beta)\) the banks’ liquidity constraint is not binding in the equilibrium of Proposition 5.

**Part 2: Binding capital and reserve requirements with high interest on reserves**

Consider the case when the central bank is paying \(i_{ior} > i_d\) but \(\kappa > \pi(i_{ior}, \rho)\), where the threshold value \(\pi(i_{ior}, \rho)\) was defined in Proposition 3. Suppose the liquidity constraint is not binding. Then, the equilibrium in this case is similar to that described in Proposition 2. First note that we still have \(1 + r_q^* = 1 + r_d^* = 1/\beta\) and, since by Lemma 3 the capital constraint is binding, from the bank’s and the experts’ problems we have that \(S^*_q = S^*_e = 0\). Hence, \(K^*_e = W_c\). Also using the bank balance sheet constraint and the binding capital and reserves constraints, we have that \(\phi^*_e F^*_e = \rho \phi^*_d D^*_d = \rho ((1 - \kappa) / \kappa) W_c\) and \(L^* = ((1 - \rho (1 - \kappa)) / \kappa) W_c\). Now, as in Proposition 2, define the weighted average of rates of return \(r_b\) as follows:
\[
r_b = \frac{1 - \kappa}{1 - \rho(1 - \kappa)} r_d - \frac{\rho (1 - \kappa)}{1 - \rho(1 - \kappa)} r_{ior} + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho(1 - \kappa)} r_k.
\]
The objective of the bank can then be written as \((r_l - r_b)I - \chi (l)\). Taking first order condition with respect to \(l\) and using the zero profit condition, we have that the optimal value of \(l = l^*\) as defined at the beginning of Section 4. Using the market clearing condition for bank capital and for loans, we have that:
\[
W_c = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho(1 - \kappa)} \Gamma^* l^* = \frac{\kappa}{1 - \rho(1 - \kappa)} \left[ 1 - G(r_i^*) \right],
\]
which can be used to determine the equilibrium level of \(r_l^*\) and \(\Gamma^*\). Since \(r_b^* = r_l^* - \chi (l^*)\), we can use the definition of \(r_b\) to determine the equilibrium level of \(r_b^*\). By definition, the capital and reserves constraints hold with equality. Following the same logic as in Part 1 of this Appendix, we can determine threshold values for \(\theta\) and \(\xi\) so that the liquidity constraint is not binding. The rest of the equilibrium variables are easily derived from simple substitution.
Part 3: A more detailed discussion of some related literature

Sargent and Wallace (1975). The paper is considered the first to demonstrate price level indeterminacy under rational expectations when the monetary authority attempts to implement policy by following an interest rate rule. In contrast, in my model the monetary authority is not conducting monetary policy by following an interest rate rule. In the stationary equilibrium, policy determines the growth rate of monetary assets, set at a fixed number \( \gamma \). In Sargent and Wallace’s (1975) model, if the monetary authority targets the quantity of money in the economy, then the price level is uniquely determined. Hence, the type of indeterminacy that I study is clearly very different than the one discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1975).

In Proposition 4, the monetary authority pays interest on reserves at market rates. That is, in equilibrium, both the “market rate” and the rate of interest paid on reserves are the same. However, the key distinction is that the monetary authority has to pay the rate determined in the market. It does not control the market rate once the growth of monetary assets has been chosen.

Sargent and Wallace set up a loglinear model with three key equations: a Lucas supply curve, an aggregate demand curve (which they call an “IS curve”) and a money demand equation (which they call an “LM” curve). For the purpose of understanding the indeterminacy result, the model can be simplified significantly. In the notation of this paper, consider the following three-equations model:

\[
\begin{align*}
y_t &= g(r_t), \\
\phi_t M_A &= h(y_t, \iota_t),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( y_t \) is output at time \( t \), \( r_t \) is the real rate of interest, and \( \iota_t \) is the nominal rate of interest. Furthermore, assume that:

\[
1 + r_t = (\phi_{t+1}/\phi_t)(1 + \iota_t).
\]

This “Fisher” equation is effectively an arbitrage equation between real and nominal returns that would be familiar to the reader since it was repeatedly used in the main body of this paper.

Note that the real interest rate gets determined by the equation \( g(r) = y \). When the monetary authority targets a fixed nominal interest rate \( \iota \) the Fisher equation pins down the growth rate of prices and the money demand equation determines the growth rate of monetary assets. However, there is nothing that pins down the level of \( \phi \) and \( M_A \) in the model. There is a continuum of possible combinations of \( \phi_0 \) and \( M_A_0 \) consistent with that policy.

On the other hand, note that once the monetary authority fixes a sequence for \( M_A \), as I do in this paper, the nominal interest rate and the price level are uniquely determine. My paper, hence, identifies a distinct indeterminacy that originates in the payment of interest on reserves at “market” rates and the endogenous split of reserves and currency.

Sargent and Wallace (1985). In this paper, Sargent and Wallace use a two-period-lived overlapping generations model to study the effects of paying interest on reserves on equilibrium outcomes. They consolidate the private sector and ignore the currency component of the monetary base, so all base money earns interest. As a consequence, they do not discuss the endogenous split between currency and reserves, which is an important element in my analysis. The Sargent-Wallace result has a similar flavor as the result in Proposition 4 in this paper in the sense that they find that when the monetary authority pays interest on reserves at the market rate, there is a continuum of stationary equilibria, each with a different price level. An important difference, however, is that in the Sargent and Wallace’s model the real rate of interest is not pinned down by the parameters of the model and it is different across the multiple equilibria. In Proposition 4 of the present paper, the (gross) real rate is given by \( 1/\beta \) in all the possible equilibria.

\footnote{Sargent and Wallace are interested in optimal monetary policy when the economy is subject to shocks. However, the stochastic aspect of the economy is not crucial for the price-level indeterminacy issue.}

\footnote{This is an important equation because it is where rational expectations about the future value of the price level come into play. Sargent and Wallace show that under adaptive expectations the price level is determinate.}
It is important to realize that in Sargent and Wallace’s model the main role of money is as a store of value (from one period to the next). In the model of this paper, money plays a role in transactions, instead. The idea behind this result of Sargent and Wallace can be explained by using a very stripped-down description of their model. Basically, the model is a standard overlapping generations endowment economy with money. Agents solve a two-period intertemporal optimization problem by deciding an amount of real savings \( s(r, \tau) \) as a function of the real interest rate and endowments net of taxes, \( \tau \). Call \( i_t \) the nominal interest rate paid on cash (Sargent and Wallace’s interest on reserves), \( \phi_t \) the inverse of the price level at time \( t \), and \( MA \) the amount of monetary assets in the economy (constant over time). We have that in equilibrium the following equations must hold:

\[
\begin{align*}
  s(r_t, \tau_t) &= \phi_t MA, \\
  1 + r_t &= \left( \frac{\phi_{t+1}}{\phi_t} \right) (1 + i_t), \text{ and} \\
  \phi_{t+1} i_t MA &= \tau_t,
\end{align*}
\]

for all \( t \), where the last equation is the budget constraint of the monetary authority and the first equation is the standard money market clearing equation in monetary overlapping generations models. The second equation is again the interest-arbitrage equation. In a stationary equilibrium, this system simplifies to:

\[
\begin{align*}
  s(r, \tau) &= \phi_0 MA, \\
  r &= i, \text{ and} \\
  \phi_0 i MA &= \tau,
\end{align*}
\]

which, after substitutions, can be reduced to \( rs(r, \tau) = \tau \). This is one equation in two unknowns and under standard assumptions Sargent and Wallace show that there is a continuum of solutions \((r, \tau)\). In turn, for each \((r, \tau)\) there is a different equilibrium value of \( \phi_0 \).

When the monetary authority does not pay interests on reserves \( i = 0 \) and \( \tau = 0 \). Furthermore, by arbitrage, we also have that \( r = 0 \). In such a situation, under standard assumptions, there is a unique stationary monetary equilibrium with a constant price level \( \phi_0 \) that satisfies \( s(0, 0) = \phi_0 MA \). This is a well-known result in monetary theory. In particular, what is required for the existence of a monetary equilibrium is that endowments are such that \( s(0, 0) > 0 \).

Sargent and Wallace’s result is a departure from this traditional price level determination mechanism in the monetary overlapping generations model. A way to understand their result is to think about the policy setting process implicit in their formulation. Note that if the monetary authority chooses a value of the interest on reserves, then the stationary equilibrium conditional on that value of the interest rate, would be unique. However, the idea behind the multiplicity is that the monetary authority chooses the nominal interest rate on reserves to make it equal to whatever rate is observed in the market. So, if the rate in the market is \( r_1 \), then the monetary authority would set \( i = r_1 \); and if the rate in the market is \( r_2 \neq r_1 \), then the monetary authority would choose a different interest on reserves \( (i = r_2) \), which would validate the different real rate of interest \( r_2 \). In a sense, the indeterminacy is the result of the endogeneity of policy. The monetary authority is “chasing” the market, making policy endogenous and the equilibrium indeterminate. This is not the same source of multiplicity as in Proposition 4 of this paper. The nominal and the real interest rates are constant across all the equilibria in Proposition 4.

An important aspect of Sargent and Wallace’s analysis is that by changing the nominal interest rate on reserves the monetary authority can validate any given equilibrium real interest rate (in a continuum). In a monetary equilibrium of Sargent and Wallace’s model, money cannot be dominated in rate of return and, by changing the return on money, the monetary authority changes the real return on savings. By contrast, in the model in this paper, the real rate faced by consumers is independent of policy.

Note that if the monetary authority in the Sargent and Wallace’s model were to exogenously set a fix value of \( \tau \), then, again, the stationary equilibrium would be unique. Taxes are endogenous in
their model. This is a point of contact with the model in this paper, where taxes also are assumed to accommodate endogenously to finance the payment of interest on reserves required by the different equilibria. Perhaps this aspect of the model suggests that my results and those of Sargent and Wallace are not too far apart at this fundamental level.

Hornstein (2010). Following Canzoneri et al. (2008), Hornstein (2010) studies a macroeconomic model with a banking system that may hold securities and reserves in the process of fulfilling its function. Banks take deposits from households and give loans to households that need them to buy the so-called “credit goods.” Banks need to hold liquidity to service their deposits and both government bonds and reserves are perfect substitutes as a source of liquidity. Using the notation in this paper, Hornstein’s liquidity constraint can be re-stated as follows: each bank must satisfy a technological constraint $s_t + \phi_{t+1}f_t = \theta \phi_{t+1}d_t$ with $\theta < 1$. Banks are also subject to a reserve requirement constraint, $f_t \geq \rho d_t$ with $\rho < \theta$. There is no bank capital constraint in Hornstein’s model and, as a result, bank capital plays no role.

Hornstein’s model can be interpreted as a particular case of the model in this paper when $\kappa = 0$ and $\xi = 0$. Note, however, that the liquidity constraint is further simplified relative to the one being used in this paper. The more complex specification seems more amenable to the interpretation given it here but this is not a fundamental distinction between the models of the two papers.

The model in Hornstein’s paper has many features in common with the one studied in this paper. However, the focus of his analysis is different. Hornstein studies the dynamic stability properties of the steady state under the kind of monetary and fiscal policy rules analyzed by Leeper (1991). In that sense, Hornstein’s framework is in the Neo-Wicksellian tradition, which is interested in macroeconomic behavior when the monetary authority is following an interest rate rule. Determinacy in Hornstein’s analysis refers to the path of inflation and nominal interest rates, but there is no discussion of the level of equilibrium prices.

As Hornstein shows, it is still the case in his model that when the interest rate on reserves is equal to the return on government bonds, the equilibrium quantity of reserves is indeterminate in a range that depends on the parameters $\theta$ and $\rho$. More formally, in the notation of this paper, when $i_{for,t} = i_{g,t}$, Hornstein shows that $f_t \in [\rho d_t, \theta d_t]$. It is also the case in Hornstein’s model that households have a well-defined demand for cash. In particular, Hornstein uses a money-in-the-utility-function specification and the household demand for cash is given by:

$$\phi_t m_t = \gamma_m \frac{i_t}{i_t - c_t},$$

where $\gamma_m$ is a parameter in the utility function. Since there is a representative bank and a representative household, we have that $f_t = F_t$ and $m_t = M_t$. Just as in the model of this paper, $M_t + F_t = MA_t$ in equilibrium. Note then that for a given value of $MA_t$, changes in $F_t$ within the interval $[\rho D_t, \theta D_t]$ will be associated with changes in $M_t$ that would be reflected in different values of $\phi_t$ to the extent that aggregate consumption and the nominal interest rate remain invariant to changes in the composition of the monetary aggregate.

From this logic I conclude that for a given level of monetary aggregates there is, in fact, a continuum of steady state equilibria in Hornstein’s model that can be indexed by the price level. It is true, however, that the set of variables that are the focus of study in Hornstein’s model are invariant across these multiple steady states and the stability properties described in Hornstein’s paper are the relevant ones when considering the behavior of the real economy under a policy regime that is committed to following Leeper-like interest rate and fiscal rules.

The discussion about the limits on the ability of the central bank to change the monetary aggregate without a necessary adjustment to the price level does not arise in the context of policy based on interest rate rules. In such a setting the monetary aggregates adjust to whatever values

---

28 Toward the end of his article, Hornstein discusses the problems that arise when the demand for government bonds is indeterminate, given that the fiscal policy rule is specified as taxes contingent on government bond demand. He proposes some simple solutions to this problem and hints at some of the issues discussed here (see, for example, footnote 17 in Hornstein, 2010).
are consistent with maintaining the targeted levels of the interest rate and long-run inflation. In consequence, the fact that more than one value of the monetary aggregate is consistent with the policy target is not consequential for the Neo-Wicksellian approach to monetary policy.

Williamson (2012). Williamson studies a model in the tradition of the money-search literature. The economy is populated by two groups of agents: buyers and sellers. Each period, agents interact in two consecutive markets. First, agents trade in a centralized market. At the end of centralized trading, agents find out if they will be in a monitored or in a non-monitored bilateral match later in the period during the decentralized-trading phase. Each buyer is randomly matched with a seller during decentralized trading, but only a (fixed) proportion of those buyers are in a monitored match. Each of the rest of the buyers form part in non-monitored bilateral matches.

There are two assets in the economy: fiat money and interest-bearing government bonds. Buyers in decentralized non-monitored matches pay sellers using fiat money. During the centralized market, agents can form coalitions that resemble banks. Agents make deposits in banks and banks make a portfolio decision and issue claims that buyers can later use in monitored decentralized matches to pay to sellers in exchange for goods. When the real return on bonds is higher than the real return on money, banks provide insurance to agents by pooling the risk that they will end up in a non-monitored match where they need to make payments using money. Since the proportion of non-monitored matches is a known fixed (exogenous) parameter, banks can choose the portfolio of money and bonds so as to have enough money to distribute to all buyers in non-monitored matches.

Williamson studies several possible equilibrium configurations. For example, it is possible in the model to have a stationary equilibrium where both bonds and money have a real return that is lower than the inverse of the discount factor. In this situation, the nominal interest rate is equal to zero. Williamson calls this a “liquidity trap.” Agents are willing to hold assets and money (or claims to those assets in banks) because both money and bonds are useful for making transactions in the decentralized market. Interestingly, since money and bonds have the same real rate of return, banks may hold reserves (in the form of currency) in this equilibrium. All these reserves constitute “excess reserves,” since Williamson does not consider reserve requirements being imposed on banks.

Whenever the nominal interest rate is positive, banks choose to hold only bonds and no currency. To consider the case of “excess reserves,” Williamson extends the analysis to a situation where the monetary authority pays interest on reserves at the level of interest paid by government bonds (Williamson, 2012, p. 2584). In other words, Williamson focuses on the case when the monetary authority pays interest on reserves at “market rates,” according to the language I have used in this paper (see Propositions 4 and 5).

Just as I did here, Williamson considers the “realistic” case in which the monetary authority issues a total amount of monetary assets and the split between currency and bank-reserves is determined endogenously in equilibrium. In Williamson’s economy, under certain conditions, interest-bearing assets (bonds and reserves) play a transactions role. This feature can influence substantially the way the economy works. However, when interest-bearing assets are plentiful (so that their marginal contribution to the execution of transactions in monitored matches is nil) the economy studied by Williamson share several properties with the one studied in this paper.

In particular, with plentiful interest-bearing assets and a real interest rate equal to the inverse of the discount factor, the price level in the economy is indeterminate and can take any value in a continuum. Williamson does not discuss this case in detail. He, instead, chooses to focus on the case when interest-bearing assets are not plentiful, showing that changes in the interest on reserves can have real effects in the economy and can move the price level in determinate ways. This result, in fact, aligns well with the finding of this paper. The transaction role of interest-bearing assets (including reserves) pins down the real value of those assets in equilibrium and, hence, the real value.

---

29 The timing is as follows: first, agents produce and consume the centralized-market good and make deposits in banks. After that, agents find out if they will be in a monitored or non-monitored match (after all production and consumption of centralized-market goods has been made). Finally, agents get to interact one more time with the bank to withdraw cash if they need to and the centralized-market sub-period ends.

30 Williamson does not consider a limit on banks’ balance sheets, such as that induced by capital requirements in my model. For that reason, there is no natural bound on the value of equilibrium real reserves in Williamson’s model.
of reserves (given the amount of outstanding government bonds). In Williamson’s model, just as in
the model of this paper, when the real value of reserves is pinned down in equilibrium, price-level
indeterminacy is no longer an issue.

Martin, McAndrews, Skeie (2013). The authors study a two-period model of an economy with
many similarities to the one presented here but with some important differences. There is a set
of households, a set of firms, and a set of banks. Banks take deposits from households, make loans to
firms, and do not hold bank capital. There is also a central bank that pays interest on reserves, yet
banks do not face a reserve requirement. Banks have a (convex) cost of issuing deposits, instead of
a cost of providing loans as is assumed in this paper (this difference does not seem critical, though).

Martin, McAndrews, and Skeie normalize the initial price level to be equal to unity, so they are
not able to consider the type of price level indeterminacy that is the main subject of this paper
(Proposition 4). Furthermore, in Martin, McAndrews, and Skeie’s model, there is no endogenous
split between reserves and currency. The central bank can choose the initial quantity of reserves
in the banking system. Notice that since the price level is equal to unity in the initial period this
implies that by choosing the nominal quantity of reserves, the central bank also chooses the real
quantity of reserves. As a consequence, Martin, McAndrews, and Skeie need to limit the size of the
initial nominal reserves set by the central bank to be consistent with feasibility (see their assumption
A2). In contrast, in the model of this paper, since the price level is fully endogenous, I do not need
to place any restriction on nominal quantities.

In Martin, McAndrews, and Skeie’s model, the equilibrium return on bank loans is always equal
to the interest paid on reserves. In the case when the cost for banks of holding deposits is set to zero
(the frictionless model), total bank lending is exogenous (given the amount of government bonds
in the economy) and the inflation rate adjusts to equalize the nominal return on loans with the
nominal interest rate paid on reserves. For this reason, inflation moves one to one with changes
in the interest rate on reserves and there is no direct link between monetary assets and prices (or
inflation). Furthermore, the rate of return on deposits is also equal to the rate of return on reserves.

The main result from the Martin-McAndrews-Skeie model is that the total amount of reserves
provided by the central bank does not influence equilibrium bank lending. In other words, the
quantity of bank lending is independent of the quantity of bank reserves in equilibrium. This is a
strong result that cannot be confirmed using the model of this paper: While it is the case that the
central bank cannot influence steady-state lending by changing the amount of monetary assets that
it issues, in some situations there is an equilibrium correlation between total reserves and total loans
(see, for example, Proposition 1). Recall, however, that in the model of this paper both lending and
reserves are endogenously and jointly determined, so there is no obvious way in which one can be
said to be causing the other.

When the cost of holding deposits is positive in the Martin-McAndrews-Skeie model, the interest
rate on deposits can be different from (and lower than) the rate of return on reserves and loans.
However, in this situation banks do not hold bonds. This is because households hold both deposits
and bonds in equilibrium and the rates of return on these two investments need to be equalized in
equilibrium, and they do at a lower level than the return on other bank assets. In this way, the
model with costly deposits works very differently from the model of convenience yield on deposits
studied in Section 5.

With a moderate cost of holding deposits and moderate levels of reserves, households in Martin,
McAndrews, and Skeie’s model absorb the changes in the cost of holding deposits induced by the
changes in total deposits that result from changes in total reserves. As a consequence, bank lending
remains unchanged. However, when the cost of holding deposits is high, an increase in total reserves
can result in lower equilibrium levels of bank lending. This is because households have access to
a storage technology that puts a lower bound in the equilibrium return on deposits. Increases in
reserves do not result in one-to-one increases in deposits and hence, loans have to fall to maintain
consistency with the balance sheet condition of banks.

The way reserves influence outcomes in the Martin-McAndrews-Skeie model is, hence, very dif-
ferent from the way reserves interact with other variables in the model studied in this paper. In all
the propositions in this paper, with the exception of Proposition 4, the real value of total reserves is endogenously determined and cannot be freely manipulated by the central bank. In Proposition 4, the central bank could in principle induce a change in the real quantity of reserves outstanding, but such a change would be fully accommodated by a change in total deposits and/or holdings of securities by banks, without changing total bank lending. This is very different from what happens in Martin, McAndrews, and Skeie’s model, where the central bank has full control over the real quantity of reserves and by manipulating this quantity can induce changes in total bank lending.\footnote{Ireland assumes a CES technology for the production of deposits, with reserves and labor as inputs. As a result, when the opportunity cost of holding reserves goes to zero, the demand for reserves grows without bound. To obtain a bounded demand for reserves, Ireland introduces a small labor cost of managing reserves, which puts a positive lower bound on the opportunity cost of holding reserves.}

Ireland (2014). Ireland studies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a banking system where currency and bank reserves serve distinct functions and the central bank is able to pay interest on reserves. Households combine currency and bank deposits to economize on shopping time. Banks combine reserves and labor to “create” (produce) deposits. Both the shopping time technology used by households and the deposit production technology used by banks are such that there is imperfect substitutability between cash and deposits in the first case, and reserves and labor in the second case.\footnote{Ireland assumes a CES technology for the production of deposits, with reserves and labor as inputs. As a result, when the opportunity cost of holding reserves goes to zero, the demand for reserves grows without bound. To obtain a bounded demand for reserves, Ireland introduces a small labor cost of managing reserves, which puts a positive lower bound on the opportunity cost of holding reserves.} These assumptions imply that there is a well-defined demand function for deposits (and currency) and a well-defined demand function for reserves even when reserves earn the “market” interest rate paid by other securities such as bonds. For given values of the various rates of return, the model pins down the real value of all quantities (reserves, deposits, wages, loans, labor allocation, etc.). In a steady state, any change in the quantity of monetary assets results in a proportional change in the price level and leaves all real quantities unchanged. While there are no reserve requirements in Ireland’s model, reserves (not liquidity more generally) play a unique role in the production of deposits, and it is never the case that banks are indifferent between holding different levels of reserves or bonds (securities). For this reason, the real quantity of reserves is uniquely pinned down in equilibrium, and a result like the one presented in Proposition 4 of this paper cannot be proved for Ireland’s model. Furthermore, Ireland does not study the role of bank capital, an important element in the logic behind Corollary 4.2 in this paper.

Ireland uses his model to study the dynamic response of the economy to various shocks when the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule for setting the market interest rate and firms face a quadratic cost of adjusting prices. The central bank also follows a rule for setting the interest on reserves. Since the market rate enters the interest on reserves rule, effectively, the central bank can be viewed as setting the spread between the market rate and the interest on reserves. Ireland uses the implied behavior of monetary aggregates to calibrate parameters of the technology for production of monetary services. The technological relationship between reserves and labor in the production of deposits is harder to calibrate, and Ireland conjectures parameter values and later performs sensitivity analysis. Ireland concludes that paying interest on reserves has important effects on the levels of reserves and other monetary assets, but not on output and inflation. Paying interest on reserves in Ireland’s model allows the central bank to influence the real quantity of reserves, but it is always the case that any monetary policy action intended to decrease the price level in the long run would require a proportional reduction in the nominal supply of reserves. Breaking this tight relationship between the price level and the nominal value of monetary aggregates (present in Ireland’s model and most of the existing alternatives) is one of the main objective of this paper (see Proposition 4).

Part 4: All-capital banks

Consider the case when $\xi$ and $\theta$ are equal to zero. Then, the liquidity constraint is not binding in equilibrium. As it will become clear later, if $\xi$ and $\theta$ are positive, then having banks fully financed with capital requires even higher values of the endowment of bank experts. Recall that the balance sheet identity for the banking system implies that $L^* + q^* S_t^* + \phi_t^* F_t^* = \phi_t^* D_t^* + K_t^*$, and the reserves constraint requires $\phi_t^* F_t^* \geq \rho \phi_t^* D_t^*$. Using these expressions, we can show that if $W_c < L^*$, then...
banks will need deposits to fund their operations. To see this, suppose not. Suppose banks have no deposits. Then, we have:

\[ L^* + q^* S^*_h + \phi^*_i F^*_t \geq L^* > W_e \geq K^*_e, \]

which contradicts the balance sheet condition for banks with no deposits. Then, to have an all-capital bank, we need \( W_e \geq L^* \). Note that if banks are fully funded with capital, then the capital constraint will not be binding. Furthermore, since deposits are equal to zero, banks can choose to hold no reserves without violating the reserve requirement. Similarly, since the liquidity constraint is not binding, banks can hold no securities. In such a situation, total bank assets equal total loans \( L^* \) and as long as \( W_e \geq L^* \) it is feasible to have a banking system financed only with bank capital.

Define the following reference interest rate:

\[ \bar{r} \equiv \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} + \chi' (l^*) \cdot \]

Now we can show that when the central bank pays no interest on reserves and \( W_e \geq 1 - G (\bar{r}) \), the equilibrium has banks fully funded with bank capital.

**Proposition A1.** Let \( \xi = \theta = 0 \), \( W_e \geq 1 - G (\bar{r}) \), and \( i_{i*} = 0 \). Given a value of \( \rho \in (0, 1) \) there exists a stationary equilibrium where banks hold no deposits or reserves and loans are fully funded with bank capital.

**Proof.** In a stationary equilibrium, if the central bank pays no interest on reserve, we have that \( 1 + r^*_{i*} = 1 / (1 + \gamma) \leq 1 \). Furthermore, we have that if deposits were positive, then \( 1 + r^*_{d} = 1 + r^*_{k} = 1 / \beta \) (from the households’ problem). From the bank experts’ problem, we have that \( 1 + r^*_{e} \geq 1 / \beta \).

Assume now that the capital constraint is not binding. We will confirm this later. Then, we have that \( 1 + r^*_{e} = 1 / \beta \). Going back to the bank’s problem, when the capital constraint is not binding, the bank solves the following problem:

\[
\max (r^*_i - r^*_k) l_j + (r^*_d - r^*_k) q s_j + (r^*_i - r^*_k) \phi_t f_t - (r^*_d - r^*_k) \phi_t d_t - (r^*_f - r^*_d) \phi_t b^f_t - \chi (l_j),
\]

subject to

\[ \phi_t f_t \geq \rho \phi_t d_t \geq 0. \]

Given the equilibrium rates of return postulated above, a direct implication of the bank’s first order condition with respect to \( f_t \) is that the reserve requirement must be binding. The first order condition with respect to deposits is:

\[ (r^*_{i*} - r^*_k) \rho - (r^*_d - r^*_k) \leq 0, \]

which implies that deposits must be equal to zero (if deposits were not equal to zero, the first order condition would have to hold with equality and from the household problem we have to have that \( 1 + r^*_d = 1 / \beta \), which produces a contradiction). Since \( r^*_d = r^*_k \), the banks are indifferent regarding their holdings of securities. The banking system balance sheet condition implies that \( L^* + q^* S^*_h = K^*_e \). The bank’s first order condition with respect to loans, combined with the zero profit condition for banks, gives us that \( l = l^* \) and \( r^*_t = \bar{r} \). The loan market equilibrium implies that \( L^* = 1 - G (\bar{r}) \leq W_e \).

Hence, for all values of \( S^*_h \) such that \( K^*_e \leq W_e \) we have that the market for bank capital clears at the rate \( r^*_k \) and the bank capital constraint is not binding since \( L^* + q^* S^*_h = K^*_e > \kappa (L^* + q^* S^*_h) \).

While this proposition indicates that there is nothing in the model inconsistent with having banks funding their operations only with bank capital, it is also clear from the conditions involved that the case of all-capital banks is unlikely to be empirically relevant. In particular, it has to be the case that expertise on banking issues is so abundant in the economy that banks can fund all their lending using the resources directly available to this specialized group of agents.
Part 5: Some extra data

The value of $\rho$. Calculating the equivalent of the reserve ratio $\rho$ in the data is delicate. In the United States only transaction accounts are subject to reserve requirements. Reserve requirements are also non-linear with a minimum amount not subject to requirements and two segments: For the amount in transaction accounts between $13.3$ million and $89.0$ million, the requirement is 3 percent; and for amounts larger than $89.0$ million, the requirement is 10 percent. In the model, there is only one type of deposit accounts. We could think that “producing” deposits requires a technologically given composition of some transaction accounts and some non-transaction accounts. In the data, the composition of deposits has been shifting significantly in the last couple of decades away from transaction accounts and toward non-transaction accounts (see Figure A1). In the proposed interpretation, one can say that the technology for producing deposits has been shifting over time. Reserve requirements, on the other hand, have not changed significantly. This is reflected in the ratio of required reserves over transaction account deposits in Figure A2. If we consider $\rho$ to be the amount of reserves needed to produce deposits, then the value of $\rho$ has been trending down, due to the technological shift in the production technology for deposits (see Figure A3).

![Figure A1](image1)

![Figure A2](image2)

![Figure A3](image3)

*Banks liquid assets.* A large proportion of the securities held by banks are Treasury and Agency
securities (see Figure A4). Going back to Figure 2 in the Introduction, we see that total securities as a proportion of assets remained fairly stable during the period when reserves increased significantly (starting in 2008). At the same time, the proportion of Treasury and Agency securities in total securities was also relatively stable during that period. From this I conclude that there is not strong evidence of reserves substituting for other liquid assets in banks’ balance sheets. See also re-enforcing evidence in Ennis and Wolman (2014).

Figure A4

U.S. Inflation. We see in Figure A5 that after the 2008 recession, inflation was relatively stable even though there were periods between 2010 and 2013 when reserves were growing rapidly (see Figure 9).

Figure A5
Rates of return. This is a detailed version of Figure 10, zooming in on values from the beginning of 2009 to the end of 2013 to show better the behavior of short-term rates in the U.S. during the period of large excess reserves.

Figure A6
References


